


• AS WE SEE IT •

RENÉ VIVIANI



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AS WE SEE IT

By
RENÉ VIVIANI
FORMER PREMIER OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

English Translation by
THOMAS R. YBARRA



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CHAPTER I

WHENCE COMES WILLIAM, WAR LORD OF EUROPE?

I TAKE up my pen after having, naturally, read the *Memoirs* of the Emperor with care. I am going to answer them, passing over what is negligible therein; my desire is to make a rapid and exact synthesis, not a table of contents. Whenever necessary, I shall make a résumé of the outstanding parts of these *Memoirs*, at which, in most cases, truth will fling a denial. I shall endeavor to follow, amid contradictions, half avowals and inexplicable silences, the thread of these pages, which are mostly lacking in the proofs that were promised and expected.

I shall point out the frightful mental confusion, the even more frightful blindness, and the contempt with which the ex-Emperor affirms and writes—certainly as late as 1921, possibly in 1922—without paying the slightest heed to the plentiful documents which history has harvested in order to place them at the feet of Justice.

The book of the Emperor seems as if it had been written in 1918, at the time of his fall and flight, when we did not know about most of the facts and telegrams which he, the Emperor, knew full well,

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since he had commented upon them in notes which were at times filthy.

OMISSIONS ARE ASTOUNDING

What hopes are harbored by this writer, who seems to handle the pen even worse than the sword? He knows nothing of the books of certain Germans whose consciences made them courageous; of the 1919 revelations of the new government of the Reich, which have substituted for the first White Book, which contained thirty-six documents, a White Book composed of five hundred and twenty-one documents; of the Bavarian revelations; of the revelations of the Austrian Red Book. He passes over in silence the terrible dispatches of the Austrian ambassador at Berlin and makes statements as if these dispatches had never existed. Yet he knows about these things as well as we do; in fact, he knows even more about them than we, since, undoubtedly, important documents were spirited away from the Imperial Palace at the very moment in 1918 when the august and heroic Emperor assured his own safety by means of a headlong flight.

Such are the *Memoirs*.

Add to this the untiring repetitions of German propaganda, statements which contradict one another on every page, plain lies—and you will have an exact idea, before putting your hands upon it, of the imperial production to which these rapidly written pages, based upon documents and upon proofs, will now seek to reply.

WHENCE COMES WILLIAM?

As is quite easily understandable, the Emperor has harked back, in his *Memoirs*, to the first years of his youth, when—unfortunately for the world!—definitive responsibility was placed in his hands. We may follow him back to those days, but hurriedly, since it is not possible to check his statements. Moreover, the useful task which we have set ourselves in writing these pages cannot be confined solely to this part of the *Memoirs*, which, interesting as it might have been in normal times, has been obliterated by the great drama which, after having been staged by the Emperor, was then presided over by him. Everything, even what concerns the most exalted personage, is blunted and diminished when placed beside the monstrous realities of the war. And is even the din caused by the collapse of a throne and the downfall of a dynasty in the midst of general contempt such as to ring long in human ears, when it sounds simultaneously with the sinister tumult of armies on the march, armies hurling themselves on the foe, armies that fall, with victors and vanquished inextricably mixed, in a hecatomb spread over four years?

Nevertheless, every stone helps in building a building, every investigation in revealing truth.

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Whence, then, comes the man who has led the world to the greatest disaster in history, who would have hurled it into the abyss if immortal generations had not stood up in answer to the appeal to

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justice? Everybody—the most humble as well as the greatest, the purest as well as the most wretched, and, particularly, he whose power for evil has distinguished him from others—may deserve an investigation into his past and even an investigation reaching higher and further—probing into the annals of the race to which he belongs, his antecedents, his forbears. By what mysterious processes was this soul formed? What individuals composed the species to which he belonged and were his predecessors? What part was played by flaws and good points, glories and infamies? What rôle was played, after the birth and first and innocent education of the child, by the education given the youth and the grown man? What rôle was played by contact, by external teaching? One may investigate all this—one ought, in fact, to do so—no matter whether such a retrospective investigation help or hurt him who is its object.

Whence came the man who to-day, after the disaster which he brought about, parades his haughty pride in the restricted refuge allowed him by a hospitality that is scandalous?

FORMIDABLE HOHENZOLLERN CRADLE

A formidable castle, a citadel, palace, and prison, massive and severe, fierce and chill, was the first shelter of that race which swooped down from this fastness, in the twelfth century, to prey upon the region roundabout, just as later on, triumphant and insolent, widening the scope of its plundering raids,

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it sought to prey upon the world. Such was the cradle of the Hohenzollerns.

From this lofty stronghold, the memory of which was often recalled by the Emperor himself, the Hohenzollerns sallied forth, first, to the conquest of Germany. It is a known fact that the motto still to be seen upon the romantic works of restoration of King Frederick William IV is "*From the mountain to the sea.*" This was the slogan of the tribe. Likewise, be it understood, the aforementioned stronghold was, for centuries, like those of other German nobles, a nest of robbers who made raids upon the surrounding plains, enriching themselves by means of murder and pillage. Their law was the law of force, the law of the fist.

HOW THEY ACQUIRED POWER

Toward the end of the thirteenth century the Hohenzollerns became Landgraves of Nuremberg. Is it necessary to recall that Burgrave Frederick William was destined to receive Brandenburg, a flat land, poor of soil, which Frederick II called the "sand pit" of Germany, a land without commerce or industries? Long and arduous indeed were the efforts of the Hohenzollerns to burst asunder these fetters, left behind this desert, increased this domain, added to the greatness of their clan, and augmented their power—efforts, these, made up of strokes of violence, perfidy, pleadings, and threats—a policy, in short, quite similar to that employed by them later on, when their activities had been transferred to a larger stage. Already

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fortune had smiled upon these men when an outlet on the Rhine had been given them (1614); thus the means for gaining riches and waging war lay ready to their hand.

Under the Great Elector (1640) and up to the death of Frederick II (1786), all was destined to please and profit the Hohenzollerns. As unscrupulous allies of the Poles, Swedes, French, Bavarians, Russians, and Saxons, they betrayed each of these in turn, violated treaties, and inaugurated, in short, that policy of the future which was really placed on a firm footing in 1700, when they caused themselves to be recognized as kings of Prussia, becoming thus the equals of other kings and raising Prussia, at the death of Frederick II, to equal rank with the great nations.

Thus it was that the conception arose, in this rude cradle, of the military state, which was to become strengthened, to spread, to transmit itself in the shape of a powerful and formidable heritage. This conception traversed the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and flashed forth, with sinister light, in 1870 and 1914. Having withstood everything—the noble evolution of ideas, the revolutionary movement which regenerated Europe—it sought, finally, to tear liberty to pieces in a tremendous struggle. With this historical spectacle upon which to feast his eyes—those eyes set ever more fixedly upon the gratification of mad ambitions—beset by the intoxication emanating from it, dazzled by its gleam, Emperor William II grew up from the earliest days of his childhood;

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he was drunk from such influences on the day of his coronation.

THE PERSONAGE BEFORE THE DRAMA

The Great Elector governed, unified, centralized. He increased the Prussian army from 230 men to 24,000.

With this example before him, Frederick William I founded bureaucracy. He was the "Sergeant-King," severe and methodical, steeped in army regulations, providing, in his actions, a daily lesson to his son—who was to become the Great Frederick. The father himself laid down the principles which were to guide the steps of that son. "It is necessary," he said, "to instill into my son the idea that nothing in the world can shed glory upon a prince as can the sword; he would be a despised creature were he not to love the sword, were he not to seek, in it and for it, the only glory."

Frederick II profited from these lessons. He kept on sharpening that formidable sword. He increased the army to 180,000 men. In order to make possible recruiting on the immense scale required—immense for that time and taking into consideration the poverty of the country—he mobilized everything, sucked up all the strength of the land, drained the spring of life by summoning to his aid the springs of commerce, industry, and agriculture. Of high mental endowment, moved by deplorable instincts, he has left on record his view of how peoples are to be led.

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He created the murderous principle which was to destroy human liberty. In his eyes, force and the greatness of the state were the supreme goal of the state. "Interest justifies everything—knavery, lying, breaking of sworn faith!" he wrote, as far back as 1746. "When a ruler sees, in a treaty, a danger for his people, it is his duty to violate that treaty—regretfully, but without hesitation."

BUILDING THE MACHINE STATE

Frederick II illustrated all these theories by his own example. His instructions to his envoys at the court of France and the court of England are masterpieces of duplicity. This man who, in his youth, had written the Anti-Machiavelli, in which he set up principles against robbery, brigandage, and other criminal acts, was destined to take part, toward the end of his life, in the odious partition of Poland. Under Frederick II the Prussian state became the prototype of the machine state, in which the principle of the state is the essential part.

But a policy of such concentration, under a régime of absolutism disguised as enlightened despotism, requires a strong hand. Hence, when Frederick II died the springs began to give way. Prussia stopped short in her forward march. War was still the national industry of Prussia, to be sure, as Mirabeau said, but German union was not to be brought about until later.

These, then, are the three men who founded the empire.

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Three heirs succeeded them. Either on account of the contrast between them and their predecessors or of their own weakness, these heirs are pale in comparison; and, in so far as they are concerned, history may content itself with naming them.

The first of them, Frederick William II, great-great-grandfather of William II, was a soldier always ready to advance, yet who, nevertheless, did not put through what he began. An opponent of the French Revolution, he went as far as Valmy, but made haste to turn about before the troops of the Republic.

His son, Frederick William III, undecided and changeable, did not make himself conspicuous by his energy except after the battle of Jena, when events and the co-operation of zealous Ministers helped him in the restoration of his country.

As for Frederick William IV, he was incompetent and inert. Though in favor of the unity of Germany, he let the opportunity for achieving it escape when it presented itself. This monarch, stricken like his grandfather, by a stroke of apoplexy, died soon after with his faculties impaired.

FATE FAVORED WILLIAM I

Then it was, in 1856, that his brother William, sixty years of age, became Regent while waiting to ascend the throne, which he did in 1861. He it was who at last was to provide an outlet for the aspirations of Germany toward unity. Fate, which, through three successive reigns, had refused to show favor to Germany, now underwent a change.

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A powerful and formidable man, of strong intelligence and unfathomable conscience, subtle and brutal, patient and impetuous, contemptuous alike of kings, men, facts, justice, and truth, a sort of monster of intelligence unchained to roam through the forest of the human race—Bismarck—now appears upon the scene. Was he the creator of Germany's welfare? Yes—in the eyes of those who have not looked as far as 1914.

It was at the outset of the regency of Prince William, on the 27th of January, 1859, that Frederick William Victor Albert Hohenzollern, future emperor of war, was born at Berlin. On his mother's side he was of English blood, but he does not appear to have inherited its coldness nor the humorous turn of the British mind. His mother, Victoria, was royal princess of Britain, a daughter of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. His father was the royal prince of Prussia, Frederick William, who was to reign under the name of Frederick III.

KAISER'S EARLY EDUCATION

At home, at the period when the brain receives its first impressions, the child found himself surrounded by beneficial influences. The refined culture of his mother, who found no obstacles placed in the path of her educational work by the elegant liberalism of Prince Frederick, sought to influence the little boy and snatch him away from "Prussification." The truth of the matter was that he was brought up in opposition to Bismarck, whose

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shadow loomed darkly before those who aspired to the throne.

As for the boy's father, a man of great breadth of mind, he was no less solicitous about the education of the young heir. In his journal, under date of January 27, 1871, on the eve of the surrender of Paris, he thus wrote down the wishes which he felt for his son: "May he become a strong man, loyal, faithful, and sincere, a true German, who, free from prejudice, shall continue the work which has been begun." Then follow these terrible lines, which—undoubtedly under the influence of a sort of presentiment which seems to have saddened the last years of his life—the father wrote concerning his son: "One really is afraid, when one thinks of what hopes are centered upon this child, and what responsibilities to our country devolve upon us, in directing his education."

Oh, prophet! On his deathbed, to which, like a jailer watching a prisoner, his son came, with tearless eyes, to watch his father's agony, did not the father perceive more clearly the responsibility which, a few years earlier, he seemed to have guessed?

In order to make him more like other men than is usual with an heir to the throne—who lives generally surrounded by courtiers, clad in purple, and breathing the incense of flattery—the young boy was enrolled at a university. There it was that he was shaped, far away—or farther than he would have been—from the influences of educa-

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tion in the family, and exposed to the slow but sure action of outside contact, and it was there that his mind was gradually modified. Yet—how is it to be explained that maternal affection was unable to keep him from feeling a precocious hatred of England? This hatred was such that it even made him desire a *rapprochement* with France. The young prince was then seventeen years old; he was giving signs of ambition and megalomania.

TAUGHT TO ADMIRE BISMARCK

At the University of Bonn, where William joined a celebrated student organization, he was gay at first, and lived as his comrades lived, taking part willingly, of evenings, in the long drinking bouts at which German chauvinism gave itself free rein in song.

It was there that his enthusiasm for Bismarck was born—an enthusiasm which was to endure until the day when that redoubtable personage rose up before William's throne. What with his mother, who felt little esteem for the Chancellor, his father, who took Bismarck to task for his illegal acts, and his governess, who hailed from Slesvig-Holstein and had painful memories of 1864, William had been prevented, in his family circle, from feeling the infatuation which the nation felt at that time for Bismarck. At Bonn he met a fanatical admirer of Bismarck, a professor of history, who took care to change the prince's views. "When the prince left the university," this man wrote

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later, "he had become, thanks to me, a fervent admirer of Prince Bismarck. I am proud of having brought this about."

In addition to the influence of the university and that derived from certain casual meetings, there was also the influence of the barracks. In the barracks it was that the final impression was stamped upon the youth's mind.

HIS GRANDFATHER'S ADMONITION

On the day when he was regularly enrolled in the army—June 7, 1877—his grandfather reminded him, in the presence of the officers of the regiment, of the special duties of kings of Prussia with relation to the army. "The years of your youth," he said, "have been the years of a glorious epoch. In your father you have a model of what a leader in war and battles should be. In the service upon which you are entering you will find many things, seemingly insignificant, which will appear strange to you, but you must learn that, in military service, there is nothing insignificant, that every part in the edifice of the army must be well made if it is to stand and remain firm."

Naturally, the most typical characteristics of his race are to be found, as at the bottom of a melting pot, in the soul of William II. But he could never shake himself free—in the eyes of those who were not blinded by his parading—from his inherent inferiority. In him there was a real lack of the qualities of strength; his fall shows this

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even more than his previous life. And, after this fall, there is nothing to be seen of "the strong oak" under the bark that was so quickly stripped away.

What he (the Kaiser) loved in army life was the book of regulations, the little things, the parading, the stiff carriage, the horseback riding, the glittering uniforms on the radiant days when reviews were held. He showed himself a stickler for extreme punctuality to a degree which led him often into being ridiculous. On the morning of his marriage he must needs go away to bestow a decoration upon a noncommissioned officer at Potsdam.

He inflicted the military pose even upon his family circle. Once he paraded his children before his grandfather in the uniform of the artillery—even the littlest of them, only eighteen months old, was there as a corporal. At the word of command, they even had to turn their faces toward old William.

In addressing his troops he never failed to glorify the military ideal and to recall warlike virtues. "Cultivate the sentiment of absolute fidelity toward the Supreme War Chief," he said. "That is your first duty." Always he identified the army with himself, the nation with himself, all Germany with himself. Always he provided the spectacle of a human being who, though lacking the privilege of genius (which, in any case, is no excuse for megalomania), persisted in trying to absorb into himself an entire nation which

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had inherited a great tradition. He said also: "We belong to each other; the army and I were born for each other; and we shall remain bound to each other by an indissoluble tie, no matter whether the will of God gives us peace or storms."

OBSSESSED WITH DIVINE MISSION

The will of God! Not only did he identify himself with the nation which, after all, was made up of men like him—though he, in his greatness, held them in contempt—but he identified himself even with God! God was his colleague. He invoked Him at all hours, every day, in his palace, on horseback, pen in hand, debasing the idea of religion by coupling it with low theatricalism. It has been said of God that He created the world in six days and rested on the seventh. That is untrue. On the seventh day He was preparing the divine clay from which this extraordinary soul was manufactured. God even held Himself at William's disposal for inflicting His punishments upon those who might annoy His representatives on earth. Assuredly, this was a form of madness—William was obsessed with his divine mission.

A champion of the Germanic race, he devoted himself heart and soul to this mission. He cordially welcomed all willing to help him in accomplishing his task, but, "I shall crush those who seek to thwart me." Never did he pause to reflect that his mission, if divine, required moderation. Another man, who possessed culture and education, character and a lofty mind, a man touched

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with the light of genius, Walter Rathenau, wrote: "William fell short of greatness because he had not based his character on unshakable will-power; he fell short of genius because he lacked sound and deep judgment and soaring imagination. Finally—and this is the most essential point of all—he never overcame the habit of thinking about his own ego."

WILLIAM'S LACK OF REAL WILL

Absence of matured and persevering will power, lack of judgment and real intelligence, overwhelming vanity and immense pride—those are the traits which have made of William a being essentially different from his great ancestors. Yet he delighted in saying:

"In me, as in my ancestor (the Great Elector) there is an inflexible will, and, despite all opposition, I shall keep unwaveringly to the path which I have decided upon as the right path."

But never did he have either that "inflexible will" or that persistent energy which, striving always toward the same goal, made it possible for Frederick II, William I, and Bismarck to carry out their plans.

He copied their attitude, to be sure, but at bottom he was pitifully weak; his was "weakness which could not do without support," as Rathenau remarks. As fickle in his desires as in his admiration and antipathies, he was correctly judged in childhood by his grandfather when the latter said:

"He is a young man full of tricks, and he will

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give plenty of work to those who undertake to train him."

Alas—not only to them! The young man full of tricks became the man of theatrical coups, of brutal and thoughtless decisions, of obstinacy born of boundless pride; he became the man who despised other men—who, to be sure, certainly repaid him in kind. And in all this he showed signs of incurable weakness.

HOW HIS FATHER GAUGED HIM

His fantastic ways likewise betrayed his lack of judgment. When it was proposed to initiate him, at the age of twenty-seven, into affairs of state, his father, Prince Frederick, who had correctly estimated the intellectual capacities of his son, wrote to Bismarck:

"His general culture is full of gaps and he lacks genuine depth. This lack of maturity and this inexperience in my son, combined with his tendency toward exaggeration, make me feel that it would be dangerous to allow him to concern himself, at present, with foreign affairs."

Alas! He did concern himself with them when he had passed his fiftieth birthday, and he showed himself even more incompetent and arbitrary! Prince Frederick had foreseen everything about his son, who acted unworthily toward his father even after the latter's death—everything except that this son would cause the massacre of millions of men! He must not be allowed to concern himself with foreign affairs!!!

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Limited in his culture, brilliant and superficial in conversation, seeking to astonish visitors by his knowledge, brushing up on a subject the day before he wished to amaze some foreign personage, but incapable of talking on that subject five minutes without becoming absurd, he never was the realization of any one complete type. It may be objected that love of parading had been instilled into him from the cradle. Granted—but he carried it to the point of madness. Bismarck saw clearly when he said:

“He is a man who would like to have a birth-day every day, or solemn processions, or receptions, or parades, and, in his haughtiness, the rôle of the world’s arbiter would be to his liking.”

His thirst for domination has been the most powerful motive force underlying William’s actions. The craving to be the only master made him dismiss Bismarck shortly after his accession to the throne; the desire to be master of the world was to cause him to unchain the most horrible of wars.

Long before his accession to the throne his ambitious and arbitrary character had made itself clearly apparent; his unworthy conduct with relation to his father is but another illustration of this.

IMPATIENCE TO REIGN

On the occasion of his first journey to San Remo, in November, 1887, he certainly did not conceal his impatience to reign. He behaved like an heir expectantly watching the last moments of his par-

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ent. Among the members of that family which had about it so little of the Prussian he never ceased extolling the qualities of Prince Bismarck, a man without a peer. This lack of consideration was habitual with William II. He did not leave San Remo until a consultation had been held which left no doubt as to the incurable nature of the Crown Prince's ailment. In May he made a second journey to San Remo, and he returned to Berlin just in time to be present when his grandfather breathed his last.

When Frederick had become emperor, he was able, by a supreme effort, to return to Germany, where he was to reign only three months, in the course of which young William, certain now of soon mounting the throne, again distinguished himself by tactless actions. At a banquet in honor of the Chancellor, William made a speech comparing the Empire to a regiment whose colonel (William I) had fallen, and whose lieutenant-colonel (Frederick III) still kept his saddle, though badly wounded, and he wound up his speech by acclaiming the Chancellor the standard-bearer, exclaiming: "Let him march ahead; we will follow him!"

A few weeks later, on June 15, 1888, Frederick III expired. William hastened to put a cordon of troops around the palace where he had died, in order to be able to devote himself, in complete security, to going through the papers of the deceased. It appears, even, that certain letters enlightened William as to the opinion of him which

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his father held, and that the correspondents of Emperor Frederick had no cause for congratulating themselves upon this discovery.

On the day of the funeral William played his part like a haughty actor, bringing upon himself, as he passed, the applause of the crowd. Then came the celebration and ceremonies of his accession to the throne, amid unprecedented pomp and display, amid an orgy of proclamations to the German people, the army, and the navy, amid declarations and speeches.

GERMANY ACCLAIMS YOUNG EMPEROR

At last he was to reign, since death, which had twice listened kindly to his prayer, had opened the way to his frenzied ambition. He had escaped from family influence, grown up in the poisoned air of chauvinism, climbed to that height where autocracy does not hear censure when censure dares to speak. In a paroxysm of madness that followed the quiet years after the war of 1870, the new generation, gorged on the booty of victory, having reached the uttermost limit of collective insanity, acclaimed its young Emperor.

And he, with light step, holding himself proudly erect, head high and looking about him insolently, seated himself in the place left by an old man and, after him, by a sick man whom pity had surrounded with care and whom oblivion now shrouded.

The new ruler's youth, his bragging, which aped valor—as we saw in 1918—the contrast between

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him and those who had departed in disgrace on account of their age and mode of life, and, above all, the presence at the celebration, of the Colossus who had fashioned with his hands, covered with blood and mire, yet indefatigable, the unity of Germany—all these things excited the German nation and reassured it at the same time.

What say those who remember all this to themselves? And we, the victims, what can we say?

We shall see.

CHAPTER II

A LAND OF WAR

WHENCE came this generation of Germans, such as it was when William II ascended the throne, such as it still remains in 1922, scarcely changed for the better by the merited disgrace of the misfortune which brought about its defeat?

In the pages of this rapid survey we cannot probe, much less solve, the problem of whether the universities of Germany or her barracks were the cradle of her haughty pride, intoxication, and collective madness, that incurable disease which killed Germany after having sought to infect the entire world—whether it was born solely of the teachings of German philosophers or was the child of events. This is not a psychological study, even of human beings in collective movement; a profound study of that sort would require another method of treatment. Nevertheless, it may be stated that two causes contributed toward facilitating the blossoming of these generations of Germans, alike hot-headed, violent, rebellious against all lessons from outside, refractory to all influences from foreign lands.

Prussia was a poor and mediocre kingdom, unable to live despite the fact that it had the determination to live, ambitious to spread beyond its

A LAND OF WAR

self, and consequently, beyond its frontiers. Its struggles were like those of a prisoner who, unable yet to break down the bars of his prison, wishes, nevertheless, to thrust them aside in order to open a narrow passage for himself. Such were the struggles of Prussia, first in pursuance of the policies of her chiefs of long ago, afterward under her three kings, particularly Frederick the Great.

CONQUEST FOR CONQUEST'S SAKE

How, then, was Prussia to extend her frontiers; not merely to seize—which is simply an act of force—but, having seized, to keep; how, then, was she to do all this, to cater to her insatiable appetite, if deference must be paid to what was morally right, to the rights of others, even to nothing more than the rare principles which the human mind had managed to set up during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as scruples evidencing the birth of a conscience among the nations? Such questions were not asked by those who believed in conquest for conquest's sake. Without even asking themselves whether what they did was morally right, whether the sporadic violence of one day might not, because it had turned out to be advantageous, engender the principle of continuous, permanent violence, the Prussian monarchs went ahead and acted. It may well be said that what they did was equivalent to applying the system of piracy at sea to politics.

First, they introduced a system of discipline which smothered in the mass of men subjected to

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it all illusions of personal independence, all independent thinking, criticism, and—naturally—all yearnings toward revolt. Then, having emptied the brains of their subjects, they took good care that their hands should be provided with weapons and that they should be taught to strike! Above all, no individual thinking!—in that the Prussian rulers paid heed to the prohibition, superfluous to be sure, of Frederick.

CONCEPTION OF PRUSSIAN STATE

And thus it was that the Prussian state was created, not, like other states, for the advantage of those whom it governed, but for its own advantage; for the purpose of swallowing up everything else; of assimilating everything into itself, to put the matter in a nutshell—individual human beings as well as material things. The state is everything—right, morality, force—such was the Prussian doctrine.

In vain the French Revolution passed, like a thunderbolt, hurling thrones into the dust. Not even the French Revolution could crush that conception of the state. In vain the Revolution of 1848, more international in aspect, came into being, that Revolution whose dawn was too close to its decline. It moved men's souls, put its impress upon them, aroused them because of its romanticism, inspired some generous acts which clothed themselves with stormy strength; but only to die down again forever into nothingness under the boot of the soldier.

A LAND OF WAR

GROWTH OF MATERIALISM

From this political materialism, whose weapon was militarism, came economic materialism, wherein it found its resources, and later intellectual materialism, its guide and propagator, then social materialism, which—imposed with a heavy hand upon the German working class—also dominated French thought for too long, and brushed aside too long the fruit of the thoughts of Rousseau, Louis Blanc, Proudhon. The world has seen what socialistic independence in Germany became under this system of education. This will be pointed out again in the course of these pages.

Let us bear in mind, for the present, the sinister lessons taught by those twin teachers, German philosophy and German literature. It was not a case, as with us French in our glorious eighteenth century, of thought creating in the human mind independence of reasoning; of philosophy proclaiming the rights of all; of a cohort of jurists breaking down the deadly formula of superannuated traditions; of genius, imprisoned in the Bastile, wearing away the stones that had lasted through the centuries until, at last, the people smashed to pieces what was left. In Prussia there was none of all this—whatever thought existed there was material, remained material, served only to strengthen what was material. Thus did Prussia form her conception of the omnipotence and unity of the State.

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CRIME OF GERMAN THOUGHT

The crime of the entire German school of thought—with the exception of certain minds that were refractory to this enterprise which, none the less, was of a general character—was to have tolerated the conception that reasoning should be subordinated to force. What a humiliating spectacle, alike for the mind and the eye, are those lengthy dissertations, so often reported—and which reappeared in part quite recently—which exalted force into a divinity of whom man was the slave and Germany the temple!

“How can a nation live otherwise than according to such principles?” asked the Germans—such an existence was, to them, incomprehensible. This line of reasoning easily led them to the conclusion that any nation denying such principles was of an inferior sort, that it should be despised and scorned, that it should be subjugated by means of an alliance, if self-interest demanded, or—if interest pointed in another direction—that war should be waged against it.

GERMANS TAUGHT TO HATE

And so it came about that hate was preached against England, which protected her trade and colonies, and, by her moving barrier of ships, thwarted German power and neutralized German commerce, and hate was preached also against France from the very beginning of the eighteenth century, even though, at that time, France had been so uselessly favorable to Frederick and to Prussia

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by means of her eighteenth-century philosophy! And hate was preached above all, against liberating revolutions which entomb the old-time respect felt by peoples for authority. Germany stood above everything!

Amid such influences the generations of Germans grew up from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The process of concentration worked slowly, being checked by a vague liberalism emanating from Königsberg, whence sounded the voice of Kant, and by the lofty thoughts of Goethe. The various German states did not resemble one another and, though similarities of mind and race drove them together despite this, there was lacking, nevertheless, a strong bond of union; moreover, the mentality of the inhabitants of these different states was not that of the Prussians. In other words, the time for the fusion was at hand, but not the powerful and crushing mold in which it was to be accomplished.

For this unity—the great dream of Frederick II—what was needed was a basic interest and the man capable of serving it. The true heir of the great king was not destined to be born upon the steps of the throne; the formidable and fateful genius was destined to come, however; that genius who possessed what everyone of the others lacked—will power.

This master of events appeared in 1862. His name was Bismarck. He it was who was destined to complete by “blood and iron” the work begun

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by the Great Elector in the seventeenth century, and continued, in the eighteenth, by Frederick II. It was Bismarck who was to force into reality the aspirations of German intellectuals toward national unity.

BISMARCK AND THE STRENGTHENING OF PRUSSIAN POWER

On the 23d of September, 1862, King William appointed Bismarck to the presidency of the Council. At that time the Prussian government was in open conflict with the Landtag regarding the question of military laws. The king, as became a worthy scion of the Hohenzollerns, had undertaken to increase the army; he wanted 190,000 men on a peace footing, 450,000 on a war footing, likewise an increase of the first-line forces to double their existing strength, for which purpose universal three years' military service, as outlined in the military law of 1814, was to be strictly enforced. These reorganization schemes were not to the liking of the Chamber of Deputies, but nevertheless, in order to allow a restricted enforcement of the royal programs, provisional credits were voted, by means of which the king formed military units of a permanent character. The Chamber, displeased at this, and irritated particularly at the tone adopted by the Minister of War, General von Roon, who denied it the right of discussing the demands made by him, refused, on September 23, 1862, every penny of the credits necessary for carrying out the projected changes.

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BISMARCK ADVISED DICTATORSHIP

On the preceding evening Bismarck had a long interview at Babelsberg with the king, who, wearied by his efforts, talked of abdicating. Brushing aside such thoughts, Bismarck advised him to resist; only on condition that the king should follow this advice, added Bismarck, would he accept the post of president of the Council.

“Direct parliamentary government,” he said, “is to be avoided at any price, even at the price of a dictatorship.” Prussia was destined, during four years, to be under the dictatorship of Bismarck.

Bismarck’s past vouched for the energy which he would display in the coming struggle. Born of old Brandenburg noble stock, Baron Otto von Bismarck had distinguished himself since 1847 by his hatred for the parliamentary form of government; in 1849 he was one of those who advised the king not to accept the imperial crown, and, on the occasion of the granting of the Prussian Constitution he protested against the introduction into Prussia of parliamentary institutions and, most especially, against the voting of the budget by the Landtag.

From the moment of his accession to power he rose superior to the opposition of the Chamber. Unable to secure a vote of appropriations, he invoked the principle of the “constitutional gap”—and, indeed, it was true that the Constitution had not made provision for a case where one of the three governing organs—King, House of Lords, and Chamber of Deputies—was not in accord with

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the others. In haughty tones he told the Chamber that, unless there was compromise, "he who has the power in his hands is the one who will go forward in his chosen direction." This maxim of government, expressed in the briefer form of "might comes before right," was to remain the ignominious brand of German policy at the end of the nineteenth century and in 1914.

CULT OF "BLOOD AND IRON" PREACHED

So Bismarck no longer submitted the budget to the Landtag, which was either adjourned or dissolved. With an unconstitutional budget, voted only by the House of Lords, he bent all his efforts to the reorganization of the army, which, thanks to the military genius of Moltke, was to become the powerful instrument of Bismarck's policy.

By means of force and violence Bismarck was now aiming to realize his one ambition—German unity. Shortly after his assumption of power he thus expressed this object of his to the Budget Commission of the Landtag: "German unity will not be achieved by speeches nor by the decisions of the majority, but by blood and iron." The cult of force, preference for violent means, voluntary violation of faith—belief in all these things was inspired in Bismarck, particularly by the life and actions of Frederick II, whom he was to hold up later as a model for the future William II.

In Bismarck's eyes, Prussia, since the death of the great Frederick, had not shown real national tendencies; in fact, her destiny, as he saw it, was

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not so much to grow constantly as to assure herself of predominance in Germany; she must not forget that it was war to the death between herself and Austria, that one of these two must vanish from the German stage.

PLANS AGAINST AUSTRIA

Prussia's duty became clear to Bismarck in the course of his long mission as plenipotentiary representative of his country at the Diet of Frankfort, and he expressed concisely in a memorial addressed to the King of Prussia in 1858 his ideas as to the necessity of launching a Prussian-Independent-German policy. Austria, he pointed out, was seeking to obtain the hegemony in the German Confederation by invoking the Constitution; it was necessary, therefore, to destroy the Confederation; a victorious war against Austria had become an unavoidable necessity.

For this war the Prussian army was quite ready; but, in addition, the support or neutrality of the Great Powers had to be secured. Bismarck, who, in the course of his diplomatic missions to Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Paris, had had the opportunity of studying monarchs and statesmen and divining the tendencies of governments, was now about to maneuver in such a way as to isolate Austria by means of promises made to Russia, Italy, and France.

The method of striking violent blows, adopted and several times defined by him, was to be applied three times in succession: first, in 1864,

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against Denmark; then, in 1866, against Austria; finally, in 1870, against France.

INCREASING PRUSSIAN DOMINANCE

In 1864, under the pretext of acting in place of the Diet, against Denmark, which had annexed Slesvig, Prussia and Austria invaded the latter land, and, after a short campaign, peace was signed and the duchies renounced by King Christian. Bismarck had occasion, from actual observation of Prussian soldiers in action, to gauge the superiority of his army over the Austrian, and, having set up an Austrian-Prussian joint control over Slesvig and Holstein by means of the Treaty of Gastein, he hoped to find therein some pretext for a war against Austria. Prussia naturally derived profit from the transaction, for she annexed Lauenburg, and, moreover, the three duchies entered the German Zollverein (Customs Union).

Bismarck's trust in himself increased. Believing, after his interview with Napoleon III, that he could count on French neutrality, and having concluded an alliance with Italy, he brought the Austrian crisis to a head. Holstein, which was under the administration of Austria, was invaded, and a project for the reorganization of the German Confederation, providing for the exclusion of Austria, was brought before the Diet. Austria countered this move by causing the said Diet to issue a decree of mobilization against Prussia.

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AUSTRIANS DEFEATED

The Prussian army, however, by means of a crushing offensive, got possession of Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse, and, forcing its way into the Bohemian quadrilateral, inflicted an overwhelming defeat on the Austrians, reinforced by the Saxons, at Sadowa, on July 3, 1866, a fortnight after the opening of the campaign. Bismarck's first move was to annex Slesvig, Holstein, Hanover, and Hesse, without consulting the inhabitants of these lands, invoking, as his reasons, "the right of conquest" and "the judgment of God." And when committees from the Landtag asked him if there were no other grounds on which to base his action, he replied, "Our right is the right of the German nation to exist, to breathe, to unite."

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870

The German Confederation was definitely dissolved by the Treaty of Prague, which paved the way for the formation of a North German Confederation—including, in reality, all Germany excepting Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt—which, though not included, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia. Thus Germany's military unity was almost completely realized; the King of Prussia, President of the Confederation and commander-in-chief of the army, stood at the head of more than one million soldiers.

These violent annexations, however, as well as the Prussian régime applied to the Confederation,

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aroused discontent everywhere. In the South German states, local prejudices reawakened, and Bismarck saw that if definitive unity was to be achieved and the general antipathy toward Prussia overcome, a more powerful sentiment must be called into being, hatred against a foreign foe, against France. He bent his efforts, during that year, toward creating it.

PRETEXT FOR WAR OF 1870

The pretext for the war was the candidacy of a Hohenzollern (Prince Leopold) to the throne of Spain. At first, Prince Leopold declined the offer made him, but Bismarck caused him to reconsider this decision. And since, as a consequence of much diplomatic activity, Leopold again declined, Bismarck, enraged at seeing the long-sought-for pretext for war slipping away from him, made public, on July 13, 1870—after falsifying it—a dispatch received from Ems and relating the day's negotiations between the King of Prussia and Benedetti, the French ambassador. This dispatch seemed an insult to France, while, at the same time, giving the impression to Germany that there had been an endeavor to humiliate King William.

On July 19, 1870, France declared war; on September 2d, after one month of fighting, Napoleon III capitulated at Sedan. But Paris, having been invested by the Germans, heroically endured a siege, and the fighting was kept up in the provinces until the armistice of January 28, 1871.

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In the peace negotiations with Thiers and Jules Favre, Bismarck showed unheard-of severity. In accordance with the Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), France was forced to give up Alsace-Lorraine, pay an indemnity of five billion francs within three years, and endure, up to the final payment of this sum, the occupation of her territory by the Germans. The annexation of her two provinces was made, like the annexations of 1866, without previous consultation of the inhabitants. German unity, brought into being by acts of this sort, and demanded in the name of that principle of nationalities which derives from the "right of peoples to dispose of themselves," had the appearance, rather, of being the very negation of this principle.

In the month of November, 1870, German unity having been achieved, the states of South Germany came into the Confederation. But, in place of the word "Confederation," the word "Reich" was substituted; and, on January 17, 1871, at Versailles, in that Hall of Mirrors where, forty-eight years later, the seal was to be placed on the defeat of the "Reich," the German Empire was proclaimed.

BISMARCK'S ACCOMPLISHMENT

Bismarck had accomplished the unity of Germany and placed her in the first rank of European Powers. During the long years that he continued to remain at his post, he sought constantly to strengthen German hegemony in Europe still

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more and to maintain and fortify political and moral unity within the Empire.

With regard to foreign affairs, Bismarck feared above everything else a coalition against Germany; he wished to be certain of the support of certain nations, of the neutrality of certain others. "We have waged victorious wars against two great European Powers," he declared in 1879; "now it is necessary to deliver one of the Powers vanquished by us from the temptation of allying herself with others in order to get her revenge."

So Bismarck turned to Austria. The year 1872 marks the beginning of the *rapprochement* between Austria and Germany, to which Russia adhered at first through the Three-emperor-pact. But, after the Congress of Berlin (1878), where Bismarck figured as arbiter of Europe's destinies, and after the coolness that subsequently sprang up in Russo-German relations, Bismarck pressed forward actively toward the conclusion of an alliance with Austria, the vanquished foe of Sadowa and the adversary of Russia in the east. This alliance, signed on October 7, 1879, was directed solely against Russia.

TRIPLE ALLIANCE DRAWN UP

In 1882 Italy, too, joined this grouping of Powers, having for a long time sought the friendship of Berlin. In the Triple Alliance, as originally drawn up, Italy merely bound herself to remain neutral in case of a conflict with Russia.

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When the alliance was renewed, though, in February, 1887, supplementary agreements were made dealing most particularly with the situation about the Mediterranean Sea and with regard to France.

With reference to the last-named Power, the desire of keeping her for as long a time as possible in a condition of inferiority dominated the entire policy of Bismarck, who, though periodically making peaceful advances to France and even encouraging colonial ventures calculated to make her forget Alsace-Lorraine, lost no chance, notwithstanding, to isolate France. He did not even hesitate, on several occasions, when he realized the altogether too rapid recovery of the enemy of 1870, to show his ill-humor and his brutality by means of methods of intimidation or threats of war.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST FRANCE

Relations between the two countries went through two serious crises—in 1873-75 and again in 1886-87—provoked by Bismarck under the influence of Moltke and the German military party. In 1873 a violent campaign was loosed against France, which finally calmed down in the middle of April as the result of the firm attitude of the French government and thanks to the intervention at Berlin of the Tsar and Queen Victoria. Nevertheless, after April, 1874, the campaign of intimidation was resumed, and in the spring of 1875 it redoubled in violence. French armament plans and the new military law of March, 1875, were denounced in the German press and in diplomatic

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notes, and there was talk in Germany of the necessity of a preventive war.

But France, having nothing with which to reproach herself and not being desirous of war, made constant protestations of her intentions; furthermore, joint action by the Tsar and Queen Victoria succeeded in quieting down the German government. In the spring of 1886, however, the agitation began again and it was not cut short until the Schnoebele incident in 1887.

Bismarck gave evidence of being worried at the nationalistic propaganda in France under the auspices of the League of Patriots. The German press, in the course of the winter of 1886-87, prepared the German mentality for whatsoever might betide; military measures, even, were taken.

THE SCHNOEBELE INCIDENT

Then the Schnoebele incident occurred. The police commissary of Pagny-sur-Moselle went to the frontier, on the invitation of his German colleague, and, when he had reached it, German agents fell upon him and arrested him on French soil. Having been accused of espionage, Schnoebele was turned over to the High Court of Leipzig. On this occasion the French government gave proof of a high degree of coolness. Confronted with the material facts of this outrage, Bismarck was taken aback and the incident was closed a few days later.

But this crisis brought about a *rapprochement* between France and Russia, a prelude to the alliance between these two Powers—the provocative

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attitude of Bismarck, therefore, had different results from what he foresaw. But these crises, to which he assuredly attached great importance as instruments of diplomatic action, were also engineered and desired as a goal of internal politics. In a federated state like Germany, wherein the various states had preserved their own institutions and life, there was need of creating a community of interests and aspirations in order to strengthen constitutional ties. The phantom of French *revanche* was a weapon wielded by Bismarck with marvelous skill for the purpose of arousing German chauvinism.

Profiting by these crises, he secured all the more easily the passage of the military laws; thus, in 1874, he had the army increased to 401,000 men on a peace footing; but this change, which Bismarck wished to have made permanent, was voted only for a space of seven years. It was renewed, in 1880, after a further campaign in the press. In January, 1887, Bismarck again demanded in advance the renewal of the seven-year period. The Reichstag refused, and was dissolved on the self-same day. Less than a year later, in December, 1887, a new bill, increasing the German forces on a peace footing to nearly half a million men, was brought forward, and it was passed on March 6, 1888.

TREITSCHKE AND HAECKEL CONTRIBUTE TO GERMAN KULTUR

In his reorganization of the Empire and his work toward moral unification Bismarck was supported by the efforts of the intellectuals, who

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helped him toward molding the public mind. Their ideas, expressed at the universities and spread broadcast in books, were tirelessly propagated and diffused by a "reptile" press in the Chancellor's pay. And even though there were, before the violent acts of 1866 and 1870, certain historians, or savants, who, despite seeing the necessity of Prussia's supremacy, nevertheless hesitated as to the means to be employed, the eyes of these, too, were opened on the day after Sadowa and Sedan; they realized that might had become right, that they must teach this truth and work out the theory upon which it was based.

"RIGHT OF THE STRONGER" URGED

War, violence, the law of force—these were to find theoretical champions without number. As far back as 1868, a professor at the University of Berlin, Lasson, made public a strange pamphlet dealing with the ideal of culture and war (*Das Kulturideal und der Krieg*). His conclusion was: "Among states there is but one right, the right of the stronger. . . . Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable that there should be wars between states. Despite all treaties, the weaker becomes the prey of the stronger just as soon as the latter is willing or able to bring this about. War is a fundamental phenomenon in the life of a state. . . . Many things may be postponed, but, should the opportunity present itself, it behooves him, who has the power and feels himself prepared, to solve questions by the sword."

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This defense of war, made with such cynicism, aroused some protest, to be sure, at the time, but the victories of 1870 silenced it. After that literary men and professors vied with one another in justifying Bismarck's maxim, "Where it is a question of Prussia's power, I recognize no law."

The most famous of the professors, Treitschke, was the great educator of German thought from 1875 to 1895. In his history of Germany during the nineteenth century, as well as in his teachings, speeches, and books, one finds passionate, wild, sectarian patriotism, evincing absolutely no desire to win a reputation for impartiality. He devoted himself particularly to demonstrating the excellence of the institutions of the Hohenzollerns, to elucidating the history of Germany by means of that of Prussia.

TREITSCHKE'S DOCTRINE

"How often [he said] have we sought to give theoretical proof to the little German states that only Prussia could assume the leadership over Germany; the really decisive proof of this, however, had to be furnished them on the battlefields of Bohemia and the Main." Treitschke justifies everything by this sentence: "In politics one can judge only that which has succeeded." He speaks enthusiastically of the great human butcheries in history and of their significance, and warns everybody against those who preach universal peace, "the most dangerous of Utopias."

"War remains the only process, and, even in

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times of high culture, it always preserves its plastic power of molding states. Our epoch is an epoch of war, our age is an age of iron; if the strong vanquish the weak it is the unescapable law of life."

This biological conception of history, tending to subject the living organism of the state to the universal law of the struggle for life, was developed in Germany under the influence of the great naturalist Haeckel, who introduced into that country the theories of Darwin on the evolution of species. The German university students after 1870, developed passionate interest in the lessons of Haeckel, which were the corroboration of the ideas absorbed by them on the superiority of certain races and the justification of all the excesses of militarism. It was Haeckel who suggested replacing the motto, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," with the words, "Determinism, Inequality, Selection." And, at the very time that the religious sentiment of the German people was weakening, this sort of biological religion—"monism"—came upon the scene and strengthened imperialistic ideas.

WHAT ARE EXCESSES?

What would those nations have felt who did not live, as we did, close to this volcano—in whose smoke the lightning flashed already—what would those nations, separated from that volcano by abysses dug by nature, whereas ours had been dug by history, have felt had they lived by the side

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of such a neighbor? How could one fail to see the specter of war in the shadows; how could one fail to guess that such a philosophy of force acted like poison on the adult of the German nation, followed him through life, prepared him for the worst excesses? Excesses? They exist only through the confrontation of good and evil, which presuppose, in order that they may be perceived, a conscience and at least average moral principles.

Every effort of German thought during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bent upon isolating the German from other men politically, morally, and economically, upon confining him to the divine race to which he belonged and preventing the infiltration of foreign ideas which would have gradually dissolved his deadly pride. The cynicism of the German plans for war derives from the cynicism of the general ideas by which the German nation was governed. Hence, war was approaching with huge strides, through German schools, books, lectures, and press, through the arrogant lessons of the universities, those teachers of the barracks and purveyors of the battlefield. And we, next-door neighbors, had for half a century made the mistake of not being on the alert; of relying upon our good faith, upon our ardent desire for peace; of believing that Germany, satiated with victory, would at last strike out upon another road—in other words, our mistake was to credit Germany with ideas of which any other nation would have been proud.

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SO WILLIAM FOUND IT

It was in such a condition that William found Germany, and he was destined to show himself worthy of her. From the proud eminence of his throne, two years after his accession—in 1891, at Potsdam—he thus addressed his troupes: “You belong to me, body and soul, and, if I should give you the order to fire upon your fathers and your mothers, you should obey me without a murmur.”

Thus Emperor William, still young, crowned with the radiant favors of fortune, reigning over a victorious, happy, and rich people, looked into his heart and found nothing better than this bloody word of command. One may imagine what kind of soldiers those must be in whom their chief instilled such a grim duty, turning their thoughts not toward the obligations imposed upon them by their fatherland, but toward the doubly impious murder code of civil warfare. Later on the tool obeyed this guiding hand.

CHAPTER III

THE RACE OF THE ABYSS

WILLIAM, who had shown such impatience to become emperor, who inaugurated his reign by so many manifestoes, could not long resist the pompous wish to display himself at all the Courts of Germany and Europe.

First, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, then England and Rome—where the Vatican is not overlooked—finally, Athens and Constantinople, receive, in turn, his visit. Everywhere he appears amid splendor, in different guise, donning all sorts of costumes, changing his tone and his physiognomy with the consummate ability of a veteran actor. During these travels, which take up the last part of 1888 and almost all of 1889, and which arouse much hostile criticism at Berlin, he loses no chance to make speeches and reiterate his determination to carry on the traditions of his race and above all else to complete the achievement of his “unforgettable grandfather.”

And Bismarck, standing beside him and loyally attached to the Hohenzollerns, is the personification of this achievement.

At the beginning of his reign, William never fails to manifest to Bismarck his gratitude and admiration. While he is traveling, and on each

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of his birthdays, he sends Bismarck telegrams couched in ridiculously lyrical terms. Nevertheless, the temperament of the Chancellor does not fit in at all with the fiery impetuosity of the young Emperor, who gives signs of having harbored, from the very moment of his accession to the throne, the intention of cutting loose from Bismarck.

"I shall allow old Bismarck to prompt me for six months," he once remarked, "and after that I shall rule alone."

BISMARCK FELT HIMSELF INDISPENSABLE

Bismarck, the builder of German greatness, hardly expected such ingratitude. He felt himself so indispensable to the Empire that, in October, 1889, he replied to Tsar Alexander III in these words, "I am sure of remaining all my life." There were, to be sure, some minor incidents, but Bismarck attributed them to the "youth of his master." Notwithstanding this, the publication in the early part of March, 1890, of an imperial ordinance not countersigned by the Chancellor was the occasion of explanations that were not of a pleasant character.

A few days later, on March 15th, William took Bismarck to task for having received the chief of one of the Reichstag political parties. Bismarck replied haughtily, claimed the right of receiving anyone he pleased, and added that he was ready to give up his post. But the old servant could not believe that his master would resolve to allow

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such action on his part; only on receipt of a formal order from the Emperor did he send in his resignation on March 20; moreover, he wrote a long memorial justifying the line of conduct which he had adopted.

And now William is master. He hastens to make this clear in a speech: "There is but one master in the land and that master is I; I shall tolerate no other besides me."

He acts like an absolute ruler, paying heed neither to his Cabinet nor to the Reichstag. He wishes none but obedient servants around him. His Chancellor must merely be the executor of his orders, he tells General Caprivi, who has been chosen to replace Bismarck. And Hohenlohe, Bülow, Bethmann-Hollweg, they, too, must bow to his exacting demands.

"VERSATILE AND DISSOLVING" FOREIGN POLICY

William took it upon himself to direct in person the foreign policy of his country. But the policy of such a changeable, impulsive, and arbitrary man was bound to assume an aspect the meaning of which was often unfathomable. Hence, it became a difficult matter for the foreign offices of the European governments to guess the goal or intentions of the Wilhelmstrasse. This brand of diplomacy, on the lookout for all sorts of "incidents," meddling in every quarrel, not in order to smooth them over, but to derive profit from them, constantly seesawing back and forth among the other European Powers, was quite rightly

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described in 1895 by the Russian ambassador at Berlin as "versatile and dissolving."

At the beginning of William's reign the alliances built up by Bismarck seemed such as to assure to Germany for a long time a hegemony over a Europe desirous of nothing but peace; and William endeavored, by exchanging visits with the sovereigns of the three allied countries, to strengthen the ties between them. The Triple Alliance, which guaranteed the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, was looked upon with favor by England, which wished before all else to lighten the burden of armaments. France, after the Boulanger agitation, was entirely absorbed in internal questions; the idea of *revanche* championed by a minority, faded away; she could not justly be accused of desiring war. As for Russia, William adopted toward her a policy of friendliness, but Tsar Alexander could not forget Bismarck's rudeness toward him, and drew closer to France, without ceasing at the same time to maintain amicable relations with Germany. The Franco-Russian alliance, whose purely defensive character was evidently known to William, did not seem to worry him at that time; and Bülow even went so far as to acknowledge in 1914, before the Reichstag, that "this alliance had exerted an influence toward peace in Europe."

William was now on the point of adopting that double-faced attitude of his: to scatter to the four winds statements professing a love of peace, and, beneath the shelter of these innocent rhetorical

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flights, to reinforce his army against a nonexistent peril.

WILLIAM INCREASES HIS ARMY

The measure taken in 1888, by which the German forces were increased by more than half a million men, now seemed to him insufficient, so that, in the autumn of 1892, Caprivi brought before the Reichstag a new project for adding 86,000 men to the army on a peace footing. The Reichstag refused to sanction this and was immediately dissolved. It was not until July, 1893, that the bill was passed by the new assembly, with a majority of thirteen votes. Confident in the strength of his army and in its superiority over the rest of Europe, William was now in a position to give free rein to his dreams of world-politics. He felt the need of colonies and points of support beyond the seas, of a fleet that should flaunt the banner of Germany in every corner of the world. To accomplish this, many years of effort were required.

In 1890 he acquired from the English the island of Heligoland, dominating the mouths of the Weser and Elbe, and took possession of it, amid great pomp, on the 1st of July, 1890.

A few weeks later, on September 23d, on the occasion of the opening of the new harbor of Stettin, he launched his famous formula: "Our future is upon the water." He surrounded himself with a naval cabinet, a thing apart from the military cabinet, under the direction of an admiral. In those days, however, it was difficult to get ap-

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propriations for the fleet from the Reichstag. Nevertheless, the Kiel Canal, assuring rapid communication between the Baltic naval bases and the ports on the North Sea, was opened in June, 1895, amid magnificent ceremonies.

AMBITIOUS FOR WORLD EMPIRE

At about this time William's conceptions of world-politics began to assume definite shape. In a speech made on January 18, 1896, on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the German Empire, he thus described the situation of Germany: "The German Empire has become a world-empire. Everywhere, even in the remotest corners of the world, some of our fellow countrymen are living. German products, German science, German industry, are spreading beyond the ocean. The value of the merchandise which Germany carries upon the seas runs into thousands of millions. It is your duty to help me to attach the great German Empire firmly to the Empire of Europe."

This speech set forth clearly the causes which were to compel William, already inclined to ambitious dreams, to seek continually for outlets, to construct a navy capable of protecting his world commerce. Economic causes, to be sure, were the most decisive—yet William's lust for world-domination did not fail to make use of them in furtherance of his political designs.

Even if events themselves irresistibly pushed the Emperor toward a policy of expansion, the

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movement of ideas was no less a party to it. Manufacturers and merchants had long realized the need of a great Germany, but ideas of this sort had still to penetrate into the mass of the people. Now professors, intellectuals, and historians took up the task. Already the teaching of history had been developed on all sides; William himself took the initiative in this as far back as 1890. What he wanted above all was that emphasis should be laid upon contemporary history, that courses in history should "begin at Sedan and Gravelotte and finish at Thermopylæ."

"In this way," he said, "the people will be brought to understand upon what foundations its existence and strength are built."

At the universities the old theories about the superiority of races were still advanced. "Germany is truly the heart of Europe, her mission is to reinvigorate, through the diffusion of Germanic blood, the worn-out limbs of old Europe." And, after having "organized" Europe, the world-empire was to be "founded," whose only citizens were to be Germans of pure stock.

KARL LAMPRECHT'S THEORIES

In place of the old historical school, which disappears with Treitschke in 1896, a new school arises, of which one of the most illustrious representatives is Karl Lamprecht. In the eyes of the new generation, brought up amid the material progress of the country, economic force is the creator of right, and, supported by military power,

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should be the foundation of German hegemony over the world.

"The Empire to-day is no longer a political body confined to territorial limits," wrote Lamprecht, "but a power acting throughout the universe. It is at every point to which German economic interests extend their tentacles. It acts as tentacles act. Economic forces should be set in motion in the same way as the army and the navy, which merely form one whole with these forces in so far as national expansion is concerned." Then comes an amplified conception of the cult of force, presented as the salient trait of the age of "free enterprise," and Lamprecht adds: "The strength of the army and navy has as its foundation the warring mechanism brought into being by capitalism."

WILLIAM EXTENDS HIS POWER

All these ideas, taught by university professors to members of the cultivated classes, propagated by means of school books or popular books, were likewise spread before, and assimilated by, the public in Germany, thanks to numerous associations, such as the Pan-German Union, founded in 1894, and the Naval Association, established in 1896; likewise by means of thousands of lectures given throughout Germany, by means of pamphlets published by millions of copies, such as *Greater Germany and Europe in 1950*, by means of their monthly bulletins like the *Pan-German Pages*, wherein there is constant reiteration of this

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phrase: "The German nation is a nation of masters, and, as such, should be respected by all other nations upon the entire earth."

These associations never ceased working for the cause of German expansion. The Pan-German Union, especially, bent its efforts toward uniting the Germans scattered throughout the world, for the purpose of "having them continue to be part of the nation," and the Naval Union sought to arouse passionate interest in maritime matters in the breasts of all Germans. The work of these associations found the best support from William II, who granted them the honor of his patronage and publicly testified his approval of them; in fact, the impulse given by him to the policy of Germany marked out for them the path that they ought to follow—all Germans ought to be Pan-Germans and imperialists. By means of the speeches delivered by him he was to become the animating and vitalizing force of *Deutschum* (Germanism), that theory, born of madness, which was to lead its devotees to war.

In the speeches delivered by him between 1896 and 1900 William gave evidence of the strengthening within himself of his ideas of world-domination and enabled observers to take account of the violent reaction caused in a man of such impulsiveness by the opposition of the Reichstag, or the European Powers, to this or that whim of his.

In 1897, on the occasion of the departure of his brother Henry upon a cruise to the Far East, he apostrophized the "budding commerce of Ger-

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many," but added the statement that "it cannot develop itself usefully unless it feels itself safe. Imperial power presupposes power on the sea as well as on the land."

In 1891 he stated that a great fleet was, in his eyes, "an indispensable prerequisite to the maintenance of the greatness of the Empire and the development of its economic interests."

THE FIGHT FOR A BIG NAVY

In 1899, on the occasion of the launching of a battleship, he placed upon the Reichstag the entire responsibility for the hampering of his policy. "If every increase of my fleet had not been obstinately refused me during the first eight years of my reign," he said, "despite my urgent appeals and my warnings, which met nothing but ridicule and jokes, we should have been able to develop our budding commerce and our interests across the seas in quite another manner."

Finally, at the reception held by him on January 1, 1900, he declared himself determined to "complete the work of reorganization in order that the navy may have the same rank as the land forces and that, thanks to its navy, the German Empire may occupy in the world the place which it does not as yet occupy."

In 1900 came the climax of that world policy pursued by William ever since 1895, with the support, dating from 1897, of Bülow in the Foreign Office and Tirpitz as Minister of the Navy. In July, 1900, William was able to proclaim that

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"upon the waves of the ocean and along the most remote shores no important decision can be arrived at without Germany, without the German Emperor."

At the same time the Emperor witnessed the coronation of his efforts to provide his country with a formidable fleet. Between 1895 and 1900 he worked indefatigably toward accomplishing his projects, exerting personal influence upon members of the Reichstag, designing for the halls in which the Reichstag held its meetings, paintings which depicted the proportional importance of a navy. But what most influenced public opinion was the seizure, toward the end of 1899, of two German vessels by a British cruiser on the coast of Africa, in the course of the South African War. The Reichstag, which had shown some reluctance in 1898 in passing a preliminary bill presented by Tirpitz, adopted in 1900, by two-thirds majority, a new bill calling for a program double that of 1898 and providing for the construction of 38 ships of the line and 14 armored cruisers.

The preamble of this bill set forth the intentions of the government in these brutal terms: "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that even the greatest naval power shall not be in a position to risk a war against her without jeopardizing its own supremacy. To accomplish this, the German navy must be as strong as that of the strongest naval power, since the latter cannot, under ordinary conditions, concentrate all its forces against us." All this sounded like a threat against Eng-

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land, but William took good care not to lay stress on it, for he knew full well the cost of hurting British susceptibilities. In 1896 his telegram to President Kruger had almost precipitated a war and the inferiority of his navy at that time had compelled him to make apologies to Queen Victoria. Therefore, as long as the German naval program had not been carried into effect, he made a point of making prodigal protestations of his peaceful intentions.

Little by little, however, the Entente Cordiale came to the fore, and Edward VII took it in hand. Emperor William did not see—or, if he did, he remained indifferent to this fact—that he was becoming a menace to the peace of the world.

Nobody desired, and—which was even more important—nobody was in a position to prevent Germany from acquiring, as soon as she was able, a galaxy of colonies. Bismarck had always—or at least up to the end of his tenure of power—despised these distant colonies, fearing that they might bring in less than they cost, declaring that, after all, everything would be decided upon the Rhine, the principal political questions as well as all the rest.

GERMAN COMMERCE GAINS GROUND

Moreover, Germany had discovered another method of colonization. She was conquering the world by other means, by installing herself within other nations, cutting down prices everywhere, ruining the commerce and industries of other

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lands, making her own industries the dominant power. This method, however, was one that was destined to bring no profit; in order to win at such a murderous game one must survive, and Germany, though magnificently strong to all outward appearances, was in reality being undermined by this very method, through which she was impoverishing herself in order to produce, in enormous quantities, that which she sold at very high prices to her own people and at lower prices to the people of other lands.

It was for the purpose of winning economic domination over the world that the German Empire created its formidable navy, not for the purpose of providing Germany, by legitimate efforts, with prosperity and security. Confronted with the danger of this German hegemony, which was based upon a well-armed Triple Alliance, and which found expression, beyond its own frontiers, in the menace of a disproportionately powerful navy, other nations, with quite honorable ends in view and resolved to uphold peace and defend themselves, proceeded to strengthen the bonds that united them to each other.

KING EDWARD'S WORK FOR PEACE

On April 8, 1904, came the Anglo-French agreement, which had been planned for many years. This agreement of April 8, 1904, was the crown upon the efforts made by King Edward, ever since his accession to the throne, toward the establishment of friendlier relations between the two

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countries. This monarch, in whom "the desire for peace is very marked"—as his nephew William averred—employed all his talents and all his diplomacy in consolidating the peaceful relations of nations with one another. He showed himself "inclined to tender his good offices in every quarter of the world where he foresaw possible collisions."

First, he set himself to improving the relations between France and Japan, which had deteriorated somewhat during the Russo-Japanese War. On June 10, 1907, an agreement was made between France and Japan—the latter of which was already allied to England, since November, 1902, by a treaty renewed on August 12, 1905. This Franco-Japanese agreement may be considered "the continuation of the peaceful policy of France, the object of which is to forestall all complications all over the world."

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE IS BORN

Bringing about a *rapprochement* between Russia, on the one hand, and Japan and England on the other, was, however, a more difficult matter. But Edward VII did not allow himself to be daunted, and, with the co-operation of the French government, he succeeded in getting a Russo-Japanese agreement signed on July 20, 1907, and, on August 31st of the same year an Anglo-Russian agreement, which put an end to all pending difficulties in Asia.

Thus the Triple Entente was born in the face

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of the Triple Alliance, and it was destined to become constantly a more intimate and trusting relationship between three governments pursuing a deliberately pacific policy. King Edward, a man of much finesse and moderation, liked situations that were clean-cut and unequivocal. He had a hatred of grand gestures, of sonorous phrases. He loved France, with which land he was well acquainted, and felt only a lukewarm liking for his nephew William, whose unworthy conduct toward Frederick III he had not forgotten.

Republican France desired nothing better than to live on good terms with all nations. The era of great expeditions to distant parts was over, but France wished the assurance of being able to develop her Mediterranean colonial domain in security, for which reason she made agreements with her neighbors: first, in 1900 and 1902, with Italy, regarding Tunis and Morocco; later, on October 3, 1904, with Spain, regarding Morocco. It was this last agreement which gave a pretext to William II for a play to the gallery. With reference to Germany, France harbored no fiery ambitions of revenge, but, at the same time, she had no intention of being treated like a second-rate Power.

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

As for Russia, that nation, having just emerged from her arduous war in the Far East, was desirous of nothing but rest. Tsar Nicholas, who toward the end of the nineteenth century took the initiative in proposing a peace conference at The

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Hague, also sought, by means of a second conference summoned in 1907, to find a solution for the very delicate problem of the limitation of armaments and of obligatory arbitration. Opposition to these, by the way, came from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

Given three governments inspired by such sentiments, the Entente could have none but a peaceful goal in view; a goal, in fact, more distinctly peaceful than that of the Triple Alliance. In 1904, William and his Chancellor, Bülow, saw in the Entente Cordiale nothing more than a liquidation of the past.

But the formation in Europe of new groupings of Powers with Russia upset the plans of William. At Berlin, no doubt, it was well known that the Triple Entente was directed against nobody, and Bülow saw in it no more than a new form of the traditional English policy of equilibrium, but in the eyes of the Emperor it was exactly in this that the danger to German hegemony in Europe lay. It would become increasingly difficult, he foresaw, to bring to bear the whole weight of German armaments by means of negotiations, upon these three Powers, which, though peaceful, were allied with one another.

Therefore, William and Bülow denounced to the utmost the efforts of Edward VII, branding them as a policy of encirclement aimed at the isolation of Germany.

As early as November 15, 1906, when the idea of an Anglo-Russian agreement was in the air,

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Bülow declared in the Reichstag that a "policy having as its purpose the encirclement of Germany would be dangerous to the peace of Europe, and that the making of such a circle aroused apprehensions of an explosion." And William, who, since 1905, had, on several occasions, spoken of "dry powder" and "the sharp sword," became threatening in 1907.

"Germany is ready," he said on February 3d of that year, "to trample underfoot those who get in her way."

William still thought that he was living in the days of Bismarck, when all Europe bowed at a sign from Berlin.

WILLIAM A GOOD ACTOR

From 1904 to 1914, William sought to break the imaginary circle drawn about him. In order to accomplish his ends, he found every means good—courteous advances, violent acts, intimate confidences, dramatic coups, trusting avowals, lies, official negotiations, steps by adventurers. In this he was what he has always been—a great actor.

"The Emperor," said Holstein, who had been concerned for thirty years in the shaping of German policy, "has the theatrical instinct, not the political."

Working now upon Russia for the purpose of hurting France, now with France to alienate her from England, seeking now to break the Franco-Russian alliance, now to worm his way into it as

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a third party, his sole direct object remained that of breaking the entente of other Powers with England, which he wished to isolate.

From 1904 he turned toward Tsar Nicholas, being well aware of his influence upon the weak character of that monarch. Moreover, the Tsar was at that time face to face with the serious problems arising from the Russo-Japanese War, for which William was in part to blame, for had he not constantly encouraged the Tsar in the latter's Asiatic policy? Telegrams exchanged between the two rulers, discovered later in the Russian archives and made public, cast a strong light upon the maneuvers of the Kaiser, which were filled with perfidy and duplicity.

KAISER AND TSAR WORK IN SECRET

At the very moment when France was exerting herself to prevent a rupture between Russia and England as a consequence of the Dogger Bank incidents, William, while congratulating himself in public on the fortunate results from the peaceful conclusion of the matter, at the same time hinted on the sly to the Tsar that France was fulfilling her duties as an ally pretty badly, and that a good entente among the three continental Powers would be the best way to checkmate England. At first Nicholas yielded. The text of an agreement was drawn up between the two sovereigns, on October 30, 1904. Later, though, scruples arose in the mind of the Tsar, who was faithful to his alliance with France. He wished to communicate the text

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to France before signing. William opposed this violently, fearing that England might get wind of it.

This first attempt failed. But, in July, 1905, at the time when the disasters of the Russian fleet had painfully impressed Nicholas and when the mutterings of revolution were audible in St. Petersburg, William, cruising in the Baltic, brought about the interview at Björkö. There, amid the calm of the sea, "with no witness but God"—whose name William took so often in vain—he caused the Tsar to sign a treaty, made known since the war, through a letter of Lamsdorff.

The pretense was made that this treaty was destined to assure the peace of Europe. Russia and Germany bound themselves to reciprocal aid in case of attack. William, moreover, bound himself to obtain the adhesion of France.

In the following month of August the Tsar notified William that he would not ratify the treaty, since he considered it impossible to obtain the adhesion of France. William insisted, but despite the efforts of Count Witte, who had become the executive instrument of the Kaiser's wishes, the Tsar held out in his objections and proposed a supplementary clause stipulating that the treaty should not be valid in case of a war between France and Germany.

The trick had failed. William had been unable to get himself into the Franco-Russian alliance in order to dominate it, and, by this means, to destroy the Entente Cordiale.

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EFFORTS TO DESTROY THE ENTENTE

As to France, William, who up to 1904 had given evidence of apparently more friendly sentiments, and who had not ceased to preach to all Frenchmen passing through Germany the advantages of an agreement, or even alliance, between France and Germany, suddenly changed his attitude after the formation of the Entente Cordiale, and, by rude spectacular plays with regard to Morocco, sought to destroy the Entente.

Germany had no special interest in Morocco; at that time Germans had but little part in Moroccan affairs. But William found in the Franco-Spanish agreement of October 3, 1904, a pretext for a complaint that he had been excluded from the Morocco settlement.

In February, 1905, he declared, through his ambassador at Paris, that he, ignoring all the agreements reached, did not consider himself bound in any way. Then it was that he decided to stop at Tangier, in the course of a cruise in the Mediterranean; and a few days before his departure, on March 22d, he said in a threatening speech: "I shall allow bayonets and cannon to rest as long as I can, but the bayonets must be kept sharp and the cannon in good condition."

Nine days later, on March 31st, he landed at Tangier, despite the wise counsels given him by Queen Amelia, while he was stopping at Lisbon. Received by an envoy of Abdul-Aziz, he declared publicly that he would deal only with "the Sultan of Morocco, an absolutely free and independent

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sovereign, in order to safeguard German interests in Morocco efficaciously against all kinds of monopoly and schemes of annexation.

WILLIAM CAUSES FALL OF DELCASSE

This brutal blow at France was soon followed, on April 12th, by a demand from Bülow for an international conference. Abdul-Aziz, at the instigation of Germany, addressed a communication on May 30th to the Powers, but Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, replied to it with a formal refusal.

Thereupon William wished to be rid at any price of that "Anglophile," Delcassé, so he dispatched an official go-between, Count Henckel-Donnersmarck, husband of "La Païva," an adventuress of the Second Empire, to Paris. Henckel prevailed upon the French Premier, Maurice Rouvier, to leave his Minister of Foreign Affairs in the lurch, and, on June 12, 1907, the resignation of M. Delcassé was accepted. Notwithstanding, M. Rouvier continued to uphold the French government's point of view, and, although he finally accepted in principle the proposal of a conference, he likewise obtained from Germany the formal recognition of the preferential position of France in Morocco.

The Algeciras Conference was not a success for Germany. But France, on the other hand, thanks to her honest policy, had the satisfaction of seeing other nations draw closer to her. The Entente Cordiale, which, as Count Witte said, was the tar-

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get at which William was aiming when he paid his visit to Tangier, emerged unscathed.

The régime of uncertainty created by the Algeciras agreement soon gave opportunity for further German meddling. Though France had preponderant privileges in Morocco, Morocco had been internationalized and its Sultan left without any real power, and now, whenever troubles arose there, fomented by German agents, France was blamed because she did not put an end to them, yet, whenever she took a hand, she was blamed for her police measures.

FOREIGN LEGION DESERTERS

One of the most serious of the incidents that arose was that of the Casablanca deserters. On September 25, 1906, some members of the Foreign Legion tried to desert. They received assistance from the chancellor of the German consulate, since three of them were of German origin, but French officers succeeded in recapturing them. These acts, carried out by subordinates, were made much of by the Berlin Foreign Office, which agreed to their being arbitrated only after considerable show of reluctance. But, when the facts came out, there was nothing to do but declare Germany in the wrong.

GERMANY AGITATES WAR

After that it looked as if there was to be an era of quiet in Franco-German relations with regard to Morocco. In fact, at the beginning of 1909—on February 8th—an agreement was signed setting

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forth Germany's lack of special political interests in Morocco and favoring the association of Frenchmen with Germans in commercial undertakings there.

Germany had speculated upon the broad opportunities opened up by this agreement, but, in her eyes, collaboration amounted to domination. She complained of not having received her share, which simply meant that she had not received the whole. A rupture appeared to be imminent.

On July 1, 1911, the *Panther* dropped anchor before Agadir. Germany was particularly displeased on account of France's recent expedition to Fez, which had been made necessary by the intrigues of Mulai-Hafid—"Germany cannot allow Morocco to become French."

"If Germany but gets her share of Morocco," said the German Crown Prince to M. Cambon, "there will be an end to all trouble."

FRANCE MAKES CONCESSIONS

The French government of that period, desirous of peace, granted compensations to Germany, after long and difficult negotiations, but granted them not in Morocco, but in the Congo region. The Agadir coup, that new threat whereby William wished to put the solidity of the Entente Cordiale to the test, had been no more successful than its predecessors. From the very first day, England let it be clearly known that, in the whole Morocco matter, she would be on the side of France.

The "fist on the table" policy had failed. But

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William tried once more, in the early part of 1912, to break up the Entente between the Powers, by means of official negotiations with England and, later, with France.

First came the Haldane mission to Berlin in February, requested in January by the Emperor himself, which was wrecked by the impossible demand of Germany that England guarantee to remain neutral in case of war. And, in March, came attempts at Paris and Berlin toward bringing about a *rapprochement* between France and Germany, as a result of the granting of broader autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine.

KAISER BLAMES ENGLAND

It is extremely probable that William sought to start a war by his Agadir coup. But, confronted with the energetic action of England, the "valiant poltroon," to borrow the description of him made by Maximilian Harden, backed down again—his navy was not yet ready. So he had to content himself with the agreement of November 5th. Seeking always to make a boast of his peaceful intentions, he congratulated himself, in the presence of a Frenchman, on having overcome the crisis, adding: "The English, however, did everything in their power to bring about a good war."

The agreement, nevertheless, was far from enough for the Pan-German appetites of the German people. Had not the German Chancellor promised the leaders of the Pan-German Union that there would be a partition of northern Africa

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whereby Germany would obtain a large part of Morocco? Hence, when the text of the agreement became known, it aroused bitter criticisms in the German press. The agreement was everywhere dubbed "the Morocco slap."

Once more all the Pan-German arguments were trotted out concerning the inequality between the colonial possessions of Germany, on the one hand, and those of France and England on the other. The press again drew up the balance sheet of the Agadir operation, proclaimed, with much display of statistics, that Germany ranked first among all the countries of the world, and poured vituperation upon the government which had thus allowed Germany to be treated as if she were a secondary Power.

PEACE BY "THE GOOD GERMAN SWORD"

"The government," wrote Bernhardi, "has sacrificed too much to its desire to maintain peace." Even in the Reichstag members declared, amid applause from the Crown Prince, that "it is not by making concessions of this sort that peace is to be assured, but by the good German sword."

This manifestation of public opinion, which was accompanied by scandalous court trials, was the tardy climax of the Pan-German movement, tirelessly engineered for almost a century. The passionate aspirations of the German historians had now become mere useless literature; the violent theories of men like Lasson and Treitschke now seemed actually moderate!

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In 1912 it was a case of a demand, from all Germans, for a war that had become necessary—not a defensive war, but a war of conquest, a war of extermination. "*Deutschland über alles*" must be made into a reality. The German people had told itself so loudly of its merits, it was so firmly convinced that might made right and that the struggle for "conquering its place in the sun" had been imposed upon it by fate, that it was now thirsting for a war which, it had been assured, would result in easy victory because of the anarchy and decay reigning in other nations. It included France, England, and Russia in one and the same contemptuous hatred, detested Japan, felt jealousy for the United States, and resolved that the little nations of the world must be obliged to conform to the needs of German hegemony over the universe.

Such were the ideas to be found over the signature of German literary men and historians, officers and diplomats, even of princes of the imperial blood, scattered through that multitude of articles, pamphlets, and books which saw the light in 1912 and 1913.

Daniel Grymann's *Were I the Emperor!* ran through thirty editions in a few months. "France," said he, "must decide between England and Germany. In the first case, war will become necessary. The empire of the world must belong to Germany; she must display an active policy, a policy—I say it without compunction—of an aggressive character."

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Then there was General Bernhardi, with his *Germany and the Next War*, a more scientific work, without preachments of excessively violent measures, but which, nevertheless, coolly advocated war; a confessedly arduous war, since Germany would be obliged to vanquish France, England, and Russia, but a war that was necessary notwithstanding, since Germany was confronted with the choice between "world power or downfall."

MORE BELLICOSE BOOKS

Then came Colonel Frobenius's *Germany's Fateful Hour*, which, bearing the recommendation of men occupying the highest posts, reached its fourteenth edition within a few weeks of its appearance. In this work the author demonstrated the necessity of attacking and, consequently, of being prepared.

Then there was also the Crown Prince himself, with his *Germany in Arms*, published in 1913. "This present day," he wrote, "when people are chattering about cosmopolitanism and dreaming enthusiastic dreams of eternal peace, is not at all to the liking of the German. He needs war."

These theories found cordial approval from the German public, especially from the members of the innumerable leagues which had developed and multiplied in Germany. The old Pan-German Union had been continuing its mission of knitting together the Germans scattered over the world, greatly aided by that monstrous law of July 22, 1913, which permitted Germans naturalized in

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another country to preserve, notwithstanding, their German nationality. When mobilization came it behooved these foreigners to take their places as fighters for Germany.

EFFORTS TO DESTROY BRITISH NAVAL POWER

The Naval League, which maintained close relations with the press bureau of the Admiralty, sought to demonstrate more earnestly than ever the necessity of destroying the military power of England. And, beside these old associations, others had sprung up composed of military veterans, which masqueraded as benevolent associations, such as the Union of German Fighters, which had, in 1912, 2,700,000 members, all of which were under the thumb of the Pan-German Union. Finally, on December 25, 1911, the Defense Union (*Wehrverein*) was founded at Berlin, under the presidency of General Keim, which, according to its statutes, had for its object "to make the armed forces of Germany internally and numerically strong enough to be unquestionably capable of assuring the protection of the Empire and its power in the world." From the very beginning of its existence, in 1913, it had a membership of over 300,000.

This fever of warlike propaganda, manifested in the most variegated ways, bore fruit. A sort of collective madness, of persecution mania, seized upon the German people. On all sides there arose a demand for the "statesman who, paying no heed to the clamor of parties and press, should be

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capable of satisfying the desire of the nation to play a part in the world."

"We need a man of energy," exclaimed Einhart, in his *German History*. "What we need is a physician."

GERMANY CLAMORS FOR WAR

This movement, desired and prepared by the government and the Emperor, had now risen to such heights as to sweep them along with it. The Pan-German bellicose party clamored still more loudly for increase of armaments and direct preparation for war.

In 1911 the five-year military period was renewed; on April 22, 1912, still another project providing for "more prompt preparation for war" was brought forward, calling particularly for an increase in the total number of officers and non-commissioned officers. When put into effect, this would give a total effective force of 700,000 men, and create a heavy artillery of 633 batteries, each of six guns. The bill was passed on May 10th and was almost entirely in effect by the ensuing October.

The navy, also, developed along parallel lines. Tirpitz, who had seen chancellors and Ministers of state come and go since 1898, pressed actively forward with naval construction, for which he had obtained constantly augmenting appropriations—285,000,000 marks in 1905, 310,000,000 in 1906, 350,000,000 in 1907, and 428,000,000 in 1908. In 1912, four days after the passage of the military law, the Reichstag adopted a naval program in-

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creasing the total number of men in the navy from 63,500 to 80,000. Also, a third squadron was created, with reserve ships, and, in addition, three battleships and two cruisers were ordered built. According to this program, there were to be, in 1920, 61 big armored ships in the German navy.

BALKAN WAR BRINGS A CRISIS

These prodigious increases seemed still insufficient when the Balkan War broke out. In the autumn of 1912 a new plan of land armament was taken into consideration, under the greatest secrecy. This plan was laid before the Chancellor in December, together with a report declaring that increases were necessary in the army on account of the attitude of the Triple Entente, which, though a defensive counterweight to the Triple Alliance, showed, nevertheless, "strong offensive tendencies, since it had political ends in view, the pursuit of which was adjudged by the allied Powers worthy of their maximum efforts." Despite these considerations, which were a shameless camouflage of the truth, the Chancellor and the entourage of the Emperor hesitated. The plan was not approved until the first of the ensuing January; it was presented to the Reichstag in March, 1913.

HUGE INCREASE IN GERMAN ARMY

The increase provided for was formidable indeed; the total number of troops rose from 700,000 to 866,000, and war material of every sort was likewise augmented. For the purpose of

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carrying out this program, which was to be completed in great part by October, 1913, exceptional financial measures were provided for; to cover nonrenewable expenditures, which reached a total of 1,000,000,000 marks, provision was made for a single war tax. The bill for all the above was promptly passed on June 30th, and the press did not conceal the joy felt by the government. "The security thus obtained," said the Cologne *Gazette*, "opens the way to us for a world policy." And the goal to be pursued was clearly acknowledged thus: "The army can now pass with more ease from a peace footing to a war footing." The Crown Prince and the Kaiser adopted a bellicose tone in their speeches and orders of the day, which was an echo of the inmost thoughts of the German nation.

How different, during 1912 and 1913, was the attitude of peoples and governments in the lands of the Triple Entente—which, according to the Pan-German leaders, were ready to take the offensive and hurl themselves upon Germany! France, England, and Russia had no object in view except the maintenance of peace.

Naturally, in view of the gigantic armament plans of Germany, France and England felt the necessity of establishing closer relations between the General Staffs of their armies; but, in letters exchanged on November 22 and 23, 1912, they provided solely for action in case of aggression against them. France and Russia, to be sure, completed, by means of a naval agreement on July 18,

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1912, the defensive agreement of 1892. France, to be sure, returned in 1913 to three-year military service. But were not these elementary measures of precaution, dictated solely by regard for national security, and quite easily understandable in the midst of the rumors of war emanating from all sides in Central Europe and the Balkans?

Standing by the side of Germany in arms, Austria-Hungary also made immense war preparations in 1912. Having, beyond a doubt, received secret information from Bulgaria as to the intentions of the Balkan nations with regard to Turkey, she bided her time for realizing her ambitions with regard to an outlet on the Ægean Sea.

ENTENTE BLAMELESS IN BALKAN TURMOIL

Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, in fact, had made a series of agreements in the spring of 1912, a veritable series of war compacts, of which France and England were at that time almost totally ignorant, and of which Russia, though in some cases intrusted with the rôle of arbiter, had only imperfect knowledge. Despite this, Germany felt no compunction in pretending, even in her 1919 Memorial on the responsibilities for the war, that the Balkan happenings had been simply a vast plot engineered against Austria-Hungary and Turkey by Russia, with England, France, and the Balkan States as her accomplices.

In order to refute such allegations it suffices to refer to the official publications of the various allied governments, particularly to the three

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French Yellow Books dealing with Balkan matters. Therein may be found the clearest possible proof of the endeavors made without cessation by Entente diplomacy, notably by France and M. Raymond Poincaré, for preventing the conflict, and, afterward, for localizing and abating it. On the side of the Triple Alliance, however, quite different sentiments were manifested.

Austria, who seemed disappointed at the rapid victories of the Balkan Allies, particularly of Serbia, could not reconcile herself to a partition of Turkey without her own participation; therefore she speeded up her military preparations and concentrated troops on the Serbian frontier. At the same time she sought to involve Italy, who had just obtained Tripoli from Turkey, in her game. The Triple Alliance was renewed in advance on December 5th, and Italy received promises assuring her of preponderant power in the eastern Mediterranean.

GERMANY WORRIED IN 1913

But Austrian designs on the Balkans and the defeat of the Turkish army, despite its having been trained in the German school, had not failed to worry the German government, which, at the outset of 1913, had its doubts as to being able to win a rapid victory in case of a war against the Triple Entente. The measures provided for by the military laws under consideration were not to become fully effective until the following October; the widening of the Kiel Canal to allow the passage

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of the biggest naval units was not yet completed; and important submarine and aviation construction was still under way. Hence, it was Berlin which advised Vienna to wait; it was upon the initiative of the German government that Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria addressed to the Tsar a request—promptly agreed to—that he order immediate demobilization, in the higher interests of peace.

At London, ever since December 13th, the ambassadors of the Powers had been endeavoring, under the leadership of Sir Edward Grey, to come to an agreement. On May 30, 1913, preliminaries of peace were signed; the Triple Alliance succeeded in securing the creation of an autonomous Albanian state on the shores of the Adriatic, under the government of a German prince.

Re-established by the Treaty of London, the peace, however, was of short duration. On June 30th hostilities in the Balkans recommenced. Bulgaria picked a quarrel with her former allies, Serbia and Greece, concerning Macedonia.

In this the responsibility of Austria was beyond doubt. Previous to opening the new campaign, Ferdinand of Bulgaria received from Vienna a promise of support. But now Rumania also declared against Bulgaria, and Turkey, backed by Germany, profited from the general confusion by retaking Adrianople. Ferdinand, finding himself surrounded, accepted the terms of the Peace of Bucharest, signed on August 10, 1913.

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During this second crisis the Entente Powers continued their active policy of mediation, but did not on all occasions find the desired co-operation from Germany and Austria. Moreover, Austria could not bring herself to allow the aggrandizement of Serbia, so she tried again, on the eve of the Treaty of Bucharest, to drag Italy into the Balkan War by invoking the *casus foederis*. Italy, however, spurned the appeal.

AUSTRIA SPITEFUL AFTER BALKAN WAR

Peace having been signed, Austria found herself with none of her ambitions realized, and it became clearly apparent that she would give free rein, at the very first opportunity, to her spite and her greed, and that she would be backed in this by the whole might of Germany.

As early as the month of November, 1913, it looked as if the mind of Emperor William had been thoroughly made up.

In a talk with King Albert of Belgium on November 5th he declared that "war with France is inevitable, and we are bound to come to it some day or other." And von Moltke added, "This time we must finish her up." Within the German Empire chauvinistic agitation reached its zenith; militaristic circles felt outraged at the policy of William and Bethmann-Hollweg, apparently peaceful up to then. Some of them regretted the old Austrian spirit. A new league even, the Prussian League, was formed at Berlin in the month of January.

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WARLIKE INFLUENCE OF BOOKS

Everywhere there were fresh Pan-German manifestoes and lectures. Books, like *The Germans*, by Wilser, *German History*, by Wolff, manuals for youths such as *Remember Thou Art a German!* by Westerich, were spread broadcast. At the same time, military preparations progressed feverishly; new strategic lines were built daily on the western frontier; maneuvering fields were extended; aviation was developed.

And, in foreign parts, Germany prepared her bases and points of support.

After the Turkish defeats of 1912, Germany no longer felt confidence in the Ottoman commanders, and, since she wished to assure herself of control of the straits, she sent a military mission to Turkey in November, 1913, under the leadership of General Liman von Sanders, who was to take command of the army corps of Constantinople. Representations made by the Triple Entente both at Berlin and Constantinople resulted, on January 15th, in the retention of Liman von Sanders at Constantinople, but without any actual command; he received the title of marshal in the Turkish army.

Dealings between Germany and Austria-Hungary were constant; joint action was planned and co-ordinated; Emperor William had a meeting with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Miramar in April; afterward, in June, he went with Admiral Tirpitz to the Archduke's estate of Konopischt.

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PEACEFUL ATTITUDE OF TRIPLE ENTENTE

In spite of the fact that Central Europe was in such a ferment, the Triple Entente continued upon its peaceful way. For the purpose of forestalling possible trouble as a result of conflicting French and German interests in Asiatic Turkey, negotiations were started at Berlin which resulted in an agreement on February 15th. At London, England sought to settle some disputed points in Africa and Asia in a similar manner, thereby bringing about an Anglo-German agreement on June 15th. Finally, Russia continually showed her justified apprehension with regard to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans.

But the warlike ambitions of William and his people were destined to thwart completely the enormous diplomatic labors of the Triple Entente, in the course of those three years, toward maintaining the peace of Europe. War had been decided upon! A pretext for beginning it was soon to be found! The Sarajevo murder was to be the spark that lighted the universal conflagration.

CHAPTER IV

THE JOURNEY TO RUSSIA

THE French elections of the month of May, 1914, had brought to the Chamber a compact majority of advanced republicans, whose first demand was for revision of the three-year military service law, which they wished lightened. This law had just been passed in the midst of a political agitation, the intensity of which had been heightened by the elections; it was intended as an answer to the formidable armament designs of Germany. Hence, the first problem presenting itself to the government, now face to face with the majority in the Chamber, was that of this military law.

I became Premier through the appeal which M. Poincaré did me the honor of addressing to me, on June 3, 1914 (M. Doumergue having, despite my repeated requests, refused to remain in power).

I do not wish to call attention again to this crisis, which was certainly mild when compared with the formidable convulsions which followed it, for the mere pleasure of setting down personal memories, but because it is bound up with the ensuing drama.

Convinced of the necessity for maintaining the three-year service law, and desiring at the same time to demonstrate that it was by no means something that could never be altered, I took in hand

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the formation of the Cabinet, with the idea of leaving intact the law that had been recently passed. All I wished was to lay stress on the fact that military preparation of the organized youth of the country had become a necessity, and that, should foreign affairs permit, the measures taken might be revoked, since military laws depended upon conditions in Europe. This compromise, however, suffered the fate that is usually meted out by political parties to arrangements based on justice: the moderate party was afraid of it and some members of the Extreme Left found it inadequate. After intervening in the matter in a way that jeopardized the independence of the head of the government, and, consequently, his authority, I gave up the task—which, by the way, I had not sought for myself.

M. Ribot, who took my place, fell, the very day of his accession, before the adverse vote of a Chamber, the ardent passions of which were clearly shown on that day.

On June 13th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, M. Poincaré again had me summoned. At five in the afternoon my Cabinet was formed. On Tuesday, June 16th, I put through my plan of compromise in the Chamber, which gave me a large majority of votes. The crisis had lasted a fortnight.

This crisis—and here is why I recall it—had been followed with noticeable interest by some of the foreign diplomats, particularly by those of the Central Empires. It is possible now to grasp the

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nature of this interest—now that time has elapsed and ample information, then unknown, has been harvested on the bloody fields of war.

The day after June 16th, when I had declared that the three-year law was not to be touched for the time being, I became the target for a deluge of German insults.

“M. Viviani holds his portfolio by grace of the Emperor of Russia,” said a great official Berlin newspaper.

Colonel Serret, military attaché at Berlin, who later died a glorious death, told me during the war that, having been summoned early in June, 1914, to pay a visit to Emperor William, the latter thus addressed him:

“Well, Colonel, the crisis continues; . . . do you suppose that it is to be a revolution?”

“Your Majesty,” answered the French soldier, “we have seen other crises.”

The perspicacious Emperor did not suspect that the revolution which he foresaw was destined to be so little favorable to him.

And now the new French Cabinet took up its labors, with an eye to national defense and inspired by so strong a desire to strengthen it at once that it asked the Senate, on July 14, 1914, to vote appropriations for heavy artillery. These, voted in February by the Chamber and again in April, after a modification in the Senate, were the occasion of an unfortunate debate in the Upper House. Later it was proved to us that, at that time, we did not quite

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accurately realize the extent of the harm done by imprudent words.

A Senator always inclined to criticism, M. Charles Humbert, wished to demonstrate what he considered to be the worthlessness of the organization of our artillery. This he did in scathing terms. The ministerial protest, made by the Minister of War, and myself, did not disarm censure. A few days later all the German newspapers came out with lengthy and violent comments, and without anything on the other side to counterbalance their statements. Belief in our alleged weakness was thus strengthened—and this on the 14th of July, 1914!

On the 28th of June, 1914, it will be recalled, the Sarajevo murder occurred.

On that day, having been informed of the crime while at the racecourse where the Grand Prix was being run, I felt no doubt that a terrible drama was being staged. And the disgrace of the world was that the blood of millions of innocent men was to flow for four years, that civilization was to suffer a dreadful eclipse, that the destiny of nations was to be held back, that humanity, so proud of itself but the day before, was to sink lower than in remote ancient times and dishonor science by its barbarity—all as a consequence of that murder!

What happened is well known: the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, having been the objects of a first attempt which did not harm them, while they were upon Austro-Hungarian territory,

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under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian police, participating in a ceremony for which an Austrian general bore the responsibility, were asked, by the local authorities, to continue along the route arranged for them. They did—and were killed. The assassins, the first of whom was the son of the chief of police, were not Serbs.

It was an atrocious crime. Everybody was horrified. In the French Senate, in the Chamber, I protested against the crime and paid honor to the victims. The Emperor of Austria caused written expressions of gratitude to be sent to me.

We waited.

What might happen? What was going to happen? Certainly Austria-Hungary could not pass over this crime in silence. She might strike directly, since it had occurred on her soil; and if, in the course of the investigations preceding punishment, she should unearth evidence of political responsibility on the part of the Serbian government, she was at liberty to publish it to the world. Austria did what she could. But, despite police maneuverings, all that she had obtained up to July 13th was testimony from one of her agents showing the complete innocence of the Serbian government.

It seemed as if the incident had been duly closed. In the course of other chapters, when the responsibility of the old Emperor of Austria and of Count Berchtold will be taken up, as well as that of Emperor William, Chancellor Bethmann-Holl-

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weg, and of the German Foreign Minister von Jagow, the deadly intrigues hatched in those days will be brought out. Let it be noted now that the crime against this Archduke—who was detested because of his desire to destroy the Dual Monarchy, because of his marriage, because of his lack of ability, which was even more incurable than the disease undermining him, because of his intimacy with the German Emperor, whose close friend he was while he was waiting to become his instrument—was taken advantage of with an alacrity of which the ensuing events constituted a proof.

On July 15th, M. Poincaré and I left France for Russia. Our journey was criticized adversely in various ways and from various points of view. It was said that what had happened at Sarajevo should have made us postpone it. But we could not postpone a journey which had been prepared five months back—which was to be made not only to Russia, but also to Sweden, Denmark, and Norway—without giving rise to the worst interpretations. Such a postponement would have amounted to heightening by our own act the state of tension, which was up to then scarcely visible, and to placing upon the Sarajevo murder the impress of a political crime.

As for the allegation, repeated by Emperor William in his Memoirs, that this journey was undertaken for the purpose of adopting joint measures for war with Russia, there is scarcely any need to answer such nonsense. The trip had been arranged

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by my predecessor in the French Premiership, M. Doumergue, as far back as his accession to power in the early part of 1914. In June I found the trip worked out to its smallest details. It was not merely to be a visit to our ally, Russia, but also, as I have just remarked, to the courts of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.

Moreover, at what was the alleged plot to be aimed? At what definite target, since the ultimatum was dated July 23d? And what was the need of making plans with an ally, at the price of a journey taking us away from home for so long a time, two-thirds of which had been destined in advance to other countries? Was the purpose to make joint plans with Russia? But this was an easy matter, even if done at a distance, and we actually did make such plans when the war was upon us.

Our journey, in fact, was preceded by that of the German Emperor, who, on July 10, 1914, embarked upon a cruise, the innocence of which will be shown shortly. He had no need of making plans on that tenth day of July with his accomplice, the Emperor of Austria, since, as has been proved by the German documents emanating from the German Foreign Office (*German Documents of 1919*), official Germany had already had knowledge for some days of the ultimatum—in substance, at least.

On July 10th, the honest folk surrounding the Emperor, and the Emperor himself, had been able to perceive a general war looming up on the hori-

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zon—not only as a possibility, but as a certainty. And even if it is true, as has been maintained, that the Emperor was compelled to set out upon his cruise, his departure sanctioned the plan of action decided upon in agreement with his Ministers, and proved, at the same time, the eagerness with which his Ministers pressed him to depart, fearing that some haughty prank of his might upset the plan. One may even go so far as to believe that, if this journey was really forced upon him, his Ministers were afraid of his overbearing personality, his arbitrary whims, his craving for display—mistaken by him throughout his life for action—and his far-reaching indiscretions.

During these days von Jagow was almost constantly spying upon the journey of M. Poincaré and myself. This will be shown a few pages farther along—for the time being we must forget such miserable “supers” in order to turn our eyes farther away and higher up.

M. Poincaré and I left our country on the morning of July 16, 1914. Rocked lightly between the blue skies and the blue waters, in that isolation which, for a man in public office, is the reward of action, the President of the French Republic and I sat chatting with each other. We were journeying, with heads held high and clean of heart, toward peace, toward the strengthening of our alliance with Russia, toward the establishment of friendly relations with other lands, toward that fusion of general sympathies wherein the privileged friend-

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ship caused by the existence of an alliance does not preclude additional knitting together of thoughts and interests. Nor does that friendship destroy independence, since, otherwise, an alliance would degenerate into servitude. M. Poincaré had informed me, in my capacity of responsible head of the government, of the speech which he was to make at the imperial banquet, and I had asked to have the speech to be made by the Tsar communicated to me, which request had been granted. These two speeches both paid honor, in strong and clear words, to peace.

What were we going to say to the Tsar, to the Russian government? Of course, we were going to talk about the state of Europe, about the interests of the alliance between our two countries. We also intended (nor did M. Poincaré and I omit this) to ask for the establishment of more cordial relations between Russia and Sweden, the latter having complained about isolated acts by a Russian naval attaché. Finally, we were going to give expression to English grievances with regard to the actions of certain Russian consuls. An alliance requires that a certain degree of consideration, compatible with its maintenance, be shown to other nations.

We talked of these subjects and of others also, outside the province of our duties, drawing often upon our professional and political memories for the material of our friendly conversations.

When we arrived in the roadstead of Cronstadt on Monday, July 20th, at two o'clock in the after-

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noon, a murderous heat was pouring from the heavens upon the gorgeous spectacle before us, a heat of such intensity that, far up there in the north of Europe, I almost yearned to exchange it for the heat of my beloved Africa. Tsar Nicholas, as dapper as a cavalry officer, came forth to greet us, and we departed together with his suite of dignitaries and Ministers. The touching modesty of the Tsar, as excessive as his timidity, his contempt for the magnificence of palaces, his liking for a quiet life, were clearly shown by his attitude and his remarks, expressed in the purest French. He upheld the alliance with France because of his political honesty, to be sure, but also because of a kind of religious mysticism, which caused him to look upon it as a legacy from his beloved father. Never was he insensible to the influence of those two considerations. This I was to learn later, in 1916, at the General Headquarters of his army, when an imperial sign from him, for which I asked in the course of a mission on which I had been sent, sufficed for me to obtain what France desired.

CONVERSATION WITH THE TSAR

What can I say of our conversations? The head of the French Republic spoke alone for almost an hour with the Tsar, as was proper. I, too, conversed with the Tsar; also, naturally, with the Premier, and, above all with M. Sazonoff. We were in agreement, as other Ministers had been before me, in 1912, and at all times, regarding the necessity for maintaining the alliance in dignity

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and peace. Also—as I have noted above—we transmitted the grievances of England and Sweden. All the arrangements of difficulties requested by us were granted.

Shall I speak of the celebrations, reviews, parades, of the reception by the Empress, so magnificent in her beauty, with her blue eyes as piercing as sapphires? How long ago it all is! The soil of Russia, a shroud that is always frozen, hides the horrors of hecatombs, to escape from which neither rank, age, nor sex availed. The Emperor William, in August, 1914, called for solidarity among the regicides! His government defrayed the expenses of Lenine's journey to Russia!

And now we are drawing close to the drama. We shall set forth its plot and after that it will be easy to untangle its threads.

On July 23, 1914, we left the Russian shore and started for Sweden, as had been officially and publicly decided upon a long time before. I wish it clearly understood that the smallest details of the trip, even the dinners, and, above all, the date of departure, were known to all the European Chancelleries. The press in every country was full of the matter. We left at about ten o'clock in the evening.

In the meantime, the murderers of right, who had kept silent until that moment, were stealing upon their first victim: the ultimatum to Serbia was handed to the Serbian government on July 23d, the very day of our departure, by the Austrian

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Minister at Belgrade, the worst *agent-provocateur* whom a government bent on provocative measures ever had stationed in a foreign country under the lying disguise of an official costume.

Allowing for the necessary lapse of time, we calculated that the ultimatum, having been delivered at Belgrade at five in the afternoon, had not become known in St. Petersburg until after our departure.

VON JAGOW'S SECRET SPYING

Our journey had been spied upon by von Jagow. Let readers form their own opinion as to the extent of this spying! This Minister of Foreign Affairs who (as will be shown in the course of later chapters) had denied all knowledge of the ultimatum at the end of July, having learned that we, on July 23d, were delaying our departure by two hours, telegraphed to Vienna to the German ambassador for the purpose of acquainting him with this, and with the request that he cause the ultimatum to be delivered two hours later.

This shows how everything had been prearranged in such a way that the blow should not fall until after we had departed. It shows how an attempt was made to disconcert the Entente in the face of the cleverly united combination of the Central Powers.

ANXIETY INCREASES

Nevertheless, the attitude of the Austrian ambassador to the court of Russia, which, though certainly polite, was more than reserved, combined

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with warning forebodings, led me, at about one o'clock in the morning of the night between the 23d and 24th, to telegraph to Paris, in accordance with an agreement which I had made to that effect with M. Sazonoff. To obviate all danger, even remote, I informed the government of the French Republic at Paris that if Austria should make a demand upon Serbia, M. Dumaine was to be requested in advance to endeavor to have it couched in a more acceptable form. On the next day, July 24th, while we were steaming toward Sweden, amid heavy weather and upon a rough sea, some shreds of messages, badly joined together, were brought to us by the invisible aerial waves. From that moment the shrill sound of the wireless, piercing the harmony of our solitude, made known to us, bit by bit, in separate fragments, the ultimatum to Serbia, the terms in which it was couched, its threats, the undeserved accusations which Austria, basing herself upon the official report of one of her agents, had brought against Serbia.

I made an effort to reassume my official duties and, from far out on the sea, in the solitude of my cabin, I telegraphed to London (Yellow Book, No. 22), requesting that joint action be taken for the purpose of lengthening the altogether too short time allowance granted to Serbia, counseling Serbia to show the greatest prudence, and seeking to institute an international investigation.

On July 25th, at five o'clock in the morning, we arrived at Stockholm, where M. Thiebault, our

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minister there, at last handed us the exact text of the ultimatum. And thus we received confirmation of the severity of its conditions, more insolent than all the rest, constituting a veritable declaration of war in themselves, giving Serbia only forty-eight hours in which to reply, refusing her even the right to discuss her decision, and robbing Europe of the chance to give helpful advice.

Everything looked dark. Yet we were compelled throughout the day to reciprocate the exquisite politeness of the King of Sweden, to look on at externals, without succeeding in freeing ourselves from the internal torture of our thoughts. That evening at seven our minister at Christiania, pursuant to orders which I had given him over the telephone, informed me that the German Emperor had left Bergen for an unknown destination. The comedy was drawing to an end. The real drama was to be hurried onward by the return of that innocent and naïve traveler.

We left Stockholm at eleven o'clock that night. Never did I see such a contrast between nature and the painful feelings of all those present. The heavens had gathered over our heads all their splendors; the white wake of our majestic ship was bathed in light. In our minds, however, the shadows were beginning to deepen.

ONLY MEAGER NEWS OF ULTIMATUM

We tried constantly to get news. A piercing whistling sound would cut through the air! What did it bring?—nothing but an unintelligible mes-

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sage on a sheet of paper! Another!—only a sentence bearing no relation whatever to anything else! And all the time we were waiting to learn what the Serbian answer was. Convinced that counsels of moderation and prudence had been given by France and Russia, convinced of the sense of duty of the noble little Serbian nation, we felt sure in advance that its answer would be conciliatory and of a nature making possible an honorable settlement.

The 26th and 27th were without news. Each hour that passed, we felt, undoubtedly marked some grave event, but we were unaware what it might be.

We could not know it. The German government—as was learned later from documents found at Metz—had given orders to disturb wireless communications.

Here is what was found in the files of the German wireless station at Metz:

July 27th. 2 o'clock. “The government orders that French wireless communications be disturbed in such a way as not to constitute a violation of peace” (*Gouv. befiehlt Stoerung franzoesischen Funkenverkehrs in einer den Frieden nicht verletzenden Form*).

3 o'clock. “The communication engineer of the wireless orders that French-Russian wireless communications be disturbed . . .”

July 28. 4 o'clock. “The Eiffel Tower has understood our intention of disturbing its communica-

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tions and it is evidently trying to deceive us by transmitting with great energy to Dunkirk news for the steamship *France*, which does not answer. In view of the possible importance to Russia of the contents of the dispatches, this transmission is also blocked (*unterbunden.*)”

And here is why we knew nothing of what was going on.

Surrounded by the solitude of the sea, far from all men, it is impossible to know what is going on in the world. Responsibility, no matter how crushing it may be, is assumed proudly when the will to assume it is based on reality. Out there on the sea, though, we had nothing on which to shape our actions. How thought is strengthened when it illuminates the inner world which man carries within himself! But what agony one suffers, on the other hand, when one is confronted with the necessity of acting upon the outer world and is deprived of every means of doing so!

On the morning of the 27th we received the following: “Satisfactory reply from Serbia; admirable in its moderation.” And yet, in spite of this, the Austrian minister had taken his departure from Belgrade two hours after he had received the reply. What did this mean?

As we drew nearer to France, we guessed the nature of the somber imbroglio, which, engineered cleverly and violently, served as the framework for the situation. Germany, hailing joyfully the return of her Emperor, refused to intercede with

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Austria, and, at the same time, arrogantly demanded that we seek to influence Russia. She even offered to appear our friend in this task, acting conjointly with us, her purpose being to denounce Russia, with backing from us, as the guilty party.

Refusal of further delay; no interference from the rest of Europe; England pushed aside; the conflict localized, which meant the strangling of Serbia out of our sight; Serbia invaded; Belgrade bombarded; war begun;—those were the successive stages of the drama.

DECISION TO RETURN TO FRANCE

On the preceding day we had decided to return directly to France. Up to then the route toward our country coincided with that toward Denmark, consequently we had not lost a moment. Again I telegraphed (Yellow Book, No. 76) to M. Bienvenu-Martin, who so ably acted in my place, giving my approval of his firm and prudent conduct, and for the purpose of protecting him.

On the morning of the 29th, by the first light of the dawn, we sighted the coast of France.

At last! A twinkling light beneath a roof, a house, dockyards, masts, a gradually emerging skyline—Dunkirk! And now we are piloted into port, and men versed in politics, deeply moved but firm, bring us information, and colleagues of ours give us the news, and workmen pause in their work to greet us!

Then—Paris! A sea of human beings overwhelming us. Hosts of Frenchmen, already united

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to meet the danger threatening France, their grave faces shining with the century-old idealism of France and her lofty pride.

Hail, land of independence and valor! The reception given us by thee helped our souls to rise superior to fate!

CHAPTER V

ON THE BRINK OF THE ABYSS

AND now we stood on the brink of the abyss. To-day, looking back over the years, flooded with documents bearing on the case, engaged in careful analysis of all details, it seems that weeks must have elapsed in order to have included such a great number of happenings. How can we believe that so many events, which changed everything on the face of the earth, really happened in the restricted space of a few days? But, at the fateful time itself and even just before the catastrophe, things happened—despite the fact that some minutes seemed very long—with the rapidity of lightning. Let those struck by that lightning, yet not dazed or blinded by it, bear witness to the horror of those moments! And by the light of that catastrophe it has become possible for us to read clearly that book of lies and falsifications which Germany and also Austria, under conditions which must be again recalled, sought to build up.

Germany denies responsibility. Nevertheless, this responsibility on her part is both external—that is, implied in the actual deeds which brought on the war—and internal—that is, implied in events wherein destiny played a weak part and in

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which we are aware to what extent preparation caused the conflagration.

And are you not struck, moreover, by the growing degradation noticeable in the course of the years, of the months even, in the assertions of Germany? From the outset of the sinister negotiations of July, 1914, German diplomacy was arrogant, uncompromising, hostile; it was the diplomacy of Bismarck. Those were the days when Herr von Jagow denied knowledge of the substance of the ultimatum to Serbia, although he knew about the said document and lauded it. Those were the days when—it was on the evening of the 29th of July, 1914—Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg sought to dicker with the British ambassador at Berlin with a view to secure British neutrality. Those were the days when the German Chancellor himself announced to that same ambassador that the decision had been made by Germany to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and it was this very German Chancellor who was felled by the blow struck at him in the British answer, a blow that will re-echo forever in history.

That was the moment of the “scrap of paper,” the moment when Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg debased his native country by scattering broadcast through the world as authentic truth—he, a well-informed statesman!—the silly tale of the French aëroplanes flying over Nuremberg, and founded a declaration of war upon a falsification, as Bismarck had done in the case of the Ems dispatch. Then it

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was that the German Chancellor said to the Reichstag—on August 4, 1914—in speaking of the violation of Belgian neutrality, “Necessity makes law.” Why this outcropping of cynicism?

Here is the reason: Germany at that moment was sure of victory. The generals, whose pre-war writing had already been published, the report of the German General Staff to the Emperor in 1913, declared German victory a certainty. Counting upon noninterference on the part of England and Italy, reckoning in advance upon the neutralization of Russia’s military operations and the overcoming of Belgium, what sort of resistance, the Germans asked themselves, could be made by France? A few months later, at Christmas time in 1914, according to the German Emperor’s prophecy, the German troops, gorged with booty, would return home. It would be for the victor to write the history of the war; the cowardice of the general public, interrupted on very rare occasions by bursts of courage, would believe anything told it. Night would fall upon Europe—silence would come—the silence of the tomb. Perhaps, a century later, truth would rise from the grave. But who cared? By that time everything would have been already said.

But—what came was the Marne! The imperial German eagle, grievously wounded, dug himself into the trenches. So the war was not to be over in four months, after all? No! So England had come into it, and Japan! Was America, though

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neutral in the legal sense, pouring upon French democracy her fraternal enthusiasm? Yes.

Well, then, there must be a change in the German attitude. To the aid of the German trooper came the dishonest German pedant; side by side with the sword went the penknife, to scratch out what had been written. Then it was that the claim of Germany's innocence of responsibility for the war was brought up, though it was not as yet known upon what nation the abominable burden of war guilt was to fall. And since, in spite of this, the war had been willed and declared by Germany, the Germans already began to turn their backs on the acts of the present in order to dig up the acts of the past. They cooked up the story of the responsibility of the Entente on account of the crime of the encirclement of Germany. Oh, puny Triple Alliance—you, it was self-evident, encircled nobody!

Then came another phase. What was lacking was manufactured. Above all, however, silence was employed as a means of falsification.

The publication of the German White Paper was an unprecedented thing in history, something which no other nation would have tolerated. Whereas the British White Paper contained 160 documents, the French Yellow Book 164, the Russia Orange Book 79, how many documents are in the German White Paper that appeared in 1914? Exactly 36 documents! Think of it! The entire correspondence of the German government with

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London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, and particularly with Vienna, during that feverish period, was limited to 36 documents!

What was it that was thus being concealed? Kautsky gives us the answer. After the flight of the German Emperor he was able to collate and publish 800 documents—and what documents they are! Concerning some of them the Emperor expressed his anger or joy by means of marginal notes. Later, the Bavarian book was published, with documents of a damning character for Berlin. And Kurt Eisner, who brought about the publication of the Bavarian documents, was assassinated.

And then there was the publication of the Austrian Red Book, showing the fearful responsibility of Germany in spurring Austria on! Yet there are only 36 documents about all this! That is the total which these lovers of truth could supply to us! But, at that time, where was the tribunal of posterity?

Germany has acknowledged her responsibility—in fact, she has done so twice: first, through the peace treaty, and later—which binds her even more—by the solemn vote of the Reichstag on May 10, 1921. What has she to say now? She repeats that, in 1918, she did not know of certain things. She, who closed her archives, did she not know these things? And, in 1921, was she still ignorant of them? After the publication of the documents of which we have spoken above, a part of which came

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from her own government, was she ignorant of these things?

Germany adds that she made her acknowledgment of responsibility under the menace of invasion and for the purpose of avoiding such a disaster. First, that is not true. The truth is that, in 1921, she again acknowledged it, when the terrifying specter of invasion was far in the past. And who, after all, insults Germany more grossly than her writers and ministers of state? A nation, assuredly, can fall upon its knees before those who have vanquished it; it can sue for peace and surrender its arms! it can accept hard terms. But can it accept the burden of confessing guilt for a crime which has bathed the world in blood, if it sincerely feels itself innocent? At what moment was it that Germany was no longer conscious of her honor won in the past? Was it when she was menaced by reprisals or when these no longer threatened her? Moreover—why did she speak so tardily? It was not because of a revulsion of conscience. No—what leads her on is commercial interest. Since one of the bases of her pecuniary responsibility is political, military, and moral responsibility—which she has acknowledged—it is to her advantage to sap this latter responsibility in order to destroy the former.

Let us get down to facts. Responsibility for a war is a body of successive acts linked together, every one of which, from the time when the tempest bursts back into the past when the cloud is hardly

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visible, should be of such a kind as to explain the rest. The mobilizations, the dates and hours of which will be discussed in a later chapter, are merely one aspect of the conflict—moreover, wars have often been prevented in spite of mobilization. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we shall prove that the sum total of responsibility derived from mobilization falls now upon Austria, now upon Germany. But mobilization was a result of the ultimatum. The ultimatum, which was a cause of the war because of its brutality and suddenness, was itself a result, a result of the war spirit, of the will toward domination, the wish for hegemony, of all that which has embroiled the world for centuries.

Let us examine the ultimatum of July 23, 1914, in the light of another document, which deals with happenings preceding it by one year.

On December 5th, M. Giolitti, Italian Premier in 1913, made a terrible speech in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, which we took up in the French Chamber on the 22d of December. Here is what he said: "Since the principal thing is that Italy's loyalty be maintained beyond all doubt, I call attention to the fact that, in 1913, Austria intended to take steps against Serbia to which she wished to give the character of a defensive measure. Naturally, our Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Austria that Italy did not feel herself obliged to associate herself in this action."

Never was a more serious accusation made

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against a country. Is it false? Nobody, in Germany or in Austria, answered it. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg never spoke of it, neither did Herr von Jagow.

Thus, before the Sarajevo crime, a year before it, while the sky was clear and the earth lay at peace, without the excuse—even though unacceptable, as we shall see—of national excitement, the two Central Empires were embarking upon war.

Italy's refusal amazed Germany. It had not been foreseen, since conceptions of honor are so different among different peoples that some are unable to realize that others will not act as they do. Germany decided to wait, to furbish up more numerous weapons to take the place of the nation that refused to dishonor itself.

Then it was that the heir-apparent of Austria perished on Austrian soil, guarded by a police force composed entirely of Austrians, especially organized for that day by an Austrian general. "My whole work must be begun over again," said William II, on board the yacht where the news was brought to him, in the presence of the Prince of Monaco, who noted at the same time his deathly pale color. From that day—June 28, 1914—the trap was to be prepared.

Austria said nothing. Germany said nothing. The blow was being prepared. Public anxiety was lulled through the press, and verbal assurances that a prudent course would be followed were given to the public, which showed alarm for a little while.

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But the invasion of Serbia, the military execution of that country, were being prepared, and the guilty ones were getting ready for action, refraining from the very beginning from pleading lack of realization of what they were doing, knowing—as indeed they subsequently avowed—that the conflict would involve Russia and light up a general conflagration.

Did Germany know about the ultimatum? Really, such a question should not be asked even in an elementary school. How can anyone maintain that Austria, which the year before had arranged with Germany to strike at Serbia, had not again come to an agreement with her ally in the following year before again leveling the blow at Serbia? How can it be maintained that Austria, knowing in what direction she was moving and that a general war was bound to be the outcome, assumed the sole responsibility, without notifying her more important ally, thus risking being abandoned alone to her fate as a punishment for her intrigues and her silence?

Moreover, Austria was not an ally in the noble sense of the word, which presupposes independence. She was a subjugated nation, delivered up by her lord to another nation. And, in any event, even if there could be a doubt on this matter, it would be swept aside and dissipated by documents. It is but just to state that the fact of these documents being available is due to the German revolution, to the Austrian revolution, and, most especially, to

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the Bavarian revolution, since the honesty of the German statesmen who were responsible had, up to 1919, furnished us nothing but lies.

At the beginning, at the very outset, the German ambassador at Vienna, von Tschirschky, realizing the seriousness of the step under consideration, sought to bring counsels of moderation to bear upon Austria. This was a purely personal impulse on his part and one that was quickly abandoned.

And how that diplomat was snubbed by his supreme lord, William! In a report submitted to the German Emperor the German ambassador at Vienna had taken the liberty of writing: "I avail myself of every opportunity for discouraging, quietly but earnestly, all hasty measures." William wrote on the margin of this report: "Who authorizes him to do this? It is very foolish. This does not concern him in the least. It is entirely up to Austria to decide what she is to do. Afterward, if things go badly, people will say: 'It was Germany who was unwilling!' Let Tschirschky do me the honor of stopping all this nonsense. The question with Serbia must be finished up, and that as soon as possible. Now or never" (Notes of July 4, 1914, in the handwriting of the German Emperor; Kautsky German Documents, No. 7).

That, then, was the state of mind of Emperor William, who dares prate, in his *Memoirs*, of his innocence and ignorance! There we have what he was thinking on the 4th of July, 1914, six days after the Sarajevo murder, one month before the war!

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Did official Germany know of the guiding thought of Austria, of the ultimatum and its consequences?

Here are the facts: On July 5th the Austrian ambassador at Berlin called on the German Emperor. He was an intimate of William, who held him in high esteem (let this be stated in order to refute the belated insinuation made by certain Germans, in an endeavor to attenuate the serious consequences of the dispatches of the said ambassador, to the effect that the ambassador was "older than his years") (*Memorial of the German Delegation in 1918, Peace Treaty*). The ambassador turned over to the German Emperor the autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria and the memorandum corroborating it. This memorandum, little known and very symptomatic, was an appeal to war against Serbia. It spoke of the "diminution" of Serbia, also of other Balkan nations; it was couched in a general tone of menace; it put serious difficulties in the path of those endeavoring to keep the conflict localized, in view of the fact that it dealt with a scheme for an entire rearrangement of the Balkans. Moreover—and this is more than serious—this memorandum was prepared between March and June, 1914, and finished on the 24th of the latter month—four days before the Sarajevo murder. Therefore, this crime, to which the memorandum makes a brief allusion, was merely a pretext. The flames were fed, but they had already been kindled.

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The Kaiser, in his *Memoirs*, seeks to minimize the importance of this communication, just as he had already done in his *Historical Tables*. He declares that no council took place on July 5th. There were conversations, of which record was kept, following one upon another, and strung out through the day. The first interview was between the ambassador and the Emperor; at this interview the memorandum and autograph letter were delivered. What did the Kaiser do? What did he say? The Austrian ambassador will tell us.

And the autograph letter of July 2, 1914, written by the Emperor of Austria to William II, delivered a few days after to the latter by Count Hoyos, head secretary of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—did the German Emperor receive it? He did. But it is not he who tells us that he did. That letter contained the plan for the invasion and the fiery germ of the ultimatum. Listen to it:

“The efforts of my government should in future have as their goal the isolation and weakening of Serbia. . . . But this will only be possible if Serbia, which now forms the corner stone of Pan-Slavic policy, is eliminated as a political factor in the Balkans. Hence, also, after this recent and terrible occurrence in Bosnia, one feels convinced that no endeavors should be made to patch up the antagonism which separates us from Serbia, and that the maintenance on the part of all European monarchs of a peace policy will be jeopardized

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just as long as that focus of criminal activities at Belgrade remains unpunished."

So Emperor William knew all about it. What joy must have lighted up his face! He himself, two days before, on July 4th, had reproved his ambassador for showing moderation!

Did he keep to himself the news of the crime under preparation and which he had made possible, which he even hastened forward by paralyzing the efforts of his ambassador? In any event, he proceeded to assemble around him the important personages of his Empire.

The Emperor caused it to be said in 1919, and he now repeats in his *Memoirs*, that there was no Crown Council held at that time at Potsdam. Let us not quibble about words.

In so far as historical morality is concerned, it matters little whether, by virtue of a protocol, the council was held, or whether, in order to avoid the sensational consequences of such a meeting at a moment when faces were still masked, the meetings were held successively or even on isolated occasions, between the Kaiser and certain personages. The fact remains that on that day came the idea of war; but as it could not be brought to realization before the end of the month, in view of the fact that the Kaiser meant to go on a journey in order to create for himself a deceiving alibi, it was well to make preparations quietly and far from the public eye. Therefore, the first meeting occurred between the Austrian ambassador and the Kaiser,

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the documents were read, there was conversation. We shall see, by perusal of the communication regarding this meeting, made by the ambassador to his government, what occurred there.

Then matters got so serious that Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann were summoned in place of Jagow. So much for the political trouble. Matters were so serious that officers were summoned by the Kaiser—von Capelle, von Bertrab, von Busch. Why? So that they might study the military side of the situation, carry out plans when these had been drawn up. Doubtless there was no desire to make noisy preparations, but things must be in readiness.

Von Bertrab went off to report to Quartermaster-General Waldersee, who was taking the place of the Minister of War. Greatly excited, Waldersee, on July 8th, said: "The plan of mobilization was decided upon on May 31st. The army is ready, as it always is." He departed. He was intoxicated with excitement. On July 17th he wrote to von Jagow, in whom he found a kindred spirit, and informed him concerning the Austrian war plan against Serbia, adding: "I am ready to spring. At the General Staff headquarters we are ready. Just now there is nothing for us to do." He returned the 25th; that was the fatal day on which the plans began to be carried out.

That, then, was the sequence of the conversations of July 5th and 6th, which preceded the departure of the Kaiser on his journey. The political leaders

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gave their views to the Kaiser, who gave his view to the Austrian ambassador.

As to the military chiefs, they were warned, since they must be in readiness. Who can doubt that, from that day onward, the heads of the German army were filled with the intoxication of combat, with that ardent lust for slaughter voiced by one of them, Waldersee?

And what did the Kaiser think? The answer is to be found in his acts, in those conversations which could have no other meaning except the desire for being prepared. This will be made clear at the end of this chapter, where we shall fill up, by means of data supplied by Austria, the outrageous gaps in the Kaiser's *Memoirs*.

But let us continue. We shall show that official Germany lied when she stated that she did not know about the ultimatum. In reality, she was aware of its substance (through the Austrian memorandum and the Emperor of Austria's autograph letter) and its date, and—ignoring the possibility of a satisfactory reply from Serbia—its sanctioning of war, no matter what might happen. But let us continue to pile up proofs regarding this.

If this was not a council, what, then, was this lot of interviews? And if things were so cleverly managed in order to avoid letting what was under preparation get noised about that no formal meeting was held from the 4th of July onward, does not what occurred suffice for the moral judgment of history? A conference between the men respon-

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sible for these successive meetings took place. In order to talk about what? We have just shown what it was.

After that the Emperor was at liberty to depart on his journey; he could make a pretense of resting amid the blue fjords of Norway. All was being got ready; and when he returned, on July 26th, what M. Cambon called the "*General Warning*" ("*Le garde à vous général*"; Yellow Book, No. 15) had already been sounded. This was the preliminary order for mobilization sent "to those places which should receive it in such a case." And on what day was this notice given? On the 21st of July!

Herr von Jagow likewise probably knew nothing of what was going on. Having returned to his post, he kept on our trail during our journey to Russia, co-operating with the police. Here is the dispatch (not published by him in the 1914 White Paper), and published in the 1919 White Paper, which he sent to Vienna:

"I have asked Count Pourtalès (German ambassador at St. Petersburg) for the program of Poincaré's visit. He has informed me that the President will leave Cronstadt, Thursday, at 11 o'clock, which means at 9.30 o'clock, Central European time. If action is taken at Belgrade to-morrow at 5 o'clock it will become known at St. Petersburg while Poincaré is there." To this dispatch the German ambassador at Vienna replied on the 23d: "The Imperial and Royal [Austrian] gov-

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ernment thanks you for your information. The Minister has been asked to delay delivery one hour" (Kautsky German Documents, 93, 96, 112, 127).

Undoubtedly the head of the German Foreign Office was ignorant of the substance of the ultimatum, yet he advised delaying the time of its delivery in order that the news of it might not find the allies together in St. Petersburg. And he, who telegraphed this on July 21st to Vienna, had the audacity to state, on July 24th, in a dispatch addressed by him to the German ambassador at Rome (Bavarian Documents, page 6) that he had no exact information as to the contents of the Austrian note! And that is the man with whom negotiations had to be conducted!

Is another supplementary proof needed in addition to those marshaled by history as a crushing indictment of the official Germany of 1914? There is one such in the Bavarian Documents just cited—which are stained with blood, since Kurt Eisner, president of the Bavarian Council in 1918, the man who wished to tell the truth—paid with his life for his brave devotion to duty. The proof in question is a letter from Herr von Schoen, a relative of the former German ambassador at Paris. Herr von Schoen was at Berlin as *chargé d'affaires* for the Bavarian Cabinet, and, on July 18, 1914, he wrote to Count Hertling, the Bavarian Premier, the following letter, which we quote only in part, since it is very long:

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YOUR EXCELLENCY:

Following the conversations which I have had with the Under-Secretary of State, with the heads of departments dealing with Balkan affairs and the affairs of the Triple Alliance, at the Foreign Ministry, and with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, I have the honor to make to Your Excellency the following report on the measures contemplated by the Austro-Hungarian government with relation to Serbia:

The action which the Vienna Cabinet has decided to take at Belgrade, which will consist in the delivery of a note, will occur on the 25th of this month. The delay of all action until that moment is due to the fact that it is desired to await the departure of Messrs. Poincaré and Viviani from St. Petersburg, in order not to facilitate agreement between the powers of the Dual Alliance as to possible counter-action. Up to now Vienna gives evidence of peaceful intentions by allowing the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff to go away on leave, which is not without its effect on the press and police. Here it is admitted that the Vienna Cabinet is acting skillfully. The only thing that is regretted is that Count Tisza, who previously used to declare himself against energetic measures, has lifted the veil a bit by his statements to the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies.

The note, so far as has been learned up to now, is said to contain the following demands:

1. A proclamation from the King of Serbia which shall state that the Serbian government is entirely innocent of the Pan-Serb agitation, and disapproves of it.

2. The opening of an investigation against those implicated in the Sarajevo affair and the participation of an Austrian official in this investigation.

For the acceptance of this demand it is said that a time limit of forty-eight hours will be granted. It is

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evident that Serbia cannot accept such conditions, which are incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. Therefore, the consequence will be war.

(Signed) SCHOEN.

It must be borne in mind that this report was much longer, but that the remainder has no bearing on the matter now in question. Moreover, it has already been made public and discussed.

As to Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian representative at Berlin, he wrote under date of December 9, 1914, to the Bavarian government to tell it "how it might lie and how it should lie" (the expression used by the lawyer, Doctor Lowenheld, when he delivered the letter of Schoen to the president of the Munich Tribunal, in order that it might be read at the session of April 28, 1922) :

ROYAL BAVARIAN LEGATION.

BERLIN, December 9, 1914.

MY VERY HONORED FRIEND :

The French Yellow Book is not yet here, but the newspapers have already brought extracts from it. The one of *Le Matin* speaks about a conversation between Your Excellency and the French *chargé d'affaires*, M. Allizé, which has already been mentioned also in the German newspapers. According to the extract of *Le Matin*, Your Excellency is quoted as saying to M. Allizé that the Austrian ultimatum was known to you. According to the *Berliner Tageblatt*, you expressed yourself thus: "that the ultimatum was known to you in its principal points and that you considered the situation serious. . . .

Now, I know, from the dossiers, that Your Excellency had knowledge of the essential contents of

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the Austrian note of ultimatum through the report of the then *chargé d'affaires*, Herr von Schoen, dated July 18th of the current year, No. 386.

In his report Herr von Schoen stated that Germany would pretend to have been has much surprised by the Austrian action as were all the other Powers. It goes without saying that it is necessary to stick to this and that it is necessary to deny, come what may, that Your Excellency had knowledge of the contents of the ultimatum before its delivery. Now, as *Le Matin* says, it cannot be maintained that what was known at Munich was not known at Berlin. . . . Denial must be made to foreign countries, come what may. . . . But Your Excellency will best judge about this yourself and I beg that my proposals may be imputed solely to my laudable intention to have the matter banished out of sight without leaving a trace, in so far as this is possible. I wish also to make this observation: doubtless steps will be taken to have a correction published in the *Bavarian Gazette*. Perhaps Your Excellency will send me, along with your answer to this letter, the outline of such a statement in order that I may take it up with the Foreign Office.

(Signed) COUNT LERCHENFELD.

Is this not admirable? Denial must be made, no matter what it may cost! There we have the moral sense of German diplomacy: on July 18, 1914, a *chargé d'affaires* at Berlin writes to Munich to report concerning the ultimatum which, on July 23d, Herr von Jagow denies knowing about! Likewise the Emperor!

What is to be said after that? Why waste time reading, gathering pieces of testimony, accumulating them one upon the other? What is the use of

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doing it? The world is convinced. As for convincing those guilty of the crime, no reasoning could avail for that. A fact? "It is false!" A document. "It is falsified!" Kautsky? "He is a Jew!" Kurt Eisner? "He is a falsifier." Moreover, he has been assassinated.

In no court of justice could such a debate go on, between anyone accused by ordinary process of law and the representatives of justice, without arousing shrieks of derision from the public.

CHAPTER VI

BEFORE THE ULTIMATUM

WHAT happened on July 25th is known, but it is necessary to bring again to light the wild fury of Emperor William II—since the documents in the case were confiscated for a long time for the sake of official German good faith. He departed on a cruise on the 10th of July. Of what can this peaceable traveler have thought unless it were of the heavens, the land, of peace? Well, he thought nothing of the kind!—he thought of his fleet. And on July 19th he gave the order to keep that fleet concentrated until the 25th, which meant that he wished to intimidate unarmed Europe during the delay while Serbia was examining the ultimatum.

And after July 25th? After July 25th he feels sure that he himself will be armed and ready, and counts upon the good faith of the rest having kept them from making any preparations. In vain the Chancellor asks him not to act thus, tells him that the British fleet is about to scatter, that the concentration of the German fleet may give cause for anxiety. Here is the imperial note on the margin of the Chancellor's dispatch: "Mobilization at Belgrade may bring on Russian mobilization, which will

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cause Austrian mobilization; in this case it is necessary that I concentrate land and sea forces. . . . This is what the civilian Chancellor has not been able as yet to understand" (Kautsky German Documents, 182).

This note is steeped in advance in all the blood that is to be shed. Thus, the Emperor knew—and Kautsky, moreover, so declares—that a general conflagration was going to result from the conflict; he knew it—and he worked toward bringing it about! He fed the flames! He incited! Henceforth, no measure of appeasement or conciliation can be attributed to that mind maddened by arrogance.

On July 23d (Document 121) the ambassador at London made known the view of Sir Edward Grey. The latter hoped that "the Austrian terms may be recommended to Serbia, since they will not be irreconcilable with the independence of the state"! And here is what the maddened Emperor writes: "It is not for him to judge these matters. They concern His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph."

The British Minister having said that Germany would know how to hold aloof from machinations that might bring on war—these being such as sought to exploit the Sarajevo assassination—here is what the Emperor wrote: "This is a monstrous British impertinence. I am not called upon to dictate laws *à la* Grey to His Majesty the Emperor in what concerns the conservation of his honor. Ser-

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bia is a band of brigands who should be arrested for their crimes. I shall not meddle in a matter which the Emperor alone is in a position to judge. . . . This is a perfect sample of the British style of thinking and of that imperious and condescending attitude which I think I see growing up again."

Thus, in the course of all these sinister days, while Europe waited, when there was no longer hope of Austrian moderation, but of Serbian reflection, when the Great Powers—England, Russia, France—joined their efforts toward smoothing over the trouble—one man, one man alone, was inciting in the direction of massacre! Even von Bethmann-Hollweg wished to avoid a measure which may be qualified as provocative. He was dubbed "*an imbecile*" (free translation of the marginal note given above). Even Herr von Berchtold, in one of those moments when excitement dies down and conscience resumes control, wished to reassure Russia. He was dubbed a "weakling" (marginal note).

Such, then, was the man who was to hurl himself, on the 1st of August, upon the world! An Emperor and a clown, vain and bloodthirsty! On every page of the German Documents, the only ones which we shall quote, the somber figure of the man who was responsible becomes clearer.

When there was complete certainty that the sea separated M. Poincaré and myself from Russia, and after all the murderous and maddened incitement already noted, the ultimatum was placed in the hands of the Serbian government. It is neces-

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sary to recall here its outrageous terms, written in blood, not ink, which dishonor for all time both the German accomplices and the Austrian principal actors who had a part in this heinous crime against humanity. A cry of anger on the day after the murder; an unthinking popular manifestation; arrests, even unjustified ones; measures, even brutal in character—all these might have been understood, provided that, when the truth came out, self-control returned.

But in this case twenty-five days were allowed to elapse! Were they, at least, utilized for making an investigation? Yes. What were its results? It becomes evident that there was no question of finding the guilty parties themselves; what was desired was to clear up the political situation and to learn whether the Serbian government was responsible, even though only morally, for the crime committed. Austria had sent one of her agents. She trusted him. Here is the answer given by that agent on July 13th, ten days before the ultimatum:

Herr von Wiesner, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Vienna.

SARAJEVO, July 13, 1914.

There is no proof of connivance on the part of the Serbian government, of its participation in the crime or in its preparation. There is even no reason for suspecting it. On the contrary, there are indications which cause the setting aside of such suppositions.

But what mattered the investigation from the moment that it did not lead to the shame of the Serbian government? The only reason for which

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the investigation had been ordered was to show that government's responsibility. From the moment that this end could not be attained war was necessary.

Austria was thoroughly convinced of the historical lie upon which she was staking her honor. But the trembling hand of her old Emperor was gripped by the firmer hand of the German Emperor. The poisoned document, destined to bring woe to the whole world, was drawn up.

Is it necessary to recall the clauses of that document? Here is a summary of it:

The Serbian government was to publish in its Official Gazette of July 26th and proclaim in an order of the day addressed by the King to the army a condemnation of Serbian propaganda in Austria-Hungary, and inform the entire population of the country that, from that moment, the severest possible measures would be taken against persons guilty of similar acts. In addition, the Serbian government was also to:

1. Suppress all publications inciting to contempt or dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.
2. Disband all associations devoted to anti-Austrian propaganda.
3. Discharge from teaching positions all those fomenting such propaganda, and deprive them of means for giving instruction.
4. Dismiss all officers and officials guilty of such propaganda, the names of these to be supplied by Austria to the Serbian government.

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5. Accept co-operation on Serbian soil of Austrian government officials in the surveillance of conspiracy against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

6. Accept co-operation of Austrian government officials in the proceedings instituted against those implicated in the plot of June 28th—etc., etc.

It was with good reason that Sir Edward Grey said, "This is the most outrageous document ever circulated in history."

What followed is well known: the Serbian government accepted everything except the co-operation of Austrian officials in the administrative investigation and in the judicial investigation—and it was shown later on that it eventually acquiesced even on that point. It accepted everything that was not incompatible with honor, everything that did not destroy the historical structure built up by its heroes, everything that was not equivalent to staining its banners with undying shame, which is far worse than the often immortal epitaph inscribed on the tombs of nations!

On the evening of the day when the answer of Serbia was given a variety of expressions appeared on the faces of men, according to differences in geography and in the various Foreign Offices. Neutral diplomats have recorded that, at Berlin, men well known in diplomacy and politics went about with wrathful countenances—for what had happened meant peace! But wherever there was a man living, a mind capable of reasoning, an atom

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of civilization and justice, there was a sigh of relief—for there was to be no war!

But what then?

"How is it possible that newspapers can be allowed at such a moment to publish false news? The Austrian minister at Belgrade left his post two hours after receiving this conciliatory reply? Impossible!" Such were the exclamations of surprise from the man in the street in almost every capital of Europe when he read in the papers that piece of news, which, nevertheless, was true.

The Austrian minister had left his post! Perhaps he had gone before receiving the answer, perhaps before delivering the ultimatum. The minister had already made his preparations and sealed up his archives. Some weeks back he had received the order to depart, no matter what the attitude of the Serbian government might be. In the course of the next chapter we shall go over the useless negotiations, the appeals to a deaf sense of justice, the suggestions of compromise, the encounter between moderation and bestiality.

And that was how and why millions of men perished! Because on the throne of Austria there was an old man who was worn out intellectually, and on the throne of Germany a cavalier who, valiant on days of parade, naturally enough abandoned his soldiers on the day of danger and threw his sword into the ditch!

Thus it is that evidence piles up demonstrating that the German Emperor knew, as early as the

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beginning of July, the substance of the ultimatum to Serbia, that he assembled about him, having summoned them for this express purpose, diplomats and army leaders, that he prevented any conciliatory thought from seeing the light. Is it possible to maintain, as a final hypothesis advanced in his defense by supreme impartiality, that the Emperor did not realize that he was going so far; that he merely wished to strike a resounding blow of his fist upon the table which would make the ink-stands jump but would not hurl lightning upon the world; that he was misunderstood, badly served, pushed forward? But that alone would be serious enough. At a time of such crisis imprudence cannot lead simply to involuntary homicide. Moreover, it is not even true. The Emperor knew about everything.

He knew that war was coming, that blood would flow.

And here is a crushing document, provided by the Austrian revolution. The Austrian Red Book now speaks. I might quote several dispatches therein, but I shall confine myself to the first under date of July 5, 1914. It deals with a dispatch from Count Szögyeny to Count Berchtold—Count Szögyeny, it will be recalled, was the Austrian ambassador at Berlin:

Telegram No. 237.

Strictly secret cipher.

BERLIN, July 5, 1914.

After I had informed Emperor William that I had an autograph letter to deliver to him from His Apos-

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tolic Majesty the Emperor and King, brought to me to-day by Count Hoyos, I received from His Majesty, the German Emperor, an invitation to lunch to-day at noon at the New Palace.

I delivered to His Majesty the autograph letter and the annexed memorandum.

The Emperor read the two documents in my presence with the closest attention.

At once the Emperor assured me that he expected serious action on our part with regard to Serbia and that he must admit, that, having read the explanation of the situation given by our August Sovereign, he was compelled to take into consideration the possibility of serious *European* complications, and that, consequently, he did not wish to give me any definite answer before having consulted regarding the matter with the Chancellor of the Empire.

After lunch, in view of the fact that I still insisted earnestly on the seriousness of the situation, His Majesty authorized me to state to our August Sovereign that, in such an event, we might also count on the full support of Germany. As he had already told me, the Emperor was obliged first to hear the opinion of the Chancellor of the Empire, but he felt no doubt that Herr von Bethmann would concur fully in his opinion.

This would be particularly true with regard to our action toward Serbia. In his opinion (that of the Emperor William) it was not necessary to postpone this action. Russia's attitude would be hostile in any event, but she had prepared for this for years, and, even if it should come to a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we might rest assured that Germany, with her accustomed fidelity to the alliance, would stand by our side. Russia, moreover, given the present state of affairs, is not ready for war and would certainly hesitate greatly before having recourse to arms. Notwithstanding this, she would incite the other Powers

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of the Triple Entente against us and would add fuel to the flames in the Balkans.

He understood quite well that it would be painful to His Imperial and Royal Majesty, in view of his well-known love of peace, to invade Serbia, but if we had really recognized the necessity of warlike action against Serbia, he (the Emperor William) would regret it if we should allow the present moment, which is so favorable to us, to pass without taking advantage of it. . . .

The Emperor William intends to go to Kiel to-morrow and depart from there on his trip to the northern countries, but, before doing so, His Majesty will confer with the Chancellor of the Empire on the matter in question, for which purpose he has summoned the Chancellor from Hohenfinow for this evening at the New Palace.

In any event, I shall find occasion, in the course of to-morrow, to talk with the Chancellor of the Empire.

Another telegram:

Count Szögyeny to Count Berchtold.

BERLIN, July 12, 1914. Report No. 60. P. Subject: Attitude of Germany in the present Serbian Crisis.
To HIS EXCELLENCY COUNT BERCHTOLD:

As Your Excellency has been informed by me by telegraph during the last few days, and by the impressions gathered here by Count Hoyos personally, not only His Majesty Emperor William and the other persons in high governmental positions here remain firm and faithful toward the alliance, backing up the Monarchy (Austria), but they also advise the latter most insistently not to allow the present opportunity to slip away, but to act very energetically against Serbia and do away once for all with that nest of conspirators, leaving entirely to us the choice of such means as we may consider suitable. . . .

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These two telegrams, especially that of July 5th, are a faithful reproduction, made by a privileged auditor of Emperor William, the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, of the thoughts of the Emperor.

Thus, on July 5th, the Emperor knew. Thus, on July 5th, he encouraged Austria, incited her, spurred her on to go to the limit. At that time the ultimatum to Serbia had not yet been drafted; only the substantial idea destined to be embodied therein had been decided upon. This was known to the Emperor. At first he found it so serious that he did not wish to give a reply until he had seen his Chancellor—concerning whom, however, he forthwith remarked that he was sure of the docility of his opinion. And then, without even waiting for the Chancellor to arrive, he offered his support to the crime.

Whither are matters tending? The Emperor knows full well. And he says whither they are tending: "To war!" To a general war? Yes—and at what an auspicious moment! Oh, blessed and opportune moment! Russia is hostile but unprepared. Nevertheless, he is not unaware of the system of alliances, of the interrelation among nations due to them, of the fact that a flame will become a conflagration. On the contrary—but he hopes that a conflagration will burst forth!

He summoned his counselors in order to feed the flames of this conflagration and spread it, rather than for any other reason.

One cannot but think of what that conference—

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which, in his *Memoirs*, he dared deny ever took place—might have been; that conference in which he spoke, before men accustomed to bow the knee, after he was already inspired with the idea of war.

No matter what may happen, no matter what political complications may ensue, the fact remains that war was caused on that fifth day of July in 1914. And that very man, who, after the carnage, after millions of unfortunates have perished, after he hardly dares to look upon the accusing earth for fear of seeing a tomb rise up before his eyes, cries out, a prey to belated remorse or religious terror: "My God! I did not will this!"

Mothers of all countries, you hear what he says: He did not will this! He did not will it on the 5th of July!

CHAPTER VII

THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

FROM the moment of my arrival in Paris I got back to work and was able at last to learn, by analyzing details, just what had happened, what the public knew, what still remained confidential—in a word, I was able to grasp the situation as a whole.

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under M. Bienvenu-Martin, had risen to the task with which it had been confronted, and, once again, proof had been given that the clear good sense of a good Frenchman, and his high conscientiousness, were capable of facing a terrible crisis.

What had happened during my absence?

A better understanding of the situation may be obtained by combining what we now know with the belated display of documents hidden until 1919. This combination will allow us to penetrate—throwing before us a shaft of light, as it were—into the unhealthy depths of certain human consciences.

On July 25, the day of the Serbian reply, we were unaware of the holding of the Council, or—if another way of putting it is preferred—the interviews of July 5th. I have told about them already,

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basing what I said particularly upon the terrible dispatch of the Austrian ambassador at Berlin. On that day, Emperor William, warned of the substance of the ultimatum, which was to rise up before the world eighteen days later, and warned by the autograph letter of the Emperor of Austria of the execution of Serbia as a nation whose elimination from Europe was necessary—on that day, I say, Emperor William foresaw what the consequences would be, and said that he did. These consequences were Russian mobilization, following, as was natural, upon Austrian mobilization—in other words, they were war. On July 21st, while keeping the German fleet concentrated, despite the announcement of the demobilization of the British fleet, the Kaiser once more expressed the same opinion, *viz.*, that war would result from the ultimatum.

A TRIUMPH FOR DUPLEXITY

Now we know this; at that time we did not. But, though we could not perceive, as we now can, the warlike intentions that existed, we were, nevertheless, to see them appear in the plan made at that time. After all, they had been hidden from the world for more than twenty days, which was in itself a triumph for duplicity.

As early as July 24th, the day on which the ultimatum became known and was communicated to the Foreign Offices of the European nations, and even before the reply to it, the outlines of the plan began to appear: it was necessary to terrify

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the world. The German ambassadors called at the various Foreign Offices to which they were accredited, in order to announce that the situation was serious, softening the announcement in accordance with what was demanded by public opinion in the different countries or was suggested to them by their various characters. They even went further: "The conflict is one between Austria and Serbia," they said, "and if any other nation wishes to mix up in it, such an intervention will have incalculable consequences."

This was the menacing message which Herr von Jagow caused to be transmitted to us in France through Herr von Schoen.

Let us go back for a moment. To-day we know that, on July 5, 1914, the German Emperor was so well aware that the conflict could not remain confined to Austria and Serbia that he took measures against the possible and natural preparations of Russia, which, he knew full well, would be rendered necessary by Austrian mobilization. He had realized, and realized clearly, what the character of the conflict was and that it was one which was bound to spread. Now, on July 24th, we were politely asked to remain silent, to wait, to observe, and we were warned that war would be declared against us if we showed intentions of taking a hand in the interests of peace.

The message brought by Herr von Schoen to the French Foreign Office admits of no other interpretation.

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BLIND ALLEY FOR VON SCHOEN

It did not take Herr von Schoen long to realize that he, a messenger unaware of the nature of the message which he brought, had walked into a blind alley.

"How can we be expected not to get mixed up in the conflict?" was the answer given him. "And how about yourselves?—will you get mixed up in it? Austria is your ally. Are you not going to advise her to show moderation?—are you going to let yourselves be dragged over the precipice by her?"

"But it is necessary to talk to St. Petersburg," answered the German ambassador.

"And you should talk to Vienna, since, on your own statement, the conflict cannot be localized."

"I have no instructions."

It was really too simple.

But here is a proof of the unequaled cynicism of the Germans. Herr von Schoen came four times to the French Foreign Office on the Quai d'Orsay. Why? To present for our approval a note having as its object that Germany and France, acting together, should intervene at St. Petersburg and preach moderation to Russia!

The underlying idea is evident: Germany was to say nothing at all to Vienna, unless urged so to do by Austria. And, as for us, the French, we were to have the consolation of advising moderation to St. Petersburg, where, as will be seen, such advice was not needed. Nor was that all! We were to

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give Russia this advice publicly, acting in combination with Germany, who thus appeared hand in hand with France as the guardian of peace and of the world. The result of such an intrigue—which only extreme naïveté could have failed to perceive—was quite easy to see: Russia would appear deserving of reproach from Germany and France, and, hence, the burden of responsibility would be placed upon her. (We shall see shortly, through a dispatch from the Kaiser and one from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, dated July 31st, that this was indeed the plan.)

Herr von Schoen was politely shown out of the French Foreign Office.

PART PLAYED BY GERMAN AMBASSADORS

At the same time, in St. Petersburg, pressure was brought to bear upon Russia to keep her from entering into an international debate and the same threat about “incalculable consequences” was made. In London, a more able German ambassador, in surroundings deemed to be less unfavorable to Germany, acted with more tact and would have done his country the service of enlightening the German government immediately as to the intentions of the British government, but Germany did not know enough to take advantage of this.

The part played by the German ambassadors, moreover, completely reveals the premeditation of the German government’s plan of action.

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At Vienna, the German ambassador did not allow the loosening for an instant of the chain of servitude binding Austria to Germany, and fed the fire which was to devour the world, and he did this with all the more zeal since, having earlier desired to give some advice in favor of moderation to Austria, he had been snubbed by the German Emperor (see the preceding chapter). At St. Petersburg, the task of Count Pourtalès, who, unhappily for us, was of French blood (though, fortunately, it came from many generations back), was to frighten the Russian government, bring it to the verge of war, blind it with the flash of the murderous lightning. At London, Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador, might have devoted to the service of his country the fruit of many years' experience, the sympathies which he had won, even a certain measure of authority. But all he could do was to warn a government that was deaf and make signs to ministers of state who were blind. The German government caused to be attached to his Embassy, disguised under some sort of diplomatic title, one Herr von Kulmann, whose duty was to keep a watch upon Prince Lichnowsky, and it was due to the secret reports of this man that the effect of the public notes of his chief was destroyed. Moreover, it will be shown that Prince Henry of Prussia, having misunderstood a conversation which he had had with King George, spurred on his country in the policy adopted by it at the moment of supreme crisis.

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As for Herr von Schoen, he had received no positive instructions, at least up to July 31st.

HERR VON SCHOEN WORRIED

I did not know this ambassador, since my occupancy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the war (June 16th to August, 1914) had been too short. Therefore, it will be a difficult matter for me to pronounce a final judgment upon him, which I should wish, temporarily at least, to be impartial. I cannot state that he desired war. The majority of his dispatches evinced a desire on his part to appease the German government and to show it the real situation in peace-loving but determined France. Of course, I saw him often between July 29th and the evening of August 3d. Usually he had no definite news from his own country and came in order to obtain information, impelled by quite legitimate curiosity. Though he did not play a very active part, one must needs pay him the compliment of admitting that, in order to assert himself, he never played either a perfidious or bad part. Madame von Schoen was of Belgian origin; I have always had the idea that her husband, though he did not desert the cause of his own country, was worried by the imminent peril threatening a land which he loved.

On some occasions Herr von Schoen appeared to be embarrassed by the part he had to play, so much so that, as will be shown, he refused once to impart to me a dispatch that was an insult to France,

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which dispatch he branded later on, in his Memoirs, as "stupid." The man was courteous; I feel convinced that at no time did he go to the full lengths demanded by his government.

BERLIN THOUGHT PARIS WEAK

True, diplomacy sometimes makes mistakes the importance of which is shown afterward. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr von Jagow doubtless thought that there was an impotent government in Paris, confronted by a muttering crowd of demagogues and an exasperated chauvinistic party; therefore, Berlin reckoned upon an uprising in Paris following upon the death of Jaurès. For this reason it was thought in Berlin that everything might be obtained as a result of weakness and fear. Herr von Schoen, closer to realities, soon understood that any conditions to be imposed upon a government must depend upon the strength of its position.

And so the plan was to progress for a few days: the British were to be deceived, likewise the world in general, as to the intentions of Austria; proclamation was to be made that no Serbian territory would be annexed, as if the hegemony of one nation had not a far more terrible political significance than that; and, in addition, warning was to be given that anyone meddling with the machinery that had been so carefully prepared ran the risk of death. Then, under the shelter of lies and blackmail, the Slavic sentiments of Russia were to be

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aroused; she was to be impelled to take defensive measures which were later to be misinterpreted; if necessary, some obscure police incident was to be cooked up—all for the purpose of making Russia seem responsible, and, along with her, France, the ally of Russia.

In addition, however, another plan had been hatched along with the previous one, *viz.*, if, after all, France's action should be paralyzed by inertia and fear, it would mean that Russia would be left alone and the Double Entente disrupted. With that accomplished, Russia's indifference would have been secured and it would be the turn of isolated France—in other words, war at the expense of the Entente, or disruption of the Entente and the hegemony of Germany. We shall see later on that we were indeed confronted with this perilous alternative, particularly during the 31st of July.

However, before this plan could succeed, a coefficient was needed and it was supplied by angered Serbia. What would happen if Serbia yielded? Would it be possible, with the world looking on, to continue to act against her? What answer was to be given to those wishing to keep far away from the explosion, yet demanding that due account be rendered? These questionings made Germany hesitate for a moment, a moment which must be borne in mind—first, because respect for truth so demands, and, secondly, because this hesitation, which was not destined to last, showed to what an extent Germany had been caught—brain and body

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and soul and conscience, if I may so express it—in the cogs of the whirling machinery.

On July 28th, the Kaiser, who had returned from his cruise to Norway the 26th or 27th, came face to face with the Serbian answer, which, moreover, had been transmitted to him already by telegraph, like the news of all the happenings, hour by hour, while he was on his cruise. He did not expect that this answer would be so conciliatory, and he wrote to Herr von Jagow: "Having read over the Serbian answer, which I received this morning, I am convinced that the desires of the Danube Monarchy [Austria-Hungary] are, on the whole, satisfied. Those reservations which Serbia makes on certain points can, in my estimation, be arranged through negotiations. Anyhow, the humblest sort of capitulation is proclaimed *urbi et orbi*, and, hence, every reason for war vanishes."

All is well. Why did he not make this opinion of his definitive, and, above all, why did it remain hidden, secreted in the hands of Herr von Jagow, who never alluded to it, and who did not avail himself of it for bringing to bear counsels of moderation upon Austria, which, at that moment, anyhow, were absolutely necessary? How is it to be explained that, after this opinion had been emitted, Austria should still have remained free to continue her policy of violence? How is it to be explained that, after that, war can have been declared against Serbia?

Here is the explanation: Emperor William

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could not bring himself to give up the idea of war, cherished by him for many years, aroused in his brain on the 5th of July, and presenting itself to him, of course, in the radiant guise of easy victory. Assuredly, he could not let his miserable prey go—so he wrote, in this very same document, the following:

"At all events, there is no reason for attributing to this piece of paper [the Serbian answer] and to its contents anything but a limited importance, so long as it remains untranslated into action. The Serbs are Orientals and, consequently, liars, deceivers, and consummate masters in the employment of dilatory measures. Before these lovely promises can become truth and reality, a 'gentle violence' must be exerted. This might be accomplished as follows: Austria might occupy Belgrade as surety for the carrying out of the promises and continue to occupy it until her demands have been actually met. This is also necessary for satisfying the honor of an army which has been uselessly mobilized for the third time. . . . Naturally, there is at present no longer any reason for war, but a guaranty that the promises are to be carried out is necessary. This might be obtained by a temporary occupation of part of Serbia. The action would be similar to ours, in 1871, when we left troops in France until the milliards were paid."

Is this not outrageous? What more could insatiable Austria want beyond almost total occupation of an innocent country which, by its modera-

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tion, was making itself deserving of glory in the annals of history, since it was acting in the interest of peace?

But the Kaiser understood that the Serbian answer would embarrass Austria in keeping up her brutal course, that nations would hesitate, that they would be aroused to unite with one another, since, in such an event, not one of them would be safe from the Colossus. But—will the Kaiser assume the responsibility of moderation and take upon his shoulders the detestable burden of peace? Not he! Rather will he assume the burden of war! Notwithstanding, since, in spite of all, history keeps watch, likewise the conscience of humanity; since these last longer than crime and the profit from crime; since even the most daring murderer constantly fears a ray of light that may disclose his misdeed; since, in short, there will always be responsibility to be borne even beyond the tomb—would it not be well, in view of all this, to avoid the responsibility and load it upon Russia?

At once Emperor William submits his idea to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the latter, under date of July 28, 1914 (German Documents of 1919, No. 323), sends the following dispatch to the German ambassador at Vienna:

“The answer of the Serbian government to the Austrian ultimatum shows that Serbia has satisfied Austrian demands to such an extent that an absolutely uncompromising attitude on the part of the Austrian government would justify the belief

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that public opinion throughout Europe would become increasingly hostile to the said government. . . . Therefore, the government finds itself placed in a position of extraordinary difficulty. It remains liable, during the interval, to receive proposals for mediation and discussion from other governments. Should it continue to reject such proposals it will eventually have to bear the odium of having been responsible for a European war, even in the eyes of the German people. With such a basis, one cannot start and conduct a successful war on three fronts. It is absolutely necessary that, if the conflict should spread so as to include those Powers not directly involved, Russia shall be the one to bear the responsibility. . . . The occupation of Serbia would be similar to German occupation of France, after the Peace of Frankfort, for assuring the payment of the war indemnity. Just as soon as Austria's terms are met, evacuation should be carried out."

Here we catch the trend of the Kaiser's thoughts, already revealed in the preceding dispatch.

So, at a moment when all might have been saved, when one word would have sufficed, the hand retracts that which the hand writes; it erases, substitutes blood for ink! Never did Austria receive one piece of imperial advice in favor of peace. On the contrary, in that very same dispatch (No. 323), still fearing that the German ambassador in Austria might push the Austrian government a bit too much toward moderation, Herr von Beth-

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mann wrote to the said ambassador: "You must carefully avoid giving the impression that we wish to restrain Austria."

Hence—since Truth always demands her rights—let us declare what happened: The Serbian answer, which struck the whole world with its moderation, made the Kaiser and his Chancellor draw back for a moment from the preparations of war which had been decided upon, it will be recalled, in the course of the 5th of July. The two exchanged ideas tending toward moderation, kept these to themselves, suddenly obliterated them, declaring that, despite all, Serbia must expiate her crimes, before any war in which she was bound to be beaten, as France did after the war of 1870, after the Treaty of Frankfort.

And as it was foreseen that the situation created by the Serbian answer was such, even at Vienna, that the German ambassador might be influenced to shape his actions according to it—it will be remembered that it was this ambassador who had been rebuked a few days before for his moderation—care was taken to tell him to hold his tongue and give no advice to Austria to act prudently.

It is not sufficient, in seeking to explain these self-contradictory moves, to adduce weakness of the will to do wrong followed by a renewed access of madness. Within those minds there was such a leaven of desire for war, formed there as a result of years—almost centuries—of education, as a result of vanity and arrogance, of contempt for the

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right, that the idea of war, even when it wavered under the influence of the good, invariably regained the upper hand.

So much for the psychological side.

There was also something else, less mysterious in character—interference of a military nature to which the German Emperor, the Commander, the War Lord, naturally yielded.

The Kaiser's letter to von Jagow, mentioned above, was dated July 28th. Undoubtedly it was received by him to whom it was addressed on that day or the day following. But Herr von Jagow also received and stamped with his stamp, on the 29th, a report, dated the 29th, from the German General Staff, placed first in the hands of the Chancellor, who naturally passed it along.

This report, which was rather long, was an incitement to war, an examination of the political reasons which made it necessary in conjunction with the military reasons which ought to hasten its coming.

After having taken up the situation brought about by the invasion of Serbia and the counter-move that was naturally foreseen and even hoped for by Germany ever since July 5th, the German General Staff elucidated its views as follows:

"What are and should be the consequences? Austria, should she invade Serbia, would find herself confronted not only by the Serbian army, but by very superior Russian forces. Therefore, she cannot make war on Serbia without safeguarding

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herself against Russia taking a hand, which is tantamount to saying that she will be obliged also to mobilize the other half of her army, since it is impossible for her to place herself at the mercy of a Russia prepared for war. But, from the very moment that Austria mobilizes her whole army, a clash between her and Russia becomes unavoidable. And that would confront Germany with the *casus foederis.*"

Even assuming that this military view were well founded, one cannot explain, even in the case of military men desirous of war, why no attention was paid on that day to the Serbian reply, and why the line of reasoning adopted on July 28th was exactly as if Serbia had refused to give any sort of satisfaction. What additional step would have been taken if Serbia, instead of answering as she did, had taken up arms? And how are we to reconcile the words of the Kaiser and even those of his Chancellor, declaring that "the Serbian answer eliminates all reason for war," with the murderous incitement to war, which, concealed under technical terms, was contained in that message from the German General Staff?

As a matter of fact, one may well understand what had occurred.

Tired at the delays of Austria and at those of the Kaiser, the corps of German generals deemed it time for them to appear upon the scene. Now, had the result been peace, the report quoted above would have covered the German General Staff and

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given it the chance to accuse the German government later on of having betrayed the cause of Germany. It shows the responsibility of the Kaiser and the German Chancellor, for it is a threat, made without disguise, which would, under other conditions, have had its effect upon internal politics; it was something calculated to arouse fear, dynastic fear, in the breast of a Kaiser already warned by the Zabern affair of the risk run even by him if he dared defend, no matter how timidly, the rights of civilians against the violent passions of infuriated army officers. It was a trumpet call. And those who sounded it might well rest assured that the call would be heard.

That is what occurred at Berlin when the Serbian reply was received.

Soon we shall take up the attitude of Austria. But—what was being done, during these hours, by the Premiers of the Allied countries and the countries friendly to them?

If it be possible to find in the whole length of history a more striking contrast between zeal for conciliation and feverish lust for war, I ask to be allowed to see it.

Even before Serbia had answered, even before I had received the substance of the ultimatum, I had, from the remote waters of the Gulf of Bothnia, recommended moderation to Austria, through our ambassador at Vienna, and had endeavored, through Sir Edward Grey, to institute steps tending toward peace, *viz.*, the securing of an extension of the time

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limit of forty-eight hours accorded to Serbia, and an international investigation by means of a meeting between representatives of the four nations interested in maintaining order (England, Germany, Italy, France).

France, England, Italy, and, in addition, Russia, took action having the same end in view.

But the extension of the time limit was refused without any reason (*Orange Book*, No. 12). It expired on the 25th and Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia.

There now remained the possibility of a four-cornered conference, Austria and Russia being excluded. This was proposed by Sir Edward Grey (*Blue Book* No. 17, No. 24, etc.). France, which had taken the initiative in the felicitous idea of bringing about intervention, immediately gave her adherence to this proposal, Italy also, Russia with eagerness.

Thus there was the possibility of a meeting at which two representatives of the Triple Alliance and two delegates of the Triple Entente might possibly smooth out all difficulties, allay the danger of war, calm the nerves of Europe, and, as seconds do in the case of a dispute between individuals, not only pronounce sentence, but proclaim a rule of equity.

What answer could be given to this? Basically, nothing. But, first, recourse was had to a pretext: "Austria cannot be haled before a European tribunal" (*Blue Book*, page 9). It was Herr von Jagow who raked up that beggarly retort to the

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British ambassador. Subsequently, refuge was taken in absolute refusal. It was Austria, encouraged by Germany, who refused.

Why this refusal by Austria?

On this we have two documents of prime importance, which show the premeditation with which the German and Austrian Foreign Offices acted in paying no heed to endeavors for bringing about moderation through intervention.

On July 25th (Austrian Red Book, No. 32) the Austrian ambassador at Berlin telegraphed to Vienna:

"Grave danger is seen in any delay in beginning military operations, on account of intervention by the Powers. We are particularly advised to act immediately and confront the world with a *fait accompli*. I am entirely in accord with this view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

Thus, on July 25th, before the Serbian answer was known, the decision had been made by Herr von Jagow and Herr Berchtold. War at once, at once the *fait accompli*, at once elimination of peace!

But at least, when, on the 26th, the Serbian reply became known, a reply that satisfied even the Kaiser, there will be acceptance of the conciliatory advances of Russia, England, France? Read this:

"BERLIN, July 27th.

(Telegram from the Austrian ambassador at Berlin.)

"The State Secretary has told me plainly, in strictly confidential form, that soon mediation pro-

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posals from England will be brought by the German government to the knowledge of Your Excellency. The German government makes the most formal declaration that it will not associate itself in any way with these proposals, that it will, in fact, object emphatically to their being taken into consideration, and that it would not transmit them were it not for the action of England" (Austrian Red Book, No. 68).

There, then, we have the criminals captured in broad daylight. It has been of no use to them to falsify their public documents by omitting highly important dispatches. Why they wished to omit them is plain. But when Germany is told that her government incited Europe, prevented peace, thwarted all attempts at discussion, and is responsible for the war, what can she answer, assuming she is honest?

And, were it necessary to make even more clear her intentions before the eyes of the world, here is something of capital importance, something accomplished in secret on July 26th, the very day when cognizance was taken of the satisfactory reply from Serbia. We are anticipating in telling of this in order to show the outrageous nature of what was done.

It is a known fact that on August 2d the ultimatum was sent to Belgium, who answered with magnificent spirit. It is generally supposed that, at the last moment, Germany, by sending this ultimatum, sought to force passage for her armies.

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But that order for opening passage, which was sent to Belgium on August 2d, was drawn up on July 26th by General von Moltke and sent on the 29th to Brussels to the German minister there, who did not present it until August 2d to the Belgian government, pursuant to special orders from Berlin (German Documents, No. 376).

Thus, the ultimatum was merely the logical sequence of the German plan of invasion prepared in 1913, which was made public at the beginning of our Yellow Book. This plan was continued in the report which had been made by the German General Staff to the German Emperor.

Thus, on July 26th, the ultimatum to Belgium was dispatched, at the very moment when Serbia, replying in conciliatory terms, had eliminated, according to the admission of the German Emperor, all cause for war. The eternal shame destined to fall upon those responsible for these acts seemed so intolerable that Herr von Jagow, who certainly had a part in all the falsifications of those days, sought to conceal what had happened by telegraphing on July 30th (German Documents, 648) : "The Belgian government must be under the impression that all instructions regarding this matter did not reach you until to-day."

Two crimes, then, were committed on that same day: the execution of Serbia was begun and that of Belgium was prepared. No other document proves more unanswerably that Germany moved deliberately toward war.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA

SO Germany and Austria, in accordance with a criminal compact, refused the proposal of Sir Edward Grey for a discussion in which four nations were to take part.

The scheme of the *Memoirs* becomes evident from the very start: The Kaiser did absolutely nothing in his Empire; in fact, as one reads, one is led to believe that he reigned under a sort of guardianship, he himself remaining indifferent to, or unmoved at, what went on, a stranger to all that was being done, capable only of receiving impressions, traveling, parading—in short, that he was a sort of Dauphin with nothing to do but play a sort of theatrical rôle. In his *Memoirs* there is not one solitary event the responsibility for which—provided it turned out badly for Germany—he does not shift upon somebody else. Did anybody ever notify him of anything? Was he a free agent? Was not the Foreign Office dumb toward him, or, when he dared speak to it, was it not deaf?

Bismarck, of course, was responsible for all evil, and his brutal character often hurt the gentle soul of the Kaiser, who sought relief in solitude or travels. As for Caprivi, the author of the *Memoirs*

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seems to have had a rather more human opinion of him, but Bülow, who was esteemed by everybody having to do with foreign affairs in Europe, seems to have earned the Kaiser's hostility. The only other one of his chancellors, besides Hohenlohe, was Bethmann-Hollweg, the man of the 4th of August, he who had the audacity to justify the violation of Belgian neutrality by alleging that it was necessary. This man at least, one would think, would have been spared by William, since Bethmann obeyed both him and the German General Staff. But, no—William pictures his last Chancellor as weak and vacillating, calls him contemptuously (in spite of his docility in 1918) "the civilian Chancellor," and, at the same time, with incomprehensible inconsistency, shows him up as a didactic schoolmaster, peevish, incapable of taking advice, and invariably imposing his own will upon others.

"So be it," replied the Triple Entente. "Germany prefers having Austria speak directly with Russia. Sir Edward Grey and we will consent to this, on the condition that, if this private conversation fail, it be made general" (Blue Book, No. 45).

And now comes a strange and inexplicable thing—or, perhaps, one but too easily explained. Austria refuses even to discuss with Russia! The duplicity of the two governments becomes apparent; Germany, in order not to assume the responsibility, since she is not directly concerned with the

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refusal to discuss, does not oppose the discussion, yet Austria continues to refuse. Who can possibly believe that she has plucked up courage enough to refuse to follow the advice of a Germany who is irritated at her conduct?

What is going to happen? Under what kind of a régime of silence and terror is the world to live? No general conference, no private conference! What then?

Austria will give us the answer.

After having mobilized secretly for some time she suddenly declares war against Serbia at noon of the 28th of July. On the same day—a ridiculous thing, indeed!—the Serbian minister at Rome had told the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Marquis of San Giuliano, “that if some explanations should be given as to the manner in which Austrian officials might participate, the Serbian government might yet accept the entire Austrian note” (*Origins of the World War*, Bazergue, page 182). The Marquis of San Giuliano transmits this information to Sir Edward Grey, and, foreseeing with admirable perspicacity that Austria would haughtily refuse to have any dealings with Serbia if she were given the chance to have them, he suggested that Austria might make her reply to the other nations and then communicate with Serbia.

At noon, war against Serbia!—and, on that same day, Serbia accepting all Austria’s terms! The whole matter hinged on the interpretation of one

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word! Though Austria has certainly paid heavily for what she did, one must needs admit that the crime merited the punishment.

Serbia, overwhelmed on the evening of the 23d by an ultimatum that burst upon her like a cannon ball, and compelled, on the 26th, to withdraw her government from Belgrade, under the guns of Semlin, had made efforts—alas! how weak they were!—to protect herself at the same time that she took this precautionary step. Her soil was invaded, Belgrade was bombarded and soon captured.

Was all lost? All would have been on that day, as a consequence of the brutal and inexplicable act, as a result of the cowardly overpowering of the weak by the strong; all would have been lost if coolness had not reigned in the Chancelleries of the Entente Powers. Austria's leap, to be sure, had brought us close to a general conflagration, but it was possible still to discuss, to keep up discussion as long as the cannon was still so far away as not to drown the voice of reason.

What were we to do?—address an ultimatum to Austria and demand that she drop her prey for the very sake of her recent statements informing us that she dreamed of no conquests? Not for an instant did we harbor such an idea. England and France, Russia, even—though Russia's Slavic sentiments had been aroused and Austria had taken the initiative in mobilizing against her—all three of these nations acquiesced in the occupation of Serbia by Austria.

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Sir Edward Grey, in agreement with us, proposed that this action be considered as satisfying the demands of Austria and he prepared the way for an arrangement (*Blue Book, 76 et seq.*). King George telegraphed on July 30th to Prince Henry of Prussia (*J'Accuse*, page 116). Finally, M. Sazonoff suggested to the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, in the course of a tragic interview, to draw up a note, which the latter took away in writing (*J'Accuse*, page 117).

So Serbia, then, was invaded on July 28th, and Belgrade bombarded, and, after these acts of violence, all of us got together to sanction the Austrian occupation of Serbia, but to request, notwithstanding, that it stop where it was, that it be deemed sufficient, and that military preparations in all countries cease.

What was to become of the conciliatory proposals of Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonoff? What happened now was due to Herr von Jagow.

He was notified, on July 30th, by the Russian minister at Berlin and by his own ambassador at St. Petersburg, of Sazonoff's proposal. He spurned it, remarking that "it was impossible for Austria to accept it" (*Orange Book, No. 63*). Did he consult Austria? He refused to do so. On that day he opened the way to slaughter, called down death upon millions of homes, and—as will be shown shortly—did not stop even there. We shall cite his conversation a few hours later with M. Jules Cambon on the same subject.

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And yet he was, so it seems, Minister of Foreign Affairs!

Yet nothing was yet entirely lost for us. We continued to discuss up to the very threshold of the battlefield, until the machine guns crackled on our frontiers along the destroyed railway lines. We shall revert to these discussions in the course of this chapter and the one following it. Now there arises, before history and the world, what I consider the most important act of the war, not only because it caused the war, but because it makes manifest more than anything else the intention to go to war, which Germany tried to conceal when it was too late for veiling it from the gaze of the conscience of humanity.

Already we have mentioned a fateful date—July 5th—the day when Emperor William, warned, through the autograph letter from the Emperor of Austria, of the elimination of Serbia, and not only foreseeing, but actually enumerating the murderous consequences thereof, nevertheless summoned about him his military counselors and told them the news. And it is necessary to bear in mind another date—July 29th—the date which we have now reached: preparation (July 5th) has now yielded to action (July 29th). On the night of July 29th Austria had bombarded Belgrade and, as we have said, she had invaded Serbia. Of course, she had been obliged to mobilize several days before in order to accomplish this, and to give the alarm in Europe by making those ominous concentrations of soldiers

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from which lightning so often strikes. At the same time, alleging various pretexts, Austria massed her army corps on the Russian frontier (Yellow Book, 95, 97, 101). What could Russia do?

The Russian ambassador at Berlin naturally must have telegraphed the news to the Emperor of Russia as soon as he learned it. The ambassador was informed of the news by a Russian journalist, M. Markow, who, having read the *Lokal Anzeiger* in the street, telephoned to the embassy and telegraphed to his news agency at St. Petersburg. Thus, at the very moment of the first appearance of the newspaper, at about one in the afternoon, the news was transmitted to St. Petersburg, in both an official and a semiofficial manner. It certainly was not such as to calm people's minds; on the contrary, it was such as to excite them.

Here, then, is the situation as it has been established on good evidence: on July 30th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the *Lokal Anzeiger* announced German mobilization; at one o'clock, the Russian embassy and a Russian journalist telegraphed this news; at two or three o'clock their dispatches reached St. Petersburg. Now, at what hour was Russian mobilization ordered? On July 30th, in the evening—and it was decreed the morning of the 31st. On that same 30th of July, at about midnight, two other telegrams from the Russian embassy at Berlin were to arrive at St. Petersburg, denying the news of the afternoon, but too late, the order having just been given to the com-

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manders and being about to be communicated to the troops.

Here is the proper place for impressing upon readers the part which mobilization plays and the effect it has—not from the absolute point of view, but from the relative point of view of the country resorting to it. A decree of mobilization is a serious thing. But it remains confined to the paper on which it is written unless it is followed by an act which it entails as a consequence, *viz.*, the concentration of troops. Now, to be successful, such concentration hinges on three things: the extent of the territory which the troops must traverse in order to reach their points of concentration; the relative ease or difficulty of assembling the various quotas of troops; and, lastly, the character of the means of transportation available for the concentration.

The possibilities of rapid concentration vary naturally in different countries. Two days, or even less, sufficed in Germany—which, moreover, thanks to legislation unknown to other lands, did not mobilize until the existence of a danger of war had been declared, so that mobilization was a mere formality. Two or three days would be required for concentration in Austria, the same in France, probably less in Switzerland (I speak hypothetically for the purpose of contrasting a country capable of more rapid concentration with other countries). And, in any case, sixteen days would be required in Russia.

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One can realize without the slightest difficulty that, given such a state of affairs—with Serbia at war and invaded and the Austrian army partially concentrated on her frontier—Russia could not hesitate; confronted as she was by a peril enhanced by the well-known slowness of her concentration, she was forced to meet the partial mobilization of Austria by partial mobilization of her own forces.

At the same time, M. Sazonoff announced through the Russian ambassador at Vienna “that these precautionary measures were not aimed in the slightest against Austria and did not imply, in the slightest, aggressive measures against Austria.” What more could aggressive Austria ask and what could she say after she had taken the initiative as she did?

She said nothing. But the extraordinary thing—perhaps one only too easily to be understood—was what Germany did. Germany had announced, on July 27th, through Herr von Jagow, to the British ambassador “*that if Russia mobilized only in the south Germany would not mobilize*” (Yellow Book, No. 67). This was quite normal, since what objection could Germany make to a mobilization that did not affect her? Yet, when this mobilization occurred, Herr von Jagow simulated indignation. M. Jules Cambon remarked to him in diplomatic language that he was not consistent. But Herr von Jagow apologized for having revealed an agreement which had been known in Russia and might have served to reassure the Russian govern-

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ment somewhat, and alleged, in explanation of his later attitude, insistence on the part of the German General Staff (*Yellow Book*, No. 109).

This shows how all had been prepared and how a minister who wishes to go back on his word needs merely to hide beyond a General Staff, whose alleged acts cannot be verified even in its own country and which can always be easily employed as a useful screen for lies. Moreover, as will be shown subsequently, there was no such insistence on the part of the German General Staff—in any event, it yielded.

Thus, while Austria made no protest against the mobilization, Germany adopted a menacing attitude, sword in hand. Count Pourtalès, her ambassador at St. Petersburg, notified M. Sazonoff "that if Russia did not stop her military preparations the German army would be mobilized."

M. Sazonoff felt the catastrophe approaching. The blow prepared ever since the 5th of July and explained by the Emperor to his ambassador at Vienna (see preceding chapter—"It is necessary to have the full responsibility fall upon Russia"—) was about to be struck. Even assuming that Russia would yield, Austria would be enabled to invade Russia, as she had invaded Serbia, since it is to be noted that Germany, of course, did not say anything to Austria concerning the latter's mobilization.

At this terrible juncture M. Sazonoff turned to me, evincing indescribable emotion. He informed me, during the night of July 29th-30th, at two

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o'clock, by means of a dispatch communicated to me at my home by M. de Margerie, "that he was confronted with an imminent war and asked whether he could count on the support of France as an ally, and whether England could without delay join Russia and France."

At two in the morning, I made the following reply:

"France is resolved to fulfill all her obligations as an ally and she will, moreover, spare no effort toward avoiding the conflict in the interests of general peace. The conversations begun among the Powers less directly interested allow the continuance of hope that peace may be preserved. I therefore deem it advisable that, whatever measures of precaution or defense Russia feels obliged to take, she shall not take any immediate action which may serve as a pretext to Germany for complete or partial mobilization of her forces."

What other reply could French pride make? With two nations arrayed against her, Russia, despite all concession on her part, stood alone, exposed to every blow. The alliance was in jeopardy. What was happening was the fruition of that plan which I have already laid bare: either to have war or bring about the destruction of the Franco-Russian alliance, with Russia abandoned, on the one hand, and, on the other, France faithless to her signature and, subsequently, herself a victim, in her isolation, of a German fury which nothing

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could offset—dishonor and punishment at one and the same time!

I waited, my eyes fixed on the dark horizon. But a surprise was in store for me. It came in a dispatch from the French ambassador at St. Petersburg which notified me that the German ambassador had renewed his demands upon M. Sazonoff, but had couched them in much less extreme terms.

So far was he from maintaining the brutal tone of the ultimatum of a few hours before that he took it up this time in a gentler manner and left M. Sazonoff after a discussion conducted politely. He took with him upon his departure, after having taken it down from dictation, M. Sazonoff's proposal (already mentioned by me) to hold a four-cornered discussion, which was delivered by him to Herr von Jagow, and which Herr von Jagow found unacceptable some time later.

In the dispatch which M. Paléologue sent to me (Yellow Book) he added that, during the night, the Tsar had given orders to restrict mobilization. Upon the testimony of Sukhomlinoff, Russian Minister of War, the Germans have constructed an entire thesis. They maintain that the Russian generals did not obey and that the order of the Tsar went unheeded. Now, even were this true, it would not detract from the merit of the Tsar's action, since, had it not been followed by disobedience tantamount to an offense against military discipline, the intent to further the cause of peace underlying it would have remained unimpaired.

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However, a document of very recent date is available for refuting this old lie.

General Dobrorolsky, chief of Russian mobilization in 1914, has just explained matters with perfect clearness and with an adequacy which nobody can question. His statement, which is of prime importance on historical grounds, since it testifies to Russia's desire for maintaining peace, was dealt with in the recent and remarkable work of Renouvin and Appuhn in such a way that the various allegations, carefully scrutinized by the reader, become no longer tenable, *viz.*:

"When evening came, everything demanded by law had been done. Dobrorolsky went to the main telegraph office for the purpose of sending to every part of the immense Empire the order for mobilization. It was at that moment—9.30, St. Petersburg time—that he received an order by telephone from General Janushkevich to suspend mobilization. Tsar Nicholas, having received a telegram from William, was temporarily refraining from general mobilization and consenting only to partial mobilization. It is to be noted that the testimony of Dobrorolsky agrees with that of Janushkevich, as set down in the *Birjevia Viedomosti*.

"The order to suspend general mobilization was, moreover, carried out immediately. It is not true at all, according to Dobrorolsky, that a lie was told to the Tsar and that general mobilization was continued in secret. The idea of so disobeying orders could have occurred to nobody in 1914; it was

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not until 1917, after the downfall of the imperial régime, that such an idea could spring up. Moreover, how could such a secret have been kept? Millions of men cannot be mobilized in secret. So Dobrorolsky gives the lie to the statement made by Sukhomlinoff at his trial and reproduced in the diary that appeared under his name, which is probably apocryphal. During the night between the 29th and the 30th, then, the order issued was for partial Russian mobilization, which was not a war measure directed against Germany, but a measure of intimidation against Austria" (Introduction to William II's *Historical Tables*, by Charles Appuhn and Pierre Renouvin).

Thus, not the slightest doubt remains as to this historical fact, which the Germans will pass over in silence.

What, then, had happened at Berlin to cause such a change in the drama? Here is what happened: and it is an event of the utmost importance for understanding the war and as a contribution to history.

On the evening of that day—July 29th—on which Count Pourtalès, at about four o'clock, had delivered the ultimatum to Russia, there had been a meeting of the Council at Potsdam. There were present at it the Crown Prince, the Chancellor, Herr von Jagow, General von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of War, Admiral Tirpitz, Admirals Pohl and Müller.

What was it that the said Council was going to

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do? Of what was it going to speak? The list of those present shows what the object of debate was to be. Diplomacy, having played its part, was now to report humbly on what it had done, to the army, which was now about to act. No soldier, no sailor, would have succeeded in getting into that Council—at which, in addition to the chiefs, less important collaborators were present—had its object been to discuss purely political matters. There, on that terrible evening, war was decided upon.

But suddenly, when the Council had barely come to an end, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg departed in great haste. He went to Berlin, and in the middle of the night summoned the British ambassador (Correspondence of the British government with its ambassador, No. 85). Then it was that the attempt was made to divide the forces of the Entente. Before starting the war it was necessary to find out more exactly what England wished. The British government had not made a definite pronouncement; it had been unwilling to bind itself to anybody. It had rightly described the ultimatum to Serbia and called for a meeting between the four Powers involved, but had remained, up to that moment, a calm looker-on. If England would only remain neutral, anything would be possible.

The talk between Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and the ambassador began. It may be summarized as follows: Germany will make no territorial annexations at the expense of France in case of a

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war. But how about the colonies? No assurance concerning them can be given. Any military operations that may become necessary in Belgium will not prevent restoration of Belgian integrity after victory (Blue Book, No. 85). In view of this, will not England remain neutral in case of conflict? This is what the British ambassador, with the contempt felt by a diplomat for a broker, called a high bid. But, at the same time, he said that England would preserve her liberty of action and he would not promise that his country would keep out.

Thus, at one fell swoop, everything was changed. If England was going to hold back, if she did not lose her liberty of action, if it was not enough to tempt her in order to get her to bargaining, what was she going to think, what would the world think, of the ultimatum to Russia? If Russia was dragged into war against two nations attacking her, it would mean that France also would be dragged in. How was this to be explained? Germany was not confronted with a mobilization threatening her own frontier. Austria had said nothing. How, then, was the peace of the world to be disturbed under such conditions? All would be well, to be sure, if England were to look on unmoved at the spectacle, but—she was not to be bought! The old conception of honor was not dead, nor was the ancient hatred of that noble country, England, for every threatening hegemony, nor her natural solicitude for her own interests.

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Then Count Pourtalès called upon M. Sazonoff, having received from his chief orders to do so. No longer is the brutal demand made upon Russia to disperse her forces while those of Austria stand arrayed against her; she is now asked upon what conditions she will suspend her preparations.

So the blow had failed—on that day, at least. But who will maintain that it was not a case of war, of war having been decided upon? What was the use of that Council hastily called together that evening, after the delivery of an insulting ultimatum, if it did not mean war? Why that supremely important conversation with the representative of England, the statement of conditions, the discounting of war as a possibility, the proposed division of the spoils over the table of victory, if war had not been decided upon?

Decided upon? It was ready to be launched. In fact, the next day, July 30th, a fearful proof of this was to be given to the world.

On July 30th, at noon, the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a semiofficial paper, in close relations with the German government and with its columns at the latter's disposal, published the official order of mobilization of the entire German army on the Russian frontier. This paper, moreover, was not the only one to publish this piece of news, which, false on that day, had been true the day before. It certainly looked as if the paper had the news from the German government, so much so that it was possible to keep the paper on sale all that afternoon, to offer

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it to the embassies, feed it to the entire population. Not until much later—when the harm had been done—was it suppressed by Herr von Jagow. The latter, to be sure, summoned M. Jules Cambon for the purpose of protesting to him against the publication of the news.

But who had given the paper the chance to do this bad deed? Who had provided it with the means? On the day before, July 29th, war had been decided upon, as we have just seen, and the plan had not failed until three days later, when the Chancellor learned the, to him unexpected, state of mind of England. The order for mobilization had been got ready—possibly it had been prepared a long time before.

In any event, because of this new feature, the Russian ambassador at Berlin, who had not been informed by Herr von Jagow (though mobilization concerned Russia), telegraphed to his government.

Let us forget nothing. The Tsar, deeply impressed by the ultimatum, had telegraphed on July 29th to Emperor William: "It would be better to intrust the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. I trust to thy wisdom and friendship." No answer was made to this telegram! Not even did it receive the honor of being included in the 1914 White Book! This supreme proposal of mediation did not become known, in fact, until the war was in progress, when it appeared in the official newspapers.

The question of the *Lokal Anzeiger* news will

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not be touched upon just now. I shall make due note of it, as of the fateful telegram of the German Emperor, in its place. But the point of capital importance concerning them is not only the question of their dispatch, but also the consequences of their receipt at both St. Petersburg and Vienna. In the next chapter it will be shown that they had a most devastating effect and contributed toward bringing on the war.

On that day two conciliatory proposals were made: that of Sir Edward Grey, backed by King George, and addressed to Emperor William, and that of M. Sazonoff, to the same individual, with the backing of the Entente. Neither was accepted. Herr von Jagow refused to transmit these proposals, in accordance with the criminal agreement of July 25th. And this occurred between the 29th and 31st of July! During those dreadful hours, when the life of nations depended on minutes, Austria answered not a word. Germany was silent and refused to co-operate. The soldiers marched, war broke out. And yet it was Austrian mobilization which caused Russian mobilization. And Serbia had been invaded!

Nevertheless, we allowed nothing to daunt or stop us; the efforts of Sisyphus to move his rock were not more desperate than what was now being done by human strength, strained to its utmost, in the cause of peace.

CHAPTER IX

THE CALL TO ARMS

WHO was the first to upset the existing state of peace and put arms into the hands of men by means of a prolonged and intensive preparation for war? Which was the country that first resorted, in a general way, to mobilization? That is now the question—and the answer to it must have a most important influence on the judgment of history.

We shall prove, by invoking every bit of evidence, including the most recent available, that the burden of having been the first to resort to general mobilization falls upon Austria, also upon Germany. But before entering upon this question we wish to recall the fact—reserving to ourselves the privilege of returning later to it—that the preparations made by these two countries went farther back still, even if these did not legally come under the head of mobilization.

It was the German General Staff which laid all the plans necessary for sweeping along with it the vacillating will of the civil government. In addition, what we know of the warlike intentions of the German Emperor, as they appeared on July 5 and July 21, 1914 (see preceding chapters), would suf-

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fice for placing upon the attitude of Germany and her leaders immeasurable responsibility.

Who wished the war? Who knowingly and silently prepared it? Who refused absolutely to be moved by persuasion, stifled debate by threats, made the situation constantly more serious, especially during the last crucial days? This is the principal question that comes up for decision before the tribunal of history. We have begun to examine this question and we shall continue to do so. Let us, at the same time, study that other matter of mobilization.

It will be recalled that Russia, handicapped in mobilization by the slowness of concentration to which we have already made allusion, mobilized partially on July 29th, in answer to Austria's partial mobilization of July 29th, at the same time assuring Austria of her desire for peace. It will be recalled that Germany addressed a violent ultimatum to Russia, demanding—though she demanded nothing similar from the aggressive government of Austria—that Russia demobilize, although the frontiers of Germany were not threatened. The nocturnal Council of Potsdam will be recalled (July 29th), where war was so definitely decided upon (the German General Staff was represented there and demanded liberty of action) that, a few minutes later during that same night, at Berlin, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg so announced to the British ambassador and asked that Great Britain maintain her neutrality, which request was

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refused. It will be recalled that the German Chancellor, all of a sudden, terrified and shaking on his legs, on that very same night withdrew the ultimatum (night of July 29th–30th) and that M. Sazonoff dictated to Count Pourtalès, German ambassador to Russia, the formula, now submitted again, of his proposal of a four-cornered agreement. It will be recalled, in conclusion, that Herr von Jagow, on July 30th, refused to transmit these proposals to Austria.

And that brings us to the 30th of July.

What is it that is suddenly happening? During the night of July 30th–31st, at about one in the morning, Austria decreed and made public her general mobilization (Dumaine dispatch, Yellow Book). Moreover, this fact has not been disputed.

As to Russia, let us see what occurred with regard to her, in the light of recent documents, according to sometimes conflicting pieces of testimony, which, however, though showing differences of some minutes in the happenings to which they refer, are, nevertheless, essentially in agreement with one another.

Russian general mobilization was decreed and made public on July 31st, at about ten o'clock in the morning. It had been decided upon the evening of the 30th.

But we have not here a mere matter of accounting, for which the consultation of a list of hours is sufficient—what must be sought, since it is of self-

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evident interest from a historical standpoint, is the reason why the Tsar, who, the day before, asked Emperor William to keep the peace, assured the latter of his affection, asked that the matter be turned over for decision to the Hague Tribunal, and even gave the order canceling partial mobilization and encouraged all the efforts made by M. Sazonoff and our officials for the maintenance of peace, was led to take final, supremely important steps for safeguarding his country.

Two documents of capital importance bear on this; they play a part in this matter upon which stress must be laid for the amazement of history and for proving the deadly responsibility resting upon the Kaiser, his government, and particularly his General Staff.

We have related, in the preceding chapters, the scandalous publication, on July 30th at one in the afternoon, by the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a semiofficial sheet devoted to Herr von Jagow and the General Staff, of the order for mobilization, and the laxness with which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had the paper suppressed when it was too late, since the edition had almost been sold out. It will have been easily realized, I hope, that the publication of this news had caused justified excitement at Berlin—how, then, could it be expected that it would not produce even greater excitement at St. Petersburg? Well, it was upon this excitement and its consequences that they were counting in Berlin, that the German General Staff was

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counting, particularly after the upsetting of its plans on the night of July 29th.

There remains to establish for the record of history how the *Lokal Anzeiger* could give to the public on July 30th the news of German mobilization. Who gave the paper the news? It could only have been the German government or General Staff, infuriated at not having secured the immediate execution of the order issued in principle and now seeking to arouse in Russia a state of excitement favorable to its wicked desires. I challenge anyone to show that this news came from any other source. Herr von Jagow, upon whom fell the burden of this shame, stated that the newspapers prepared editions beforehand and that the edition in question was published on that day. Which shows that Herr von Jagow believes that human foolishness has no limit.

First, other newspapers in Berlin published the same piece of news, so that they would have had to have made some mutual agreement. Secondly, it was on July 30th, as if by accident—on the day after the Council at which war was decided upon, as acknowledged personally by Herr von Zimmermann—that the sensation was sprung by the newspaper! This proximity of dates is both singular and sinister. It behooves the guilty to be silent and spare us the necessity of listening to their inadequate excuses!

Moreover, is it desired to know what Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg thought concerning the per-

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nicious and fatal influence which the dispatch giving the news of German mobilization might have had in Russia? He tells this (German Documents, 488) in a dispatch to London, dated July 31st: "I do not consider it impossible that Russian mobilization may be attributed to the fact that rumors which are in circulation here—absolutely false ones which were immediately denied officially—concerning a mobilization alleged to have occurred here, have been communicated as true to St. Petersburg."

The good apostle! So the news was false? Who gave it to the paper? Why was the paper suppressed so late? Why the seizure of the denials and their dispatch by a circuitous route? Of course, the 1914 White Book does not publish this dispatch from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to London.

In 1916, in trying to parry the straight thrust made at him with relation to this question by Sir Edward Grey, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was obliged to reopen it. At that time he sought to minimize the significance of his admission. He said that denials had started from the Russian embassy to St. Petersburg. The truth is that they were indeed taken to the central telegraph office in Berlin, but the Chancellor—though he was aware of it—did not state that those denials were sent not direct toward St. Petersburg, but *via* Warsaw—in other words, they were deflected from their regular route and probably did not arrive until very late

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during the night of the 30th–31st, or even on the morning of the 31st. Thus it was possible for the Tsar to be aware of all the alarming rumors, either officially through the dispatch from his ambassador, or semiofficially; nor could he shake off the ominous impression caused by them, since the denials did not reach him. Now, he was the same man who, the previous day, had restricted Russian mobilization. Had his mind been set at rest, why should he not have issued other orders?

In this unsatisfactory and futile explanation of 1916, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg concealed the truth. Nor did he explain—since explanation would have been embarrassing—about another thing for which he was responsible, concerning which he could not have failed to institute investigation in 1914, *viz.*, how the news came to be made public. For, at all events, he was Chancellor, and if he made an investigation he undoubtedly found himself confronted with the General Staff, the party most responsible for the publication of the news, and he drew back, just as he drew back on the night of July 30th–31st. Thus, through his weakness he made the coming of war a certainty.

Let us finally establish the facts by quoting evidence:

General Sukhomlinoff, Russian Minister of War, in the course of his trial, explained thus regarding the news published by the *Lokal Anzeiger*: “Influenced by this information,” he declared, “the Tsar was led to abandon his intention of not order-

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ing mobilization." There, then, is a clear statement, which is a disgrace to German diplomacy and to the German General Staff.

In 1917, Kerensky drew up the following official report on the Russian mobilization of July 30th: "The government finds, as a result of the Sukhomlinoff trial, that on July 30th, Russian mobilization had become absolutely necessary on account of imperious reasons of national protection. Now, among these reasons were 'German military preparations on land and sea' (*Indiscretion of the Lokal Anzeiger*)" (Gritling, author of *J'Accuse, Revue de Paris*, February 22, 1922).

Thus there is no doubt that the German General Staff saw war snatched away from it at the close of the Potsdam Council (did not Herr Delbrück admit this, he who accused General von Moltke of having that evening come out decisively in favor of an ultimatum and of war?) (Gritling, *Revue de Paris*, February 22, 1922). It won back its advantage by a daring blow, by hurling upon the world that explosive bomb which was touched off by the *Lokal Anzeiger*. What its effect was at St. Petersburg has been shown. We shall show, by citing a dispatch of M. Dumaine, our ambassador at Vienna, what effect it produced in the Austrian capital. And, above all, let the reader trace its murderous effect on the 30th. We shall take this up very soon in the course of this chapter.

The Kaiser, also, was taking action. On that same day, a formidable document against Russia

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came from him. On July 29th the Tsar had sent the German Emperor a dispatch in which he said: "It would be just to submit the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. I have confidence in thy wisdom and friendship. Your affectionate Nicky." All the Kaiser thought fit to write on this dispatch was: "Thanks, likewise" (German Documents, No. 366). So the German Emperor did not even answer this dispatch of capital importance, which bears witness to the peaceful spirit animating the Tsar. Of course, the White Paper suppressed it from the world.

Next day, July 30th, without alluding to the above dispatch, Emperor William sent the Tsar the following dispatch:

"My ambassador has been instructed to call the attention of thy government to the dangers and the grave consequences of mobilization; this is what I told you in my last telegram.

"Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Serbia and only a part of her army. If Russia, as appears from thy telegram and the communication from thy government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the mediatory mission which thou didst entrust to me as a friend and which I accepted at thy earnest prayer, will be jeopardized if not rendered impossible.

"The whole burden of the decision to be made now rests upon thy shoulders, which must bear the responsibility of peace or war" (Yellow Book, 210).

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This telegram, though it was in answer to a previous one from the Tsar, made no allusion to an exceedingly important proposal of Nicholas II, to convene the Hague Arbitration Court. This telegram was threatening—the responsibility for war would fall upon the Tsar because he had safeguarded his country by means of a partial mobilization!

What could the Emperor of Russia hope at that supreme juncture, after such a telegram? But—and this is important—more than important—at what hour did he receive it and at what hour was it dispatched?

Let us show clearly why the determination of this is of interest in stating and solving the problem.

In the first White Book, the dispatch bears the date of July 30th, one o'clock in the morning, which would mean that it had arrived during that same night, which would have no important bearing on the events which occurred that same day in the early part of the evening at St. Petersburg. But the hour marked is false. The second White Book shows that this telegram was dispatched on July 30th at 3:20 P.M.—or 4:20, Russian time—and that, it being an imperial message, it arrived at about 4:20 or 4:30, Russian time.

Now, at that moment, the Tsar and M. Sazonoff were together in consultation with each other. M. Sazonoff read and re-read this dispatch in the presence of the Tsar and held it for a long time in his hands. And what time was it? It was between

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five and six o'clock in the evening. It was at about that time—*i.e.*, toward the end of the afternoon—that the imminence of the danger became apparent to the Russian government, with such a dispatch coming on top of the rumors in circulation concerning German mobilization at Berlin, which had already spread in St. Petersburg.

M. Sazonoff noticed the disastrous impression made upon the Tsar by the Kaiser's dispatch. And it was at that fatal hour (5:30 o'clock) that the Tsar canceled the decision made by him the day before not to mobilize, since he as well as his counselors heard, all about them, semiofficial rumors and official warnings relating to German mobilization, and, at the same time, were struck by the threat of war implied in the dispatch from Emperor William. Thus, Russian general mobilization was caused by the underhand maneuvers of the German General Staff and by the angry and threatening dispatch from Emperor William—in short, by the combination of all sorts of intrigues.

Let one consider what would have occurred if another dispatch—a more conciliatory and less menacing one—had arrived. I will here state the situation, laying all due stress on its seriousness: the Tsar, surrounded by all these sinister shadows, beset by so many rumors, looked upon general mobilization as the supreme guaranty of Russia's safety. He even conferred regarding this with his Ministers. He conferred with the heads of the Russian army.

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Night fell. Suppose a less rude dispatch, one not constituting an ultimatum and not breathing threats and war, had arrived. It would have been a way out, narrow though it would have been. Would not the Russian sovereign, who, the day before, twenty-four hours earlier, had restricted mobilization for the sake of peace, have been capable of doing it again, in view of the fact that, in the course of the day, Count Pourtalès and M. Sazonoff had agreed upon a conciliatory formula, and that the Tsar himself, faithful to his old-time habit and to the cause of peace, had asked the brutally blind and deaf William that the question be referred to The Hague for arbitration?

The German Emperor, by acting as he did at this point, by acting as he did in what followed, by his interference, which was like the blow struck in the dark by a murderer at the back of a passer-by, contributed more than anyone toward causing the war. "Why," one asks, "is this man free?"

On July 30th, however, there came a ray of hope. Herr von Bethmann in view of the attitude of England brought to his knowledge by the German ambassador at London, and aware now that Sir Edward Grey did not wish to forfeit his freedom of action but would, nevertheless, not remain aloof if France's duties as an ally involved her in the conflict, decided to yield in the face of this new situation and to act at last—or at least try to act!

So far he had spurned the clear-headed advice

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of the German ambassador at London, listening rather to the mediocre and selfish reports of the delegate who had been set to watching his chief there, and he had also believed the tales of Prince Henry of Prussia, who prophesied English neutrality as a certainty. But now, Bethmann, realizing at last—and too late—in what direction he was going, telegraphed to Vienna:

“July 30, 1914” (arrived at Vienna July 31st, 3 A.M.)—“If England succeeds in her efforts (of conciliation) while Vienna refuses, Vienna proves absolutely that she desires war, into which we shall be dragged, while Russia remains free from all guilt. As a result of this, we shall be in an absolutely untenable situation with regard to our own nation. Therefore, we must needs insist energetically that Austria accept the proposal of Grey, who is keeping open his proposal in its entirety.”

Right on top of this he sent, also under date of July 30, 1914 (German Documents, No. 456), a dispatch by which he retracted the telegram which he had just sent. The man is drawing back! He is afraid of peace! And he sends this second telegram revoking the first, which, of course, having been revoked too soon, was not transmitted to the Vienna government by the German ambassador at Vienna.

Thus, the Chancellor, on the same day, sent to the German ambassador at Vienna a conciliatory telegram and then revoked it. This vitally impor-

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tant telegram (No. 441) left Berlin at 9 P.M. and arrived at Vienna the 31st at 3 A.M. This was the dispatch advising negotiation. As to the second telegram (No. 450), canceling the advice to be moderate which had just been sent, it was dispatched from Berlin on July 30th at 11.20 P.M. Thus, during that night of July 30th-31st, the entire burden of responsibility falls upon Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg.

If, on the 30th, he thought it his duty to advise moderation, why did not he give this advice earlier, putting an end to the state of general nervous tension and preventing the situation from growing worse? And, particularly, having given the advice tardily, why did he retract it that same evening, between 9 and 11.20 o'clock?

The truth is that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg sent his first telegram merely to cover himself, merely to give the appearance of wishing intervention in the interests of peace. He was not even able to carry out this Machiavellian attempt to the limit. The German General Staff interfered, demanding war; it alleged as a reason the preparations of Russia and France, on July 30th, at the very moment when the French government had caused its troops to withdraw ten kilometers, and when M. Sazonoff, in agreement with the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, was dictating to the latter a conciliatory formula which Herr von Jagow refused to transmit!

That 30th day of July was twofold in character.

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On the one hand, Germany pretended to wish peace, advised moderation, and later revoked the telegram counseling moderation at the very moment when it had been dispatched! Russia asked that negotiations be started, and France exposed her frontiers! On that day it was that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg started the war. He started it on that day by his fatal telegram; he gave the order to begin the massacre; he hurled the world toward the charnel house. Did he yield to the German General Staff, which, the day before (July 29th in the evening), already desired war? Was he irresolute, incapable, a slave to that docility which, in Germany, is typical of statesmen? The grave is a refuge into which Herr von Bethmann has taken his secret.

We shall follow Herr von Bethmann and the German General Staff step by step on the road of crime during that evening and night of July 30th. Every hour, every word, is of capital importance to history.

One must not take one's eyes off the German General Staff from July 29th until July 31st at one o'clock in the afternoon. The documents bearing on the case, scattered through the White Book and the Austrian Red Book, form a strong network around the criminals, when they are attached together by the thread of logic. In order to do this, certain points must be recalled:

Until about July 28th, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg remained uncompromising and haughty.

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Close upon the 29th the attitude of England showed him what the extent of the catastrophe would be if he persisted. So he drew rein—may I be pardoned such an expression in connection with such a pitiful leader of men, who was himself driven by events. Fear of responsibility, which he had not felt up to then, so convinced was he that Germany needed but to speak in order to have her way, now began to torment him. How avoid responsibility? What advantageous alibi might serve him as a refuge? In asking himself this, he was half sincere, since he had gone farther than he intended, since he had been swept along by the militaristic torrent; while he wrote, the shadow of the sword fell across his sheet of paper. Half desirous, nevertheless, to seem strong, he enmeshed himself in a lamentable tissue of contradictions.

He wrote his first conciliatory dispatch at 9.40 P.M. on July 30th. That same evening, at 11.20, he revoked it. That same day, at the Council of Prussian Ministers, he said, speaking of Russia's mobilization, that it was not comparable with mobilization in the western European nations, and that the Russians would remain standing in arms for a long time. In conclusion he said: "Leadership is lacking, the machine is moving." He himself represented leadership; the machine was the German General Staff.

Was he spied upon? Was the General Staff conversant with what he was doing? Now, while he was trying to find out whether the storm would

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calm down, while he was seeking a shelter from it, here is what the General Staff was scheming, on its own arbitrary initiative, which would not have frustrated the Chancellor's moves if only these had been inspired by sincerity instead of being hypocritical and contradictory, tending now toward action, now toward retreat.

We shall see by reference to Austrian Red Book the appeals sent from Berlin that Austria mobilize, the preparations made for German mobilization during July 30th, *before* anything was known about Russian mobilization.

Here is a telegram concerning which, of course, German writers never speak, sent by the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, and reading as follows:

"Count Szoegegy to Count Berchtold—Telegram 331—Berlin, July 30, 1914—Dispatched at 7.40 P.M.—Arrived at 10.20 P.M. In strictly secret cipher.

"The Austro-Hungarian military attaché, after a very important talk with the head of the German General Staff, has just sent to Baron Conrad a telegram in view of which Count von Moltke urgently advises me that there be immediate general mobilization. . . ."

"Urgently! Immediate!" And this on July 30th, before 7.40, since this dispatch, bearing that hour stamped upon it, refers to an earlier dispatch sent to Baron von Conrad by the Austrian military attaché. The above telegram was answered as follows by Count Berchtold:

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"Cipher—8.02—The order for mobilization is issued to-day, July 31st. Please let me know the first day of your mobilization."

How was that mobilization accomplished which, as early as July 31st, Germany was already urgently pressing upon Austria? To learn this, it is necessary to re-read the dispatch addressed to me on July 30th by M. Dumaine, French ambassador at Vienna (Yellow Book, 104). The ambassador tells of a long interview, said also to have been cordial, between the Russian ambassador and Count Berchtold, on which he pinned great hopes. Nevertheless, he thus concluded his dispatch: "The interview had been conducted in an amicable tone and gave rise to the belief that all hope of localizing the conflict was not over, when the news of German mobilization reached Vienna."

Concise enough, is it not? The sinister hours will be recalled: July 30th, at one in the afternoon, beneath the complacent gaze of Herr von Jagow and under the auspices of the German General Staff, there appeared, in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a semiofficial paper devoted to the government, the news of the German mobilization which was called false. We have noted the profound effect caused in Russia—an effect that had been desired. We have just seen what effect it produced at Vienna, where, be it observed, no denial was made. Nothing, in fact, indicates that there was an official denial.

Thus, everything was hurried forward: early

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in the afternoon of July 30th, spreading of the news in Vienna of German mobilization; the same day, in order to give definite confirmation of the truth of the news, a dispatch from Berlin urgently advising Vienna to order immediate general mobilization.

Who, then, got the start on the rest? Who mobilized first? What did von Moltke know, on July 30th at 7.40 and even before, of the alleged Russian general mobilization, since it was necessary to draw up and put into cipher the dispatch sent to Vienna? Never was a crime more patent.

And as for Germany, did she wait? Let us speak a bit of her murderous and overwhelming preparations.

A legal lie covered the movements of troops in Germany.

In order to start them, all she had to do was to proclaim the “state of war danger” (*Kriegsgefahrzustand*). As a matter of fact, this was mobilization, which is tantamount to saying that, in Germany, mobilization resembles a mere formality. It is, so to speak, the stamp placed upon an envelope already addressed and containing a letter written in full.

But even before proclaiming the “war danger”—that is, to put it correctly, mobilization—Germany had already made formidable preparations. I established this in a telegram written hastily on July 30, 1914, since all the data had not been gathered at that feverish moment, and I made public

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this telegram, which was addressed to all the representatives of France in foreign countries, in the Yellow Book (No. 106).

Here is my telegram:

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

PARIS, July 30, 1914.

Please inform Sir E. Grey of the following facts concerning French and German military preparations. England will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps.

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred meters from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometers from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, however, that the fighting position of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this, it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier: in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from

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garrisons of the interior, such as Treves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

The arming of the frontier defenses (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries, and strengthening of wire entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday the 25th; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France, on Tuesday, the 28th.

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed; motor cars circulate only with the permits. It is the last stage before mobilization. None of these measures has been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.

(Signed) RENÉ VIVIANI.

This leads me to speak of the preparations made by France. It has just been shown that they came after those of Germany, that they never came before, that they were simply a legitimate answer, and, moreover, an answer that might be termed be-

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lated. And yet we knew that we had an army inferior in numbers to the German army.

Nor did we stop there. And I am proud to recall in these pages—thereby sowing it upon the fields of the conscience of humanity, where, I hope, it will bear fruit—the magnificent thought which came to France, which places her, owing to the sacrifice which she made for the sake of the world's peace, above all other nations, whose equal she proved herself by her valor and endurance.

At the Council of Ministers held on July 30th in the morning, after I had placed myself in agreement with the Minister of War and Commander-in-chief Joffre, I proposed the measure stated in my telegram that is reproduced above.

Assuredly the risk was terrible; nevertheless, I faced it.

Why face it? I was haunted, as were all my colleagues, with the fear that war might burst from a clump of trees because of the meeting there of two patrols, from an exchange of words, from a threatening gesture, from a frontier dispute, even conducted in good faith. Soldiers might have stumbled upon each other on the line between the two countries, and then—a black look, a brutal word, an insult, and—a shot! Now I was well aware of the capacity of the German soldiery for insolence and also the pernicious power of the German government's propaganda, of which proof has been given in the course of this very narrative

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by allusion to suppression of texts, falsifications, changes of date.

In 1870, by a contemptible falsification, cynically revealed in 1891 by him who made it, Bismarck, having deceived France, was swept into war. Was a similar incident, which would be garbled the next day by the entire German press, to be allowed to annihilate the destiny of nations, the joy and labor of the world, its security, the treasures amassed by human genius, the nobility of all thoughts gathered into a glorious synthesis, the entire economic and material patrimony accumulated by bygone generations, the lives of millions of living men, the future of those still to see the light of the sun, those heirs whom we wished to make happier than ourselves?

And, at that moment, I did not suspect the fateful extent of the coming carnage, the duration of the massacre, the ignominy in the means of warfare employed, the wholesale pillage looked upon as battle, even in houses abandoned by men at the call of duty and inhabited only by old men, women, and children—in short, I did not suspect the bestiality that was to gorge itself on private wealth, on living beings, on bodies, even on souls.

I made my proposal to the Ministerial Council, taking upon my head the heaviest responsibility in history, causing France to assume it. Why? In order not to have peace hang on a premeditated or sudden move in those hours of such frightful nervous tension that calm words were impossible.

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Here I present the military documents which assured the carrying out of this daring yet prudent measure:

The first order given bears the signature of the Minister of War, M. A. Messimy. It was sent from Paris on July 30th, at 4.55 P.M. Here is its text:

“Carry out preparatory measures for operations No. 24, exercise mobilization garrisons extreme frontier prescribed by Annex II to Instruction 15, February 15, 1909.

“This measure will apply also to all the garrisons of your army corps (for the 2d Corps: to the garrisons of the 4th Infantry Division and the 4th Cavalry Division located in the 2d Region).

“Until further orders and except in case of sudden attack, no call for reservists should be made.

“Those troops having to make covering movements by railway shall hold themselves in readiness for entraining.

“Troops making covering movements by road shall proceed without delay to positions determined upon for case of sudden attack. In any event, for diplomatic reasons, it is indispensable that no incident be caused by action on our part. Therefore, no unit, nor patrol, shall, under any pretext whatever, approach the frontier or pass beyond this line.” (Then follows a list of places constituting a line upon which the French troops were kept at a distance of more than ten kilometers from the Franco-German frontier.)

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A second official telegram was sent on August 1st; it is numbered 209 and was dispatched at 10.30 P.M. It came after a telegram dispatched at 5 P.M. of the same day, by the Minister of War, confirming the instructions contained in the telegram of July 30th, quoted above.

The telegram dispatched at 10.30 P.M. read as follows:

"The Minister of War, following instructions from the President of the Republic, and for important diplomatic reasons, still insists upon the necessity of not passing beyond the limit indicated in the telegram No. 120 of July 30th, confirmed by a telegram of to-day. The prohibition in question applies to cavalry as well as to troops of other arms; no patrol, no reconnoitering party, no outpost, no unit must be located to the eastward of the said line.

"Anyone passing beyond it will be liable to court martial; only in case of well-defined attack will it be permitted to disregard this order which is to be communicated to all the troops."

The third telegram bears the date of August 2d, the day before the date of Germany's declaration of war against France. At that time German mobilization was in full swing, German troops had occupied Luxemburg, and they had violated French territory at numerous points. German cavalrymen had arrived at Joncherey and Boron, six or eight kilometers from the frontier; at Suarce, where they had seized horses about to be requisitioned, and at Petit-Croix.

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During the day, at 10.30 A.M., the Minister, despite these violations of the frontier, for the purpose of "removing all appearance of aggression from the movements of the French troops," called renewed attention to the contents of the telegram of July 30th. At 5.30 P.M., the commander-in-chief sent to the commanders of covering sectors the following message:

"The prohibition to pass eastward of the line indicated in telegram 129-3/11 T, of July 30th, distant about 10 kilometers from the frontier, is canceled.

"Nevertheless, for national reasons of a moral nature and for imperative diplomatic reasons, it is absolutely necessary to allow the full responsibility for hostilities to devolve upon the Germans.

"Therefore, and until further orders, covering operations shall be confined to pushing back across the border all attacking forces, which are not to be pursued any farther, and no troops are to cross into enemy territory."

It was not until August 5th at 12.30 P.M. (England had declared war on Germany at eleven o'clock) that the commander-in-chief sent to the commanders of covering sectors the following message:

"War having been declared, there is no longer any restriction upon covering operations to be executed such as may result from missions intrusted to the troops in the different sectors."

Such were the French preparations! Thus did

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they threaten Germany! And the German Emperor not only knew of them some months ago, when he was writing his lies in his *Memoirs*, safe in the shelter where he went to hide away his courage, but he knew them on that very day—that is, in 1914—since he made notes on a dispatch which alluded to these measures. Is it possible to tolerate that this man, in his *Memoirs*, shall disclaim responsibility because of the preparations made by nations which were simply following far behind in the footsteps of his own preparations? Whatever he may do, whatever he may say, whatever he may write, I would declare that his responsibilities encircle his brow like a crown of thorns, were it not that I am afraid of dishonoring that noble symbol in thus transferring it from a sacred to an accursed head.

And now let us settle still another question that is vital toward fixing the general responsibility of Germany and of the German Emperor and his Chancellor.

It is known that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, on July 31st, had sent two telegrams to his ambassador at Vienna asking him to press the Austrian government to agree to enter into discussion with Russia. In these telegrams Herr von Bethmann called attention to the meritorious moderation displayed by Serbia (which, to be sure, he noticed very late in the day) and stated that “Austrian honor had been satisfied.” Then, a few hours later, he annulled these messages, which, in consequence,

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kept the Austrian government from learning of the instructions contained in them. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg alleged, as an explanation of his change of front, the insistent demands of the German General Staff, "due to Russian and French preparations."

This allegation, of course, was false. Let us, however, assume that it was founded upon fact.

Can it be looked upon as founded on fact on that 31st day of July? Let it be so assumed. But—could it be so considered on July 27th and 28th? On those dates what were the alleged Russian and French preparations? On those dates had Serbia replied to Austria in uncompromisingly insolent terms? Serbia had accepted everything and asked discussion solely on one clause of the Austrian ultimatum, and the Entente, for its part, was also asking for a peaceful debate in London. The moderation of Serbia's answer was so disconcerting to those who counted upon war as a consequence of the inacceptability of her answer that Emperor William declared "that there was no longer any cause for war and that Austria had obtained satisfaction." Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said the same thing.

But now, over the tomb of the latter—for, luckily for him, his conscience now sleeps therein—a terrible question arises: If, on July 26th, 27th, and 28th, the attitude of Serbia was such that Emperor William paid involuntary homage to it, what was there, then, to prevent Herr von Bethmann-

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Hollweg from giving to Austria-Hungary, in the course of those very days, the advice which he did not give until July 31st? Why this loss of time? Why did Herr von Jagow, shortly afterward, about July 30th, refuse to transmit to Austria the Sazonoff proposal sent to him by Count Pourtalès? If, indeed, it be true that the German General Staff, which lied to the civil branch of the German government in order to drag it along into war, had reason for complaint on July 31st, it would not have had even the shadow of a pretext for complaint before that date.

The voluntary loss of time, the lapse of hours because of conscious inertia, the curt refusals—all these things produced the tense nervousness and the state of excitement—in short, the supreme result—which was sought.

Thus, the principal culprit—even though what was maintained by the German General Staff was correct—is still Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg. And to think that, in his speech of December 24, 1914, in answer to the speech made by me before the Chamber of Deputies on the 22d, he threatened me with reprisals from the world! Well, he is dead—but there are cases where death cannot serve as an excuse.

Let us draw the net still tighter around the guilty, so that no part of their crime may remain concealed.

In order to explain why he revoked the conciliatory dispatch which he had prepared on July 30th,

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Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has given two contradictory explanations. In German Document No. 341, he said that he had knowledge of military preparations in Russia and in France, for which reason he had withdrawn his project of reconciliation. That same evening at 11:20, in order to back up his withdrawal, he gave another explanation. At that time, he said, he was awaiting a dispatch from Prince Henry of Prussia—who, moreover had only served to increase the existing misunderstanding by his inability to understand what the King of England said (German Document).

Thus, proof is supplied by Herr von Bethmann himself that, on one and the same evening, within a space of two hours, he alleged pretexts which contradicted each other. At 11:20 that evening nothing would have been simpler, provided there were a basis for it, than to point to the military preparations being made by other nations. But into what condition had Herr von Bethmann fallen by that time? At that hour of the night he was tired. The German General Staff had followed his footsteps, spied upon him, closed in upon him, watched him, bound him, felled him. What avails it that he has written belated counsels of wisdom in order to clear himself?—he who always spurred Austria on, who told the German ambassador to Austria that it was not advisable to hold her back, who counseled her to act prudently so that the responsibility might be placed upon Russia, who,

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as late as July 30th, frightened at the magnitude of events, telegraphed to his ambassador at Vienna that Russia must be placed in the wrong!

During that time, the German General Staff, shorn of all scruples, not surprised at the coming of war since it had prepared and desired war, calling for it, on the contrary, with ferocious cries, was pushing Herr von Bethmann to extremes. It caused the mobilization order to be transmitted to Austria. It had caused the publication in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, on that same day at one o'clock, of the news of German mobilization, which, sent at once to Vienna, naturally cast a tragic shadow over the negotiations (see Dumaine dispatch already cited). A like result had been obtained at St. Petersburg.

Who can be made to believe that that same General Staff, which made use of the Austrian ambassador at Berlin and of his military attaché for communicating directly with the Austrian General Staff, had not prepared German mobilization, for the very purpose of being in a position to make reply to the Austrian mobilization which it had itself occasioned?

Ever since the night of the 29th, at the Potsdam Council, General von Moltke had been clamoring for it, and it has been proved, by events themselves and by correlation of documents, that the "danger of war," which is tantamount to mobilization, had been arranged ever since the 29th, or, in any case, certainly since the 30th. At that moment, what

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did the German General Staff know about Russian mobilization, which did not come to its knowledge until the 31st, at 11.30 A.M.? The "danger of war," then, equivalent to mobilization, was prepared at least as early as the 30th, and proclaimed the 31st, at about two in the afternoon, with a speed which, were it not for these facts, would be inexplicable.

The 5th of July had borne bloody fruit. War was on the way. It was now the turn of human bestiality to act.

CHAPTER X

THE DECLARATION OF WAR

NO, the die was not yet cast—not even at that supreme moment! It was still possible to save all.

For a mobilization, even when it is a general mobilization, depends, in so far as the peril which it occasions is concerned, directly upon the warlike or peaceful intentions underlying it. Russia had given proof twice in succession of her ardent desire to preserve peace and continue negotiations—the first time, by means of her partial mobilization, which she herself suspended; the second by her general mobilization, which was forced upon her.

But how was one to negotiate if the negotiator, on the threshold of the various Foreign Offices of the Powers, felt no support for his moral authority, which is derived in large part from material authority, and was confronted by the representatives of a nation in arms. Now, Austria was in arms and, up to then, had said nothing. She had not protested against mobilization. On the contrary, she continued, on the very day of mobilization, to discuss—and, though actuated in this by only partially honest motives, she, nevertheless, did not break off negotiations. Hence, there was still a possibility

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for each nation to maintain its rights peacefully, though each had taken precautionary measures and each was more or less perturbed.

In any event, whether peace was possible or not, there existed the desire to bring it about. The Entente did not lose courage and, owing to its tenacious determination, peace was sought, although there was imminent danger in Europe of an explosion at any moment. Posterity will stand aghast in contemplation of this useless meeting of men of good faith with the others. The latter, hard pressed by the force of the conscience of humanity, backed up by reason, were now forced to abandon momentarily the silence agreed upon among them and strike the criminal blow from behind.

Let us travel once more along the sad road, with all its twists and turns.

For the moment all hinged, it must be admitted, upon English intervention. Russia, preserving her calm and her dignity in the face of threats, had made an immense effort toward conciliation and had accepted all the Franco-English proposals. As for us, we had exhausted all our efforts without having had the slightest effect on Vienna and we had been even less successful with Berlin. However, England, upright and prudent, had let it be understood that bullying tactics alone would not suffice. Twice, thrice, each time in a different form, Sir Edward Grey had asked that the nations should assemble for discussion in London. He had declared, and so had his ambassador at Berlin

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before him, that he was not bound by neutrality, yet had made no definite promise of participation in the war by England, where public opinion was not interested in Serbia, had little interest in Russia, and had not realized, immediately, that France would be involved. It was necessary for the British government to convince public opinion and win it over little by little.

But it goes without saying that the formidable activity displayed during the 30th by the German General Staff was not relaxed. On the 30th the news of German mobilization was given to the world and Russia was purposely aroused to exasperation in the hope that she would thus be impelled to act. Moreover, a deep impression was produced upon Austria (dispatch from Ambassador Dumaine). On the 30th the order was issued to the Austrian army to mobilize—this occurred at 7.40 in the evening. Naturally Germany was going to profit from this situation: the “danger of war” was proclaimed at about two o’clock in the afternoon, as pointed out in the preceding chapter. From the 29th of July onward German mobilization was ready and the news published in the *Lokal Anzeiger* surprised none of the German leaders. Nor, with all the more reason, did the “danger of war” proclamation (which is substantially mobilization), surprise them; in issuing the news of German mobilization, as has been proved in the preceding chapter, those doing it knew that Russia would put herself in readiness for defense

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all the more promptly because Austria had mobilized against her. Berlin, having brought about Russian mobilization, was awaiting it, not in order to prepare the “danger of war” (Waldersee had said, on July 6th, “we are ready”), but to proclaim it. There was crying need that this infamous comedy should be clearly revealed.

By means of lying legislative trickery the shameful burden of which no other nation has been willing to assume, the “danger of war” in Germany is tantamount to mobilization itself. The reservist finds in his notebook a sheet which tells him the exact place where he is to report. It may be remarked that this “danger of war” situation has all the advantages of mobilization and none of its inconveniences.

On that day, July 31st, Herr von Schoen came to announce to me the existence of the danger of war. He told me that it was surely equivalent to mobilization.

Then, without awaiting my reply, he suddenly stood up, went toward a piece of furniture on which he had placed his hat, and suddenly said to me:

“Mr. President of the Council, will you be so kind as to present my respectful greetings to the President of the Republic?”

I rose and answered:

“No, Mr. Ambassador, I will not present them.”

Then, in order to soften what might seem a bit sharp in my answer, I added:

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"Why leave us? Count Pourtalès has remained at his post in St. Petersburg. The ambassador of Austria is here. Why give the signal for departure and take upon yourself this responsibility without orders to do so?"

Herr von Schoen said nothing and bowed his head. M. de Margerie, who was present at the interview, added:

"You cannot—you who have given proof of moderation throughout your career—bring it to an end in bloodshed."

Herr von Schoen bowed; then, before departing, he said that he would come the next day, August 1st, to repeat the question he had asked me concerning the attitude of France. This was a sort of ultimatum placed in my hands.

On that day, July 31st, what was the state of affairs in Europe? Austria, Russia, and Germany indeed, for the very reason that the "danger of war" had been proclaimed, were in arms. The frontiers of France were under close watch—nay, more than that, they were menaced—and German troops were beginning to roam insolently along the limits set, which they sometimes crossed. Progressive invasion was soon to begin. Of course, as may well be imagined, we had taken precautions and, while still respecting the order to keep at a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier, we had taken many more measures to insure the security of the country. The supreme guaranty of this would naturally be mobilization, combined—as we indeed

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combined it later—with a declaration of peaceful intentions.

But, on July 31st, an immense wave of hope passed over the world. We learned that Austria at last had deigned to enter into discussion with Russia and that Sir Edward Grey had renewed his proposal of conciliation. Were we to furnish to the German Emperor a pretext for saying that it was impossible to think of negotiations with a belligerent nation like France which was already drawing its sword? Therefore, with the agreement of the chief of the French General Staff, we allowed the day to go by.

One learns much after a thing has happened. Later, in 1918, we learned, after our cipher service had decoded certain German documents which had previously escaped us, the following fact, without parallel even among savages:

On the very day that Herr von Schoen had called upon me to announce the “danger of war,” Herr von Jagow telegraphed to Herr von Schoen:

“If the French government declares that it wishes to remain neutral, Your Excellency will kindly inform it that, as a guaranty of its neutrality we must ask that the fortresses of Toul and Verdun be delivered over to us; we shall occupy them and restore them at the close of the war against Russia. An answer regarding this must reach us here before four o’clock Saturday afternoon.”

Herr von Schoen, to be sure, never made me any such proposal. But I do not know whether Herr

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von Schoen did not hesitate as to whether or not he should bring it to my attention. Why, in fact, ask me what would be the attitude of France in case of a war between Germany and Russia? As he was aware of the substance, at least, of the Franco-Russian treaty of alliance, and that a joint attack upon Russia by two other nations confronted us with the *casus foederis*, he must have foreseen what the future held—in fact, he gave me to understand that he did foresee it.

Doubtless Herr von Schoen, abandoning brutal methods, wished to give a gentle hint; had I then seemed to yield, he would have been encouraged to continue, and then, doubtless, he would have blurted out the humiliating proposal. How could Herr von Bethmann ever have imagined such a possibility and, having conceived it in his muddled brain, how could he have brought himself to bring it officially to light?

This fact deserves special attention because it casts a light on German psychology, to which must be attributed in great part the malady from which Germany suffers. What has dragged Germany to the abyss is mistaken moral estimate of others, due to contempt; it is underestimation of valor, failure to recognize contingencies, total inability to allow for the revolt of the human conscience. For Germany, that great methodical factory, manufactures nothing but material things, and man himself today, in the land of Kant and Goethe, has been degraded to the level of a material thing. I shall

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not harp on this theme—but, anyhow, did Herr von Bethmann actually think that, even if there had been a government which had sunk so low as to accept such a bargain, the French legislature would have ratified this shameful step which, at one fell blow, sullied the most splendid national history?

Let us return to the ultimatum sent to Russia on the 31st, the time limit on which was to expire August 1st. It is necessary to bear this fatal date in mind. As we already know, as we shall see again, that day, even in the state that Europe was in, even when all around us was quaking, might have ended while there was still a happy human race in existence. Alas!—it was but the appearance in the heavens of a sort of brightness which preceded the lightning.

Austria agreed to enter into discussion with Serbia, and that another power should ask her, in the name of Serbia, what her terms were. It was the Austrian ambassador at Paris who gave me this information—and there was a similar conciliatory move on the part of the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg. Immediately M. Sazonoff accepted the proposal of preliminary conferences at London.

Light burst forth everywhere. And then—all again was plunged into darkness!

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg withdrew the conciliatory dispatches which he had sent during the morning to Vienna, drawing attention to Russian

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and French preparations! To counteract these, and in order that Russian general mobilization be discontinued, he sent the ultimatum. Why? What was to be understood from this? M. Cambon was to enlighten us. I copy from the Yellow Book the following dispatch, No. 121:

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BERLIN, August 1, 1914.

My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams from M. Sazonoff advising him that the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg had explained that his government was ready to discuss the note to Serbia with the Russian government even as to its basis; M. Sazonoff answered that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London.

The ultimatum can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The question may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia.

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand their mobilization, not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point.

Germany's ultimatum, coming at the very moment when an agreement seemed about to be established be-

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tween Vienna and St. Petersburg, is characteristic of her warlike policy.

In truth, the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria; in these circumstances, as the Powers which were interested as principals were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand why Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing, like all the other Powers, to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired war on her own account.

J. CAMBON.

I have quoted this dispatch in full in order really to bring to light Germany's responsibility.

Let there be no more talk of mobilizations, with the juggling of dispatches, falsified as regards their dates and substance! We have shown what ought to be thought about these and that the entire burden of responsibility devolved upon Austria and Germany. But, even were this not so, let us recapitulate: Austria is under arms, also Germany, but not Russia, who must devote sixteen days to concentrating her forces! Leaving aside disputes as to time and maps, in spite of their terrible mute testimony against Germany and Austria, let us explain, once for all, to history, just what it was that Germany feared.

Was it France? It will suffice to read what Herr von Schoen telegraphed to Berlin to see what he thought about her. The German ambassador—who lived in our midst, who saw me every day, or nearly every day, who, naturally, derived information from his officers who worked with him, who

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had been living among us during five years, and knew about men and matters in our country—did the French justice in these dispatches of his which were despicably omitted from the first White Book:

German Document No. 345. The German Ambassador at Paris to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Telegram 228.

PARIS, July 29, 1914.

The Minister *ad interim* of Foreign Affairs, to whom I have given confidential information of our efforts to obtain from Vienna declarations which might serve to appease St. Petersburg, sees therein a fortunate proof of our good will toward avoiding extension of the conflict. He thinks that it would be well, in order to avoid effects on public opinion in Russia, to prevent bloodshed in Serbia. With this in view, Russia had just advised Serbia to evacuate Belgrade. I answered that we could not stay the hand of Austria. To the Minister's question as to whether, ultimately, it might be possible to return to the idea of Sir Edward Grey, I answered evasively. The Minister would be obliged to us if we kept him informed of the results of our efforts, so that he may be able to do his part in due time toward the appeasement of St. Petersburg.

SCHOEN.

German Document No. 367. The German Ambassador at Paris to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Telegram 229.

PARIS, July 29, 1914.

M. Viviani does not deny that military measures of precaution have been taken, but insists upon their small importance and the very discreet manner in which they have been carried out. Here they are still a long way

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from mobilization. He would not be disturbed in the least if we should adopt like measures. Nevertheless, measures on our part would be deemed regrettable, in view of their alarming effect on public opinion. The best remedy, according to him, would be to proceed to securing mediatory action as promptly as possible, no matter in what form. Viviani does not wish to give up hope of maintaining peace, which is desired here very sincerely.

SCHOEN.

German Document No. 483. The German Ambassador at Paris to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Telegram 235.

PARIS, July 31, 1914.

Thanks to the efforts of the government, public opinion is to-day a bit less excited. Hope is renewed that the pending negotiations will be successful. The suspicion that we are pushing toward war is being dispelled. Public opinion looks toward the possibility that peace cannot be maintained with resignation and determination.

SCHOEN.

German Document No. 528. The German Ambassador at Paris to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Telegram 237.

PARIS, July 31, 1914.

I asked the question at seven o'clock. The President of the Council of Ministers told me that there was no news of Russian general mobilization, but merely of precautionary measures. Therefore he was still unwilling to abandon all hope of avoiding extreme measures. He promised an answer to-morrow on the question of neutrality, at one o'clock at the latest.

SCHOEN.

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(The dispatch whereby M. Paléologue announced Russian mobilization to me had not reached me at seven o'clock in the evening of July 31st. It was dispatched at 10:45 A.M. and received at the French Foreign Office at nine o'clock in the evening.)

German Document No. 598. The German Ambassador at Paris to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Telegram 241.

PARIS, August 1, 1914.

Telegram 184 did not reach me until after two o'clock. In another interview with the President of the Council, at 5.30 o'clock, he adhered, despite my insistence, to the formula of this afternoon, as to the attitude of France in case of a Russo-German war.

The President of the Council informed me that the mobilization just ordered (first day of same, Sunday) did not at all imply aggressive intentions, a fact which would be confirmed likewise in the proclamation. There was still a chance, he said, for the continuation of negotiations on the basis of the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, to which France assented and which she ardently supported. He said that care had been taken on the French side, to avoid frontier incidents, by means of the evacuation of a zone ten kilometers wide.

He said that he could not bring himself to giving up hope of maintaining peace.

SCHOEN.

What could the value be, beside the testimony of a man who was present and who was enough attached to his own country not to deceive it, of the ridiculous judgment of a von Jagow and the rav-

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ings of a hireling press? France? She had not mobilized; even since July 30th at noon she had, in obedience to my order, kept her soldiers at a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier. The mind would be driven to madness seeking to understand, were it not that it had already understood.

Ah, that 5th day of July, 1914, that day on which extermination was decided upon by the German Emperor when he got up from table, he who, already, was preparing for his hypocritical cruise! Now, I ask, is the significance of that day clear? And the dispatch hidden by the criminals, since it was the weapon for the crime, the dispatch wherein the Emperor advised Herr von Bethmann to act in such a way as to let the responsibility fall upon Russia?—that dispatch remains in existence.

The German General Staff had wished war for many years; it wished war ardently on the evening of July 29th; it wished it frenziedly on the 31st, and would let nothing stand in the way of its desire. I do not know whether the Emperor, who in his *Memoirs* points to the domination under which he stood, in an effort to exonerate himself, and who alleges that he did not know about matters without, however, succeeding in washing away the blood that stains him—I do not know, I say, whether the Emperor actually realizes the part played by him, now that he is living amid the quiet woods of Holland, in that peaceful land which cannot show him any graves.

In France we worked for peace, we continued

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on our way, we were to continue indeed until the first blow had been struck at us. And even afterward! On August 2d our soil was invaded. I shall show very shortly the patience of the French government and the calm of the French nation when confronted with the raids of German cavalry-men, who, on August 2d, at a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier—on the French side of it, be it well understood—murdered Corporal Peugeot.

On August 1st Herr von Schoen came to see me—not at one o'clock in the afternoon, as had been agreed upon the day before, but at eleven o'clock in the morning. I left the Council in order to receive him. He asked me the same question.

"France," I said to him, "will act in accordance with her interests."

Herr von Schoen found the reply a bit vague. How right he was!—and I, too!

He reflected a moment, then said:

"I admit that my question is a bit naïve, and, moreover, you have a treaty of alliance?"

"Exactly."

Then the conversation went on. I told him that I felt the approach of a more propitious moment, despite the ultimatum, owing to the fact that England still insisted upon the holding of four-cornered negotiations.

I can see him still, looking over my head as if seeking in the air for something on which to fix his gaze—then he said:

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"It looks as if there were a ray of hope."

He said no more to me about his passports, and I asked him suddenly:

"What is the object of your ultimatum? Russia and Austria are coming to agreement. For eight days we have been seeking that. Your ultimatum may destroy everything."

Herr von Schoen apologized for his ignorance regarding happenings and spoke of lack of instructions from Berlin. He told me that he loved France, gave assurance that he wished to unite his efforts to mine toward peace. I thanked him; nor did I have, nor have I now, any doubt as to the sincerity of his words. Nevertheless, I pointed out to him firmly the heavy responsibility devolving upon his government, which—as I still hoped—might even yet save everything.

It could even yet save everything! The Emperor could save everything. One word, one little word, and the world would breathe again! What word? Emperor William always posed as the arbiter of the world's destinies. Well, now his supreme day had come, if only he had understood the opportunity afforded him by fate.

Already I have shown what the situation was on that 31st day of July. Europe was in state of military agitation to which a limit might be set. At that moment Austria and Russia were at last to be able to talk together. What obstacle lay in their path?

Austria's self-esteem? Of that Austria was the

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best judge—and had not William acknowledged, as far back as July 28th, that all cause of war had been eliminated by the answer from Serbia?

The mobilizations? Why bother about the origin or date of these, now that Austria and Russia (which, by the way, had remained mobilized two full years during the Balkan War) had accepted the proposal of asking each other questions and answering them, despite their being under arms?

The Russian armies? But it would take sixteen days to put them in readiness and deploy them along the frontiers! In addition, had not the Emperor said, on July 5th: “Russia is not ready”—adding that the heavy artillery of France was inferior. And here is what he said about his own army in his *Memoirs*:

“The German army was the most organized in the world when it advanced in 1914 on the enemy.” Nobody contradicted this. Nobody contradicts it now. Well? What will posterity say? And what will the survivors of the war say, before death puts an end to their terrible memories?

On July 31st there was nothing to fear and everything to try to win; on that day, the path to real glory, not that glory which is founded upon tombs, lay in prevailing upon Austria, now that her pride was satisfied, to stop her mobilization where it was, to hold the surety seized from Serbia until negotiations had been opened (in which the Entente had acquiesced on July 27th), to ask of Russia that

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she, too, suspend mobilization, satisfaction having been given her by the suspension of Austrian mobilization, and to ask us—which was superfluous, seeing that we had already set back our mobilization one day—to wait until negotiations had been opened. And, since Germany seemed to balk at retracing her steps, the thing to do was to confine the danger of war to the threat implied in mobilization, after which—with all the nations equally under arms—the thing to do was to start discussion. Equally? This was not the true state of affairs, as a matter of fact, since, had a conference been held at London, it would have been held with France not yet mobilized, England not yet mobilized, Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, not directly involved, and Germany in arms and ready to blast any nation breaking the agreement.

That is what a strong conscience would have grasped, a clear mind conceived, and a firm will turned into reality. In fact, not even a firm will was needed, but simply the good sense of an ordinary man not posing before the world as a conqueror! In that direction lay real glory, which owes nothing except to itself, and which, on this occasion, would have crowned one brow alone. Had that happened, Germany might have said afterward—and what she said might have gone down in history—that she was strong because tradition imposed armed strength upon her, but that her strength, placed, though but for one day, at the

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service of right, had rehabilitated her. A good man, for the simple reason that he was good, a man without genius, without that inner flash which reveals to some what others do not see, would have acted thus, for the simple reason that he was a man.

Alas!—what a man, though, was the one to whom the opportunity came!—he whom we now see, on his knees, cowering under the curse of the world! The Kaiser may write, groan, plead, harp upon details, seize upon documents concerning which he has no guaranty of authenticity, but all to no avail, since none of this can keep from his ears the cries of the ages and of mankind, of the living and of the dead!

But let us continue to follow in the steps of history.

The ultimatum to Russia stated that Russia had twelve hours in which to demobilize; for her it meant that she was required to demobilize not only in the face of Germany, but even of Austria, who had been the first to threaten her, yet continued to negotiate. The most extraordinary point for the consideration of historians is that the peril which seemed to frighten powerful and formidable Germany was regarded by weaker Austria without apprehension, thus proving that negotiations were still possible over the heads of the armies. That is one of the crucial points in the history of the war; it shows how the spirit of war entirely dominated Germany.

On July 31st the Tsar sent to the German Em-

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peror the following dispatch, which is a supreme appeal of peace to war, of justice to bestiality:

"I have received thy telegram. I realize that thou hast been compelled to mobilize, but I should like to receive from thee the same guaranty which I have given thee, *viz.*, that these measures do not constitute war and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and of general peace, which is so dear to our hearts. Our friendship of long standing will be able, with the help of God, to prevent bloodshed. Full of confidence, I impatiently await thy reply. (Signed) NICHOLAS II (German Document, No. 546).

The answer was the declaration of war.

Thus was war declared on August 1st. At that very moment the Austrian ambassador at Paris was informing us that a *rapprochement* was under way with St. Petersburg, and the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg was receiving from M. Sazonoff assurances that Russia would agree to the interviews with us and England which she had so often requested. As Count Pourtalès walked into the office of M. Sazonoff to deliver to him the declaration of war, the Austrian ambassador was there for the purpose of negotiating.

That was the end.

On August 1st, in the afternoon, I countersigned the decree of mobilization at the very time when Germany, already under arms since the day before, was seeking to cover herself with the legal pretext that had preceded the brutal reality.

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Thus, France, having drawn back her troops from the frontier, had waited for the supreme moment; she had not mobilized yet, in the midst of a Europe that resembled an intrenched camp. I could wait no longer. Had I waited beyond that last moment, my responsibility would have become criminal.

After having tried every means, I, at that unforgettable moment, summoned the French nation to arms and independence. At the same time we issued, with the decree of mobilization, a declaration signed by the President of the Republic and by the whole Cabinet, which, posted on all the walls of France, proclaimed France's ardent desire for peace, which was in every way reconcilable with her justified regard for legitimate defensive measures.

And then, as I was tired of looking toward Germany, where I saw nothing but the reflection of arms, I turned my eyes toward England. Sir Edward Grey had maintained an honest and impartial attitude, refusing to jeopardize England's freedom of action, yet he had not resolved upon any definite course of action. This was also true of the King, complying with the anguished appeal of the President of the French Republic.

Nevertheless, at my request and at that of M. Paul Cambon, the British Foreign Minister promised to defend our coasts and our flag, by means of the British fleet, against all insults.

This was not as yet actual co-operation with us—

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the moment was yet to come when violation of Belgian neutrality made England rise up over the waters, immovable as destiny. Germany hastened the coming of this moment, did nothing else but hasten it, since nothing can bring me to believe that, even had there been no violation of Belgian neutrality, England would have remained a passive spectator. The protection promised against maritime brutality on the part of Germany would have been the spark, and, even had there not been that, England would have remembered 1870, as we in 1870 bitterly remembered Sadowa, and she would not have allowed a combat for her honor and her interests to be fought without her participation in it.

CHAPTER XI

FRANCE'S HOUR

HISTORY will affirm that, when the knell struck, it found us standing erect. Here is how the declaration of war was delivered to me:

On August 3d, at 6.15 P.M., an agonized telephone call brought to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the message of that noble and great man, the American ambassador, my friend, Myron T. Herrick. He informed us—and his voice was wet with tears—that Herr von Schoen had asked him to hoist the flag of the United States over the German Embassy.¹ The American flag, that flag whose first stars had been placed upon a glorious silken background by the intertwined hands of Washington and Lafayette! Myron T. Herrick received the German's request with a gesture of disgust. It meant war.

I gave the order to warn M. Poincaré, and I waited alone—willingly alone—for the visit of

¹ I had telegraphed two days before to M. Paul Cambon in Berlin, asking him to request Mr. Gerard, the American ambassador there, to take over the protection of French interests in case of war. M. Cambon never received this message, which was intercepted by honest individuals well known to the German government. That government, in fact, already intended to ask the good offices of Mr. Herrick, hence America could not undertake protection of two divergent sets of interests.

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Herr von Schoen, which, a bit later, was announced to me.

Alone! Alone! For, after all, what could I say, attempt, seek to do? For a week we had been slipping down the rough road and every bit of its roughness had lacerated us at every step. We were compelled to sit and wait, to wait for the coming of the messenger of violence and of death, and, after him, for the coming of annihilation or victory, and —no matter what might eventually happen—we were sure of the coming of a most frightful hecatomb.

At that supremely fateful moment, while I sat alone, face to face with France, in that office of mine darkened by the setting of the sun, in the midst of the great city whence came no sound, I took consolation in feeling that I stood in close contact with France, who had so often sunk into the agony of death, yet had risen, immortal. I knew that France would rise of herself, out of the depths of the centuries, sure of her innocence and of the courage of her sons, holding once again the mandate of justice conferred upon her by the rest of the nations.

I was seated, with my elbows leaning on the table of my office, my eyes fixed upon the door. It opened. Herr von Schoen entered.

By the other door M. de Margerie entered.

Herr von Schoen came into the room with rapid steps; the color in his face betrayed the intensity of his feelings. Before occupying the seat

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which I indicated to him with my hand, he said to me:

"Mr. President, I have just been insulted—I and my Emperor!" He added, "A lady has just insulted me, beside my carriage."

"So you were coming here?"

"Yes."

"Certainly you did not come to complain about this incident?"

"No."

"I present to you my regrets and apologies."

Herr von Schoen bowed, and later, in his memoirs, he paid homage to my courtesy. I kept my eyes fixed upon him, indicating, as it were, that it was his turn to speak, and I waited.

In contrast to what Herr von Schoen has since recounted (subsequently the importance of pointing this out will be realized), he said nothing more; he simply read from a document which he had taken from his pocket. Here it is:

The German civil and military authorities have taken note of a certain number of acts of a distinctly hostile character committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of the latter have undoubtedly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory; one of them sought to destroy buildings in the vicinity of Weysel, others have been seen over the Eiffel region, another threw bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I have been commissioned to inform Your Excellency—which I now have the honor of doing—that, in view of these acts of aggression, the German Empire

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considers itself in a state of war with France, owing to the acts of the latter Power.

At the same time I have the honor of bringing to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the German authorities will hold French merchant vessels now in German ports, but will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of reciprocal action.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, all that remains for me to do is to request Your Excellency to provide me with my passports and to take whatever measures Your Excellency may deem necessary in order to assure my return to Germany with the staff of my Embassy, together with that of the Bavarian Legation and the German General Consulate in Paris.

Kindly accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my highest consideration.

(Signed) SCHOEN.

Naturally I listened in silence to the reading of this document. I stretched out my hand to take it, but Herr von Schoen kept it in order to return it.

Then I protested against the madness of such a contention and against its injustice. I called to his attention the fact that, far from having permitted raids of French troops on German territory, France had withdrawn her troops to a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier, and that it was Germany who had murdered our soldiers, far from the frontier line and on the French side of it. I also called to his attention in strong language that, two days before, on August 1st, at 9.30 P.M., I had had delivered to him a note, which I had forwarded to M. Cambon for the latter to deliver to Herr von

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Jagow.¹ He declared that he knew nothing about it. He had nothing more to say. Nor had I. I accompanied him to the outside of the Ministry, as far as the courtyard, and I stopped on the threshold of the front door, opposite the Place des Invalides, seeing for myself that the measures for assuring his personal safety had been thoroughly carried out.

Herr von Schoen bowed low to me from his carriage. I bowed to him. He disappeared.

What followed is well known. He departed that evening, after having sent his archives ahead

¹ "M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. Paris, August 2, 1914.

"Since German troops have to-day violated our eastern frontier at various points, I request you to protest without delay and in writing to the German government. Kindly take note, in doing this, of the following, which, in view of the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have sent directly to the German ambassador:

"The French civil and military authorities of the eastern sections have just brought to our attention a number of incidents which I have asked our ambassador at Berlin to bring to the attention of the German Imperial government.

"One of these occurred at Delle, in the Belfort region, where, on two occasions, the French customs post was fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle, two German patrols of the 5th Mounted Jaegers, crossed the frontier this morning and advanced as far as the villages of Jonchery and Baron, more than ten kilometers from the frontier. The officer in command of the first of these blew out the brains of a French soldier. The German horsemen took away horses which the French mayor of Suarce was about to gather together, and he obliged the inhabitants of the place to lead away these horses.

"The French ambassador at Berlin has been instructed to protest formally to the Imperial government against these acts which are a distinct violation of the frontier by German troops in arms, which is entirely unjustified in the present state of affairs. The French government cannot but place the entire responsibility for these acts at the door of the Imperial government.

(Signed) "RENE VIVIANI."

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some days before, so sure was he of peace. He arrived undisturbed in his country, after having been stopped by the Germans and forced to don the uniform of a colonel, so great was the respect of the German rabble at that moment even for diplomats. On the other hand, it will be recalled that M. Jules Cambon was accorded infamous treatment, was refused permission to depart by the route chosen by him, had to pay in gold, since checks were not accepted, for the traveling expenses of the Embassy staff, and was locked up in his railway carriage, hedged in by rifles leveled at him. Herr von Jagow was certainly a gentleman; all the vulgarity of official Germany found fit expression in its worthy representative.

A few days later the Kaiser, not wishing to be outdone in anything, took occasion, in his own country, surrounded by his army, to insult the British ambassador, who had asked for his passports. And to think that this fellow had set himself up to rule the world!

The wording of the German declaration of war has been given.

Alleging as a pretext that French aviators had flown over Nuremberg, war was declared, Belgium ripped open, France invaded, the world hurled back. And, in order to preserve moral continuity in her sinister history, it was again by means of a falsification that official Germany sent millions of men to their death.

The burden of this disgrace devolves, first, upon

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the Kaiser, next upon those coworkers closest to him, Herr von Bethmann and especially Herr von Jagow, who had the audacity to transmit over his signature to the entire world that final outrageous crime against truth. The world knows how false that legend about French aviators was; it knows that the false allegation was officially admitted as such by Germany, that witnesses on the spot protested against it, that no aviator flew over Nuremberg.

Hence it was urgently necessary that a more solid foundation be found for the declaration of war, so the accessory yarn about French raids into German territory was invented, just as the other one had also been invented. Herr von Schoen, having returned to Germany, sought to maintain that he had discussed the declaration of war with me, and that, in the course of our talk, he had complained of the bad weather, which might have affected the telegraph wires and made the words of the telegram which he brought unintelligible to him. But he held no conversation with me except to make a complaint, at the outset of our meeting, and then he began to read. But it behooved him to create the belief that we had been warned by him of the inadequacy of the telegram. Yet how could he have done it at my office, before me?

The day before I had sent to him a note accompanying a protest setting forth the murderous incursions made by German soldiers, and I had told of the death, ten kilometers from our frontier (thus

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proving that the ten-kilometer retirement of the French forces had indeed been carried out) of Corporal Peugeot. At that moment, on August 3d, he said nothing to me. One can easily understand that the German government, confronted with the sudden collapse of the shameful yarn about French aviators, should have sought to replace it little by little with something else. But Herr von Schoen could not tell me, on August 3d, that his telegram, alleged to have become mixed up in transmission, contained anything at all different, since his chief, at about noon, had not even spoken about it to M. Cambon. Nevertheless, what a magnificent opportunity was presented to Herr von Jagow to answer my protest enumerating the murders committed by German soldiers, which protest had been in his hands since nine o'clock in the morning of August 3d. Yet—nothing came from him. Nothing. It was not until afterward, when the yarns about the aviators was shown to have been a chimera, that they came back to earth in Germany and cooked up a fresh cock-and-bull story.

We shall return once more to these incidents, though the truth about them has been settled already, in order thoroughly to edify the world, which was deceived so long, and also in order to convince it once more of the mixture of trifling and dishonesty with which the diplomatic methods of Germany were impregnated. No matter what may be said to the contrary, war was declared against France—who waited, in arms, ten kilometers

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from her frontier (where the German Lieutenant Mayer was found killed)—on the pretext that France had violated German territory by way of the air, and that French aviators had hurled bombs.

Now, here are the facts: The Minister at Munich telegraphed on August 2d (No. 758) to Herr von Jagow: "The news spread here, to the effect that French aviators threw bombs in the vicinity of Nuremberg, has not been confirmed at all up to now. Merely some unknown aircraft were seen, which did not resemble military planes. The throwing of bombs has not been proved, even less the fact that the aviators were French." To this must be added the dispatch published August 3d, very early in the morning, by the Cologne *Gazette*: "The Bavarian Ministry of War doubts the correctness of the news to the effect that aviators were seen above the lines of Nuremberg and that they threw bombs on the railway. Munich, August 2d."

One may judge how satisfied Herr von Jagow must have been when he received this bomb—I mean the first telegram. He had based the declaration of war on several trumped-up stories—on (1) the yarn about the Nuremberg airplane, which never existed, and (2) the one about the Weysel aircraft, equally nonexistent. In view of the fact that Herr von Jagow spread the news of the Nuremberg airplane, though it was false, one may imagine what credence should be given to his statement that there was another airplane. Here is the

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dispatch of Herr von Jagow to Herr von Schoen (August 3d, 10.05) :

"A French aviator, who must have flown over Belgian territory, has been brought down while attempting to destroy the railway near Weysel." Not even a child would have dared write such a piece of stupidity in 1914. It was quickly suppressed by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who, not daring to confirm or deny it, submerged it, with other matter, amid a mass of generalities, on the 4th of August.

Now, who was this model aviator who, in 1914, had attempted a flight of five hundred kilometers from France to Weysel and back? Also, assuming that he had attempted it, how is one to explain that those in Germany did not know that he would have flown over Luxemburg, not Belgium, and, in addition, over a town commanding the railway lines leading toward the Dutch frontier? (*The Crime of August 4th*, page 193.) Also, what proof was adduced? The aforesaid pilot died, it is alleged, after an exploit which, in 1914, would have been classed as something magnificent—yet nobody knew anything about it.

Thus, it has been shown that the German declaration of war rests on falsifications. One of these was acknowledged by official Germany. Was that falsification willful? Herr von Jagow asserts in his defense that the Munich dispatch was delivered to him some minutes after the declaration of war had been sent to Paris, but he remains silent on many points. First, how could a responsible man, at such

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a moment, snatch up a rumor without confirming it in order to evolve from it a sensational dispatch? What respect could such a man have for his duties and for the honor of his country? Moreover, if he received the denial too late, he nevertheless received it a few minutes after the sending of the declaration of war. Since the latter had just gone, it would have been useful to set matters right. But he did nothing about it. In other words, without confirming the rumor, he displayed a lie to the world, placed the signature of his country to a lying document, and then, having been warned, as he says, he refrained from acting! It was left to the irresponsible press to make protest!

It is easy to see why he should have tried, under these circumstances, and immediately afterward, to complicate and strengthen his assertions. Then it was that the accessory falsehoods were piled up—yarns in contradiction to the facts, yarns about aggressive action by French detachments in the face of the well-known impassive attitude of the German forces. Take note of the fact that, had this been true, Herr von Jagow, at nine in the morning of the 3d of August, should at least have countered my protest against German incursions, which had been delivered to him by M. Cambon, with a protest against aggressions by French troops. But nothing came that morning.

And here is something that is even more serious: he saw M. Cambon close to noon, he spoke to him of airplanes—not a word did he say of the alleged

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aggressions on land! Surely, that was the moment for it. But—never a word! When M. Cambon, on August 3d at 9 A.M., had caused the delivery of the protest cited above, Herr von Jagow stated that he had not had time to read it. Then, a little later, M. Cambon received a visit from this very Jagow: "Monday morning, August 3d, at eleven o'clock, Herr von Jagow came to see me. He came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Coblenz, by French aviators, who, according to him, had come from Belgium" (Yellow Book, No. 158). Now, at that moment, it is to be noted that he did not say a word about aggressions on land, and, at two o'clock on the same day, he drew up, without saying anything about it, the declaration of war.

There is nothing to be found in this belated endeavor but erroneous allegations. Here are some examples: Herr von Jagow denied, on August 3d (716) that any German had crossed the frontier. So did Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg on August 4th. Now here is what General von Moltke telegraphed on August 4th (869): "A patrol of the Fourteenth Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier August 2d. It was probably wiped out, because only one man returned." August 2d! That was the crime of Jonchery, denied by the Ministry, acknowledged by the army! But, falsification being a habit, General von Moltke, in the same dispatch, accused France of having

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thrown bombs over Nuremberg. August 4th! That story had been demolished forty-eight hours before by the Bavarian Minister.

Another instance: the original German version of one incident accused French soldiers of having made a raid to Reppe. The next day this claim was omitted in a second version, since some Germans were made prisoners on this occasion and their being in our hands was evidence of their crime and of our justified defense.

Another story was to the effect that there had been a French raid upon Montreux-le-Vieux, and this story was adhered to, since the Germans concerned managed to escape and witnesses were lacking.

Another lie: on August 3d, the Minister of the Interior at Berlin declared in all seriousness that automobiles with women passengers, carrying millions in money, were passing through Germany in the direction of Russia. Press indignation regarding this was stimulated even until after the declaration of war, and, on August 6th, in an official note, the said Minister denied the story and continued to allude only to "so-called enemy autos." But by that time imagination, carried to the extremes of delirium, had done its work.

And then, the news having been launched, and the wish having arisen to deny it, it was diluted, submerged, and generalized, and exact statements were avoided, so that an answer became easy. It was stated that patrols had been seen "on the Vosges

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road." But at what place? At what town? Who was killed or captured, in these patrols? Where was the debris of the Weysel airplane? As for us, we shot and captured, in self-defense, upon our territory, soldiers who had attacked us; these are our witnesses.

So nothing remains but the ruins of the laboriously concocted plan and of the most audacious lie ever registered in history. Yet the war remains. What followed is known.

What happened to Belgium is known—the disgraceful ultimatum of August 2d, the magnificent answer of the weakest nation to the heaviest blow, its resistance for the sake of the right, the respect of Belgian neutrality shown by France and England. "Necessity makes law," said Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg.

It will be recalled that on the next day there was an interview between him and the British ambassador, and the world will not forget the immortal retort by which the latter called back the Chancellor to a sense of honor:

"So, are our two nations to fight on account of a scrap of paper?"

"I would respectfully call to your attention that England has a different conception of honor."

Why did not Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg take France and England to task on that day for the alleged plans for violating Belgian neutrality which he, of course, invented when victory seemed to him less of a foregone conclusion?

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As for France, she stood erect, calm and resolute, having done all that was possible to avoid war, and capable, since she was threatened, of facing the worst peril.

I left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 7.15, conferred with M. Poincaré, and returned to my residence, having, throughout my long periods of tenure of governmental office, preferred it to official residences. A fateful day that, to be followed by others—days which fitted, without a break for rest, into nights of unceasing labor. It now devolved upon me to draw up the official Ministerial declaration concerning the negotiations which I had conducted, proclaim aloud the rights of France, her innocence and her courage, appeal to these before the nations and before history, denounce criminal Germany and her accomplice, and, before the opening of the struggle, brand her with the stigma which blood has been unable to wash away. In addition, I had to prepare a speech for delivery at the tomb of Jaurès, a victim of the madness aroused during terrible days like those, since that great orator was still lying in his humble abode and since, around the fallen Colossus, ominous rumors and vehement expressions of grief were beginning to arise. All these things had to be done.

On the evening before the battle and before the funeral ceremony, I sat in my quiet study, where my severe rows of law books surrounded me as if seeking to give me their protection at that awful hour against the imminent orgy of violence.

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In the morning, the funeral of Jaurès became an expression of national grief, and if Germany—as hinted at in the *Memoirs*—had reckoned upon the death of Jaurès for depressing the French state of mind, she had deceived herself.

In the afternoon, after the Council, I was bound for the Chamber of Deputies, when, at two o'clock, the telephone bell rang. M. Paul Cambon, our ambassador at London, informed me that the British government had authorized him to express in stronger terms than before her friendly attitude toward France; I immediately added to the declaration I was preparing some sentences bearing on the agreement of 1912.

When I arrived, the members of the Chamber, all standing, all magnificent in their bearing, accorded to me, the French Premier, the unforgettable token of the enthusiasm and emotion which they felt. It was not for me, but for glorious France, about to enter the arena, that this storm of acclamation arose. The fact that during those terrible days I bore aloft the banner of France, and kept it aloft without wavering, will be to me always the proudest badge of honor of my whole life.

The grave and virile message of the President of the French Republic, followed by the declaration in which I set forth the position of France, met with unanimous approval both in the Chamber and in the Senate: “A free and strong nation, which fights for an ideal rooted in the centuries, and unites, in its entirety, to protect its existence; a

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democracy which has been able to keep its military strength within the bounds of discipline and did not fear, a year ago, to increase the burden of that strength in order to counter the arming of neighbors; a nation in arms fighting for its very life and for the independence of Europe—these are what we have the honor of showing to the witnesses of this tremendous struggle, for which preparations have been making for days amid the greatest calm and in the most methodical manner. We are without reproach. We shall show ourselves to be without fear."

Then came the voting, by the two sections of the French Parliament, of the war laws. Then the work of the Chamber was over. Our eyes sought one another, also our hands, because, without our realizing it, our hearts had gone out to one another, and the arms of the elder men caught up in fraternal embrace the younger men, whose faces were alight with manly enthusiasm. Could we part thus?

I spoke to all those men, I spoke to my whole country, to France—to France of the past which I evoked, to France of the future which I invoked. It is not true that an orator creates feelings—no, he makes them burst forth because they lay already deep down in the human bosom; the orator's power consists in finding them and not being overwhelmed when they burst forth! O ye who were not present at that session of the French Chambers. never will ye know how cruelly ye were disinher-

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ited by Fate! Here we stood in the presence of something more than national unity, that unity begun by our kings and carried to conclusion by the French Revolution. Upon that tree, centuries old, the tender flowers of our Sacred Union blossomed.

We parted. Night fell. Usually, at that time, in summer, it is clear and cheerful. But this summer night struck me as a thing of terror. Yet, how comforting for all of us was that hour when France found anew her altar, her religion, her soldiers, her martyrs, her liberators. "*Allons, enfants de la patrie!*"

Often have I been asked how I met those hours of distress and also those that followed, the hours of Charleroi, of the retreat, the anxious eve of the Marne, the hours when we almost felt the breath of the invader upon us as we waited, like the hunter before the leap of the onrushing beast. No man can say that he draws strength from himself alone—heart and soul and body would break were he to try it. But the spectacle offered by those last days of waiting, the grim march toward the frontier, coming after the hours of religious silence, the willingness of an entire nation for sacrifice, that fusion among men caused by destiny—all this was the supreme fount of strength, the supreme intoxicating tonic.

From the 4th of August onward a sort of mystic faith flashed forth in all of us, feeding upon our labors of each day. I said to myself on that day

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that France could not perish, that she was indispensable to the world, like air, light, equilibrium, universal harmony.

And now she went into the battle, and for four years she stood with her feet deep in blood and her head held higher than the heavens. She saved herself and she saved the world. Nobody, surely, least of all I, who saw the first soldiers of our allies come to us, will quarrel as to the partition of the laurels. Nevertheless, when our national pride and truth are in agreement, one may well satisfy both. In love with liberty, France had preserved for its protection her arms—that is, her army—for she knew that, as long as wolves were roaming through the forests of the human race, it would be necessary to preserve that emblem of idealism, which would be but a futile symbol of weakness unless strength was brought to its arm!

Since we saw clearly, and acted conscientiously, to the extent that our material means allowed, we halted the barbarians on the threshold of civilization and gave all free men time to leap into the fight, strong and well armed.

Sons of our sons, that will be your title of nobility!

CHAPTER XII

THE GERMAN EMPEROR'S IMPOSTURES

THE evidence presented in the course of this short study would probably suffice for settling once for all the question of the responsibility for the war, particularly since most of it has been drawn from German, Austrian, or Bavarian sources, since complete impartiality has been aimed at. The sources of the evidence, therefore, simply serve to make the facts all the more crushing.

Nevertheless, we do not wish to allow those chapters of the Kaiser's *Memoirs* to go unanswered in which he takes up the question of responsibility, those chapters of his filled with fantastic and futile allegations, significant silences, and voluntary omissions. To answer these chapters, with their empty statements, may possibly be a waste of time, but, nevertheless, such an answer is necessary, if only to bring into relief the uselessness of the Kaiser's attempts at whitewashing himself.

The surprising point about his *Memoirs*, particularly in the chapters dealing with the responsibility for the war, is the shameful desire of the fallen monarch to evade the responsibilities of his position. His *Memoirs* will go down in history, assuming that history ever bothers with them, not

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as a piece of teaching, a contribution, an addition to truth, or a piece of research, but as a monument of blindness and an example of cowardice.

The Kaiser, in his *Memoirs*, abandons everything and everybody, takes to abject and headlong flight, to a flight even more nauseating, if that be possible, than his flight of November, 1918.

Can the Kaiser hope to make anyone believe that, in all the length and breadth of Germany, there is but one innocent man—himself?

On the contrary, the resolve made by him, when he was a young man quite without experience, scarcely two years after his assumption of the terrible burden of power, to dismiss Bismarck, the great creator of German unity, the comrade of his grandfather, is proof of his ardent desire to enforce his sovereign will and impose his control upon the Empire. At the age of thirty-two he overthrows one of the iron men of history; yet he wishes us to believe that later, with his authority constantly growing stronger, he was a mere puppet of the chancellors summoned by him, who owed their appointment to him. Truly, the Kaiser, paradoxical as it may seem, has brought Germans and French upon common ground, since both have a like distaste for methods such as he employs in his *Memoirs*.

In order to bring out clearly the great discrepancy between the Kaiser of yesterday and his picture of himself in his book, it would suffice to re-read the documents which Karl Kautsky brought to

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light, the full collection of criminal dispatches, the murderous deed in its phases of preparation and execution—that book whose eight hundred documents, concealed at first, have finally overwhelmed the thirty-two published at the beginning.

Really, it would seem as if the Kaiser had never read them!

But he *did* read them, because he jotted down notes along their margins! And what notes they are! We cannot quote all the opinions that he set down, pen in hand, thinking, doubtless, that they would be locked up, safely hidden from history, but which suddenly bobbed up one day, to the shame of him who wrote them!

The language in which they are couched is rude and sometimes filthy. Here are some examples:

DISPATCHES

Vienna, June 30, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Vienna. (German Documents, No. 7.)

. . . Here I hear even serious people express the desire of settling accounts with the Serbs once for all. A series of conditions should be sent to the Serbs, and, if they did not accept these, energetic steps should be taken. I take advantage of every such opportunity for quietly but earnestly discouraging precipitate measures.

Vienna, July 10, 1914. Dispatch from the German Am-

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Now or never!

Who told him to do this? It is very foolish. This does not concern him in the least. It is entirely Austria's affair to decide what he is to do.

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bassador at Vienna. (German Documents, No. 29.)

His Majesty discussed the situation with the greatest calm. Then he expressed his cordial thanks for the attitude of our august Sovereign and of the Imperial government and declared that he now shared our opinion completely, that he thought as we did that a decision must be reached in order to put an end to the intolerable state of affairs in Serbia.

Vienna, July 14, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Vienna. (German Documents, No. 49.)

. . . The count told me that he had been the man who had always advised prudence, but that every day had strengthened his opinion that the Monarchy must come to an energetic decision in order to give proof of its vitality and put an end to the intolerable state of affairs existing in the southeast. . . .

As to the time for the delivery to Serbia, it has been decided that it would be better to await the departure of M. Poincaré from St. Petersburg—that is, the 25th. . . .

Therapia, July 21, 1914.
Dispatch from the German

As His Majesty's memorial is dated a fortnight ago, this thing is lasting too long. Nevertheless, it was only drawn up in order to make clear the reasons for the decision.

Certainly.

That is too bad.

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Ambassador at Constantinople.
(German Documents, No. 99.)

... Not only Bulgaria, but also Rumania and Turkey, would range themselves unreservedly on the side of the Triple Alliance if Austria should administer a severe lesson to Serbia.

London, July 24, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at London. (German Documents, No. 157.)

... But he doubted very much that it would be possible for the Russian government to advise the Serbian government to accept the Austrian demands without reservation; a state accepting such terms would cease to count among independent states. He, Sir Edward Grey, found it difficult at this time to give advice to St. Petersburg.

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.
Dispatch from the German Ambassadors at St. Petersburg.
(German Documents, No. 160.)

... Russia knows what is owing from her to the monarchical principle, and the present case does not in the least affect this principle.

We shall remind these gentlemen of this at the right moment.

This would be very desirable. It is not a state in the European sense of the word; it is a band of brigands!

She knows this better since her fraternizing with the French Socialistic Republic.

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Berlin, July 25, 1914. Dispatch from the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Emperor. (German Documents, No. 168.)

... The text of the Austrian note was written in such an aggressive and awkward fashion that public opinion in Europe and Italy would be against Austria, and no Italian government could oppose it. . . .

... My impression is that the only way to keep Italy in the Alliance is to promise her compensations soon enough in case Austria proceeds to make annexations of territory or occupies Lovcen.

Berlin, July 25, 1914. Dispatch from the Imperial Chancellor to the Emperor. (German Documents, No. 182.)

The Chief of Staff of the Navy informs me that Your Majesty, in view of a telegram issued by the Wolff Agency, has ordered the fleet to prepare to return rapidly to German harbors. . . .

He wanted to swindle in Albania and Austria has bristled up.

Piffle!

The little thief always wants to gobble up something whenever the rest do.

It is unbelievable that such intentions should be credited to me! Unheard-of! Never would I have thought of such a thing after my minister reported to me the mobilization at Belgrade! That may bring about mobilization by Russia, which will cause Austrian mobilization! In that case I must concentrate my forces on land and sea. In the Baltic there is not a single warship! Moreover, I am not in the habit of taking my military measures

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in accordance with a Wolff telegram, but with an eye to the general situation, which is what the civilian chancellor has as yet been unable to understand.

London, July 29, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at London. (German Documents, No. 368.)

Sir Edward Grey has just summoned me. The Minister was absolutely calm, but very serious, and he received me with the words that the situation was becoming more and more tense. . . .

But he deemed mediation an urgent necessity if those concerned did not wish to have things become a European catastrophe. . . .

The strongest and most unparalleled trait of English Pharisaism that I ever saw! Never would I make an agreement concerning the fleet with such low-down fellows!

If, instead of mediation, there should be a warning to St. Petersburg and Paris to the effect that England would not help them, it would immediately calm matters.

England uncovers herself, now that she thinks us chasing scarecrows and that our fate is, so to speak, sealed. The vile rabble of shopkeepers sought to deceive us by means of dinners and speeches. The grossest deceit lay in the words addressed to me by the King through Henry: "We shall remain neutral and try to keep out of this as long as possible." Grey inflicts a denial upon the King and what he said to Lichnowsky is due to his remorse because he feels that he has deceived us. At the same time, it is a threat com-

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bined with a bluff for detaching us from Austria, preventing mobilization, and throwing back upon us the responsibility for war. He knows quite well that if he said one single word in earnest and energetically to Paris and St. Petersburg and invited them to be neutral, both would instantly be quiet. But, instead of this, he threatens us! The ignoble clown! Vile dog's excrement! England alone bears the responsibility for war or peace and it is no longer we! This must be proved publicly!

(German Documents, No. 401.)

Here we have, in all its nakedness, the terrible situation slowly and surely engineered by Edward VII, continued and systematically developed by conversations, afterward denied, of England with Paris and St. Petersburg, and finally brought to its conclusion by George V, and now to be made a reality. Thus, the stupidity and awkwardness of our ally are to be the rope for hanging us. . . . A grandiose conception which arouses admiration even in him who is to be ruined thereby! Edward VII, after his death, is stronger than I, who am alive! . . . And we are caught in the noose. . . . Now all these machinations should be exposed pitilessly, the mask of Christian pacifism should be publicly torn off, and

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this Pharisaical hypocrisy about peace should be pilloried! And our consuls in Turkey and the Indies, our agents, etc., should foment a savage insurrection of the entire Mussulman world against this nation of odious shopkeepers, these conscienceless liars, since, even if we are to be bled white, England must at least lose India.

London, August 1, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at London. (German Documents, No. 596.)

Sir Edward Grey has just read me the following declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet. . . .

. . . When I asked him whether, if we respected Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite declaration that Great Britain would remain neutral, the Minister answered that this was not possible for him, but that this question would play a great rôle in public opinion here. . . .

. . . He had also asked himself if it would not be possible for us and for France, in case of a Russian war, to stand in arms opposite each other without attacking. I asked him whether he was in a position to state to me that France would enter into a compact of this nature.

The rubbish talked by this man Grey shows that he has absolutely no idea what he ought to do. Now we shall await England's decision. I have just learned that England has cut the Emden cable. This is a war measure! And while she is still negotiating.

What a low cheat!

The fellow is insane or an idiot! Moreover, the French began the war and violated international law by having their aviators throw bombs.

My impression is that Mr. Grey is a low scoundrel who is afraid of his own dirty tricks and of his lying policy, who does not wish to take part openly against us, but wishes to be forced to do so by us.

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Rome, August 1, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Rome. (German Documents, No. 614.)

. . . He made ceaseless repetition of the external and internal reasons militating here against participation in the war. . . .

. . . Through a man in the confidence of M. Barriere I have received secret information that M. Barriere declared that the Italian government had taken steps to draw closer to the English government. Perhaps, in spite of the denial of the Marquis di San Giuliano, conversations have already been begun with England.

Rome, Aug. 4, 1914. Dispatch from the German Ambassador at Rome. (German Documents, No. 850.)

. . . Even a partisan of the Triple Alliance like Giolitti, who has just returned here, thinks that the *casus fæderis* has not arisen, that the country needs tranquillity and should remain neutral, since there is no reason for its activity participation.

One may obtain from this résumé—in which we have not included all—an idea of what the Kaiser was when he was writing in the silence of his study,

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The rascal! The King has not yet answered me even!

So if we do not respect Belgian neutrality England will attack us and Italy detach herself from us—that is the situation in a nutshell!

So our allies are betraying us also!

The unbelievable scoundrel!

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when he thought that what he wrote would remain unknown for all time; quite a different impression from what one now gets in reading his *Memoirs* destined for the public!

How can the Kaiser seek to make people believe that he was, so to speak, led by others, without any knowledge of things on his own part, when, by his own statement, he made, on all dispatches, marginal notes alike imperious and insulting in tone for all those who did not seem to understand what he wanted.

In these notes he incited to violence, prevented smoothing down of difficulties, coerced his ambassadors to silence when they wished to speak. He prevented his ambassador at Vienna from preaching calm, and deemed that it was never too soon to strike Serbia, and then, like a raving maniac whose cries are heard from behind the bars, he insulted England, insulted Italy, threatened the whole world!

How, after having written such things, and being aware that they are known, can he have the audacity to present himself to the world in the guise of a gentle, quiet man who visited museums, admired antiquities, had no other taste but a taste for travel, and was the last of all the inhabitants of his Empire to learn what was happening? That is not mere lying—it is absolute blindness in the midst of lying, since the man writing this knows that, three years ago, his real nature was disclosed and that he cannot make it disappear. Just think,

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then, how much credit is to be attached to the assertions of this man, how much one can believe him, how well-founded are his statements, how valuable is his narrative, how worthy of trust from the reader are his asseverations!

This man would have had to bear the burden of responsibility for the war, even if he had not daily vaunted the sovereign power which he claimed to exercise by the grace of God, which he enforced far from and above the rest of mankind, despising earth and exalting himself to equality with Heaven.

What does he say in these *Memoirs* of his, which sound like the faltering declarations of an accused man who sees on the table of the court the incriminating evidence of his crime, who hears the still confused murmuring of the witnesses about to be called, who, aware that his crime is known, knows that he must reply to questions? He says that he would like to have been tried by a neutral tribunal, at The Hague, for instance, and that he has not accepted the verdict of the nations banded together in victory. Really, such mockery goes too far; if there be one who ought to understand that he should not have recourse to joking, that the position in which he finds himself does not justify it, it is certainly he!

First, one might remind him of the traditions of Germany, those traditions which were imposed upon us in 1871. We endured the Treaty of Frankfort, which, after a war lasting five months and absolutely not to be compared with the Great War,

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imposed upon us an indemnity of five billion francs (which, reckoned at the present rate of money value, was extremely high); decreed the occupation of forty-five of our departments until payment had been made, and stole from us Alsace and Lorraine. To what tribunal did the grandfather of the Kaiser summon the French nation?

Unable, since the world was looking on, to ignore the initiative taken, in 1898, by Tsar Nicholas, he did everything possible to cause the failure of that noble and belated endeavor. His emissaries confused the debates, filled them with their heavy analyses, made objections at every step.

On the eve of the war, when everything might yet have been saved (since mobilizations are merely measures for defense, when, as in the case of that of Russia, they go hand in hand with an appeal for peace), when Tsar Nicholas sent him a supreme appeal on July 29th, begging him, for the sake of the world, to have the matter arbitrated by the Hague Tribunal, he answered not one word. In the threatening dispatch, whereby he answered this supreme bid for peace, and which brought about Russian mobilization, he made no allusion to this proposal. Now he tells us that it was too late—with what painful amazement the world listens while he avers that, on July 30th, it was too late to stop military preparations by summoning the nations before the Hague Tribunal!

But so ashamed was he of his own dispatch that he made no mention, in the first White Book, of

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that appeal to humanity, hurled over lines already bristling with weapons, by another Emperor! And now this sinister hero tells us that the Hague Tribunal has jurisdiction for trying his august person, although, in the cause of peace, it ought to have closed its doors!

He never invoked this tribunal, to be sure, until this late day when he sits writing beside the tombs that he has dug. Yet one may well ask in amazement what he would have said had he appeared before it, in view of the puerile *Memoirs* which he has just presented to us. One may assume that he would not have said anything different from what is in them, since, in 1922, all he has to give us is the deplorable cacophony and the still more deplorable text of his writings. In any event, he would have found a way to be ridiculous and, at the same time, detestable. Really, is it necessary to answer the absurdities accumulated within the covers of this book?

The military attaché at Tokio called attention in April, 1913, and some military attaché in Russia in March, 1914, to certain statements tending to show that war was going to break out, and Japanese officers, at army messes, made similar statements at the same time. Is it not absurd that remarks which cannot be investigated, and which may have been garbled or invented, which, even if true, compromise nobody, should be considered as causes for waging war? And what sort of thing was being said at that time by German officers at German

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army messes, amid riotous noise, with drink flowing plentifully and songs shaking the rafters? Ah, at such gatherings those present thought solely of idyllic peace, in spite of the fact that the German army, already swollen to colossal proportions, was still further increased in 1912 and 1913.

And the 1913 plan of invasion, sent to the Kaiser by the German General Staff, which took for granted the march through Belgium—that, doubtless, was simply a bit of table talk?

Then come quotations from two women, who may or may not have disappeared from the scene during the tempest of war—the daughters of the King of Montenegro, Russian princesses, who said to M. Paléologue, French ambassador at St. Petersburg, on July 23, 1914, that their father had told them that war was possible. That was when the German Emperor and the Emperor of Austria had jointly drawn up the insulting ultimatum to Serbia, knowing that it meant war, a war which they had foreseen was coming on July 5th. After all, was it only women who were talking about war on the 22d of July?

I pass over what the Kaiser relates about the Caucasus, drawn from an American report of 1915; also his crowning piece of stupidity relating to the finding by Germans in France in 1915 of English military uniforms brought there, he says, long before, thus proving that England and France were in agreement for fighting Germany.

Is it possible to answer all this sort of thing?

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Of course, the German Emperor tells for the twentieth time that the Emperor of Russia, much impressed by his (the Kaiser's) dispatches, had given the order to demobilize on July 29th, and that the Russian Chief of Staff disobeyed this order.

Things did not happen as the Kaiser says they did.

On the evening of July 29th, in view of the preparations being made by Germany, which were increasing hourly, and in order to secure herself against Austrian mobilization, mobilization was to be decreed by Russia.

Very late in the evening, before the Russian General Staff had given the necessary orders by telegraph, the Tsar gave an order countermanding mobilization, so that mobilization was confined to certain military districts.

Was the order of the Tsar, which gave proof of his love of peace, transmitted? Of that there is no doubt. So well do the Germans acknowledge this that they say that this order was disobeyed, thus paying indirect homage to the Tsar. On this point a denial has been given which is official and carries authority, emanating as it does from Dobrowsky, former chief of mobilization in the Russian General Staff. It is contained in a new document published by a Russian paper in Serbia, and was translated into German under the title "*Die russische Mobilisation.*" The general, who was in a position to know all that was going on, flatly declares that any claim that the order was

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disobeyed is false. He adds that nobody would have thought of disobeying. Moreover, he adds, how could the failure to obey the order have been concealed from the Tsar?

There, then, is the explanation of the matter, by the principal witness in the case—the only witness, one may say. It constitutes proof of how the facts were falsified. The Kaiser has given us the opportunity to put an end to the legend spread by Germany. Thanks to him, the good faith and desire for peace of the Tsar are brought into stronger relief.

But it does not suffice merely to answer these *Memoirs*. Though we have no need to furnish more proofs after the verdict handed down by twenty-seven nations, we shall, notwithstanding, do more than is demanded by truth.

The actions of the allied governments are known. They are based on no garbled statements, no hearsay rumors or documents fabricated brutally out of the whole cloth, or discreetly rearranged; no such things can obscure the shining light of the efforts made in the countries of the Allies for maintaining peace. It is necessary to take up these actions from the beginning, during July, 1914, to follow them through that fatal month, as they develop, bound one to another, just as history, which is their judge, has followed them. The war did not break out on July 29th or 30th or 31st, or on August 1st. Long before those dates it had been prepared, and was standing in its full armor, waiting in the shadows.

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We shall see shortly that, guilty as were the Central Empires and heavy as was their responsibility at the last moment, in the confusion born of their acts, they were even more guilty and even more heavily responsible before that, owing to the underhandedness, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and unfairness of their acts.

I have sought to assemble here, in the form of summaries, all the things that were done, so that they may constitute an exact, though incomplete, résumé. What did England, France, and Russia do beyond drawing together for the purpose of mediation—which was frustrated by Germany? What else did they do, from the very day when the delivery of the ultimatum to Serbia became known?

Here is a list of their acts:

1. The British government advised the Serbian government, which heeded the advice, to be very moderate in its answer to Austria (*Blue Book, 12–15 et seq.*).

2. In agreement with Russia and France and feeling that the time limit of two days granted Serbia was no better than strangling her, the British government asked for an extension of this period (*Blue Book, 12 et seq.*). The Central Empires absolutely refused this request.

3. The British government asked extension of the time granted (*German Documents, 157*), pointing out that the shortness of the time made war inevitable. Herr von Jagow made an incomplete

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report to the Kaiser regarding this petition. Austria emphatically refused the delay requested by all. Germany, on her part, refused the proposal of a four-nation conference (Germany, France, Italy, England) alleging that Austria could not be tried by a European tribunal (German Documents, 248).

4. Desirous that some sort of conference be held, Sir Edward Grey, after the setback suffered by the proposal for the holding of the four-nation negotiations, accepted, in agreement with Russia and France, the proposal that there be a private conversation between Russia and Austria (Blue Book, 45-74 *et seq.*). Answer: Declaration of war by Austria on Serbia, despite the latter's satisfactory answer, and refusal by Austria to discuss.

5. Serbia having been invaded, Sir Edward Grey, acting in agreement with Russia and France, acquiesced in the occupation of Serbia by the Austrian armies as far as it had gone, and in Austria's making known her terms while maintaining the occupation, the said terms to be transmitted to the Powers and recommended by these to Serbia, provided the independence and integrity of the latter were respected (Blue Book, 88-98 *et seq.*). Answer: The Central Empires refused to reply to this proposal.

6. The British government, on July 31st, maintained the necessity for holding the Austro-Russian conversations begun on July 31st and sought to succeed in satisfying Austria and securing the suspen-

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sion of all military preparations (Blue Book, 110-111 *et seq.*).

7. On August 1st, that most fateful day, on which war was declared against Russia, Sir Edward Grey sent seventeen dispatches to all the Foreign Offices, urging an entente among the various nations. Answer: Germany and Austria started the war.

What is there to be added to the above? What Russia did? Very well. Let us see what were the acts of the Russian government:

1. After coming to agreement with Sir Edward Grey and France, and despite the excited Slavic sentiments of the Russians and the menace to Russia, the Russian government counseled Serbia to seek conciliation, and from the very first day advised that she send an answer to the Austrian demands such as would be satisfactory to Austria.

2. On July 26th, after having asked for extension of the time allowed Serbia (as France did), the Russian government asked that the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg be allowed to talk directly to it (Orange Book, 38-45 *et seq.*). Answer: War by Austria against Serbia.

3. The Russian government refused to be discouraged and supported the Grey proposal (Orange Book, 32-49).

4. In case of nonacceptance of the proposal of having private talks between Russia and Austria, Russia stated that she was awaiting proposals from

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the Powers (Blue Book, 55-78 *et seq.*; Orange Book, 32).

5. Following a request from the King of Serbia, the Tsar, on July 27th, advised him to be calm.

6. On July 30th, M. Sazonoff dictated to Count Pourtalès, German ambassador at St. Petersburg, a compromise formula, and bound himself to suspend defensive measures (Orange Book, 60). Answer: Herr von Jagow refused to transmit this formula to Austria.

7. M. Sazonoff even went so far as to acquiesce, with Grey and ourselves, in the occupation of Serbia by Austrian troops, adopting a policy of waiting (Orange Book, 67).

8. On July 31st the Russian government agreed to enter into discussion with Austria and telegraphed to that effect to London (Blue Book, 110 *et seq.*).

9. On August 1st, after having received Germany's declaration of war, the Russian government again asked to enter into negotiations, provided that Russian territory be respected, adding that Russia would not attack (Blue Book, 139).

10. On that same day Russia declared that she would take no aggressive step so long as discussions with Austria, just resumed, should continue (White Book, 12-13 *et seq.*).

There, then, is what Russia did. . . . And France?

France, in so far as she did not take the initiative herself, adhered heart and soul to the line of action adopted at the initiative of England and Russia.

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Before throwing light on certain of her acts, I wish to call attention to the fact that their principal witness, he who watched them close at hand—Herr von Schoen, German ambassador at Paris—has paid them striking homage in his dispatches (see the memoirs of Herr von Schoen). On a number of occasions he brought to the knowledge of his government France's efforts in the direction of peace.

As for the said efforts, here they are:

1. As far back as July 24, 1914, at one o'clock in the morning I telegraphed, while on the way from Cronstadt to Stockholm, to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking that it seek through our ambassador to Austria, to calm down Austria and suggest to England that mediation be attempted by the four nations in order that the dispute might be arranged peacefully.

2. France supported Sir Edward Grey's proposal.

3. The French government supported the request for extension of the time allowed Serbia (Yellow Book, No. 29).

4. It renewed its request on July 27th (Yellow Book, No. 61).

5. Same request, July 29th (Yellow Book, No. 85).

6. On July 29th (No. 97) France urgently asked at London that Sir Edward Grey renew the proposal of mediation by the four nations, in whatever form he might deem best.

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7. On July 30th (No. 101) the French government suggested to Russia that, if she adopted defensive measures against the mobilization already carried out by Austria, she would give Germany no excuse for meddling.

8. On July 30th a telegram was sent to England to inform the latter that the French government had just given the order to have the French troops drawn back from the frontier a distance of ten kilometers.

9. On July 31st (No. 112) the French government urged all ambassadors to support the English proposal of mediation by the four nations.

10. August 1, 1914 (No. 122), France renewed her declaration that she would respect Belgian neutrality.

What more could be done? And why did all this fail? We shall answer this question in the clearest and most concise form, by making a series of summaries based on all the documents in the case, which will show, date by date, day by day, the principal burdens of responsibility that fall upon Germany and Austria.

CHAPTER XIII

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF GERMANY

GERMANY'S responsibility for the war is both of distant and recent date; it includes the past and the present; it is military, political, and diplomatic.

The first summary to be presented here will show the responsibility of Germany in the period considerably before the war. The second will show her responsibility in the period immediately preceding the war.

FIRST SUMMARY

(Covering a Period Some Years Before the War)

1. Here are the tenacious and persistent preparations by which Germany paved the way for the war:

On April 13, 1905, the Reichstag voted a new military law for a period of six years, providing for a nonrenewable appropriation of 87 millions and of a supplementary annual appropriation of 39 millions for war expenditures.

On March 7, 1911, the Reichstag voted over and above the regular budget a supplementary

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nonrenewable appropriation for five years of 103 millions, and a supplementary annual one of 27 millions.

On June 14, 1912, it voted another nonrenewable appropriation of 180 millions and another supplementary annual one of 55 millions.

On July 31, 1913, the Reichstag voted a nonrenewable appropriation of 1,105 millions and another supplementary annual one of 228 millions.

During the same period the French Parliament, on March 21, 1905, voted an annual supplementary appropriation of 21 millions and, on March 26, 1914, in order to meet the threat implied in the formidable sums voted since 1904 by the Reichstag, and especially those voted in 1913, the French Parliament voted a permanent supplement to the war budget of 257 million francs and a nonrenewable supplement of 720 millions.

The above proves, by dates and figures, what the respective tendencies of the two nations were at the beginning of 1914.

2. April 2, 1913—General report and war plan of the German General Staff:

"The people must be imbued with the idea that our armaments are a reply to those of France and to French policy. It must be accustomed to the belief that an offensive war by us is a necessity in order to combat the aggressive

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policy of our adversary. It will be necessary to act prudently in order not to arouse any suspicion and to avoid any crises that might hurt our economic life. Matters must be conducted in such a way that, in view of the heavy impression caused by powerful armaments, of considerable sacrifices, and of a political situation full of tension, the breaking out of a war shall be looked upon as a deliverance, since, after it, there will come whole decades of peace and prosperity, as they did after 1870. War must be prepared from the financial point of view; in this direction there is much to be done. Care must be taken not to arouse the distrust for our financiers; nevertheless, there are many things which cannot be kept concealed. . . .”

“. . . In the south Switzerland forms an extremely strong bulwark. As to the little nations on our northeastern frontier, they cannot be considered in the same way. In that direction the situation for us is vitally important, and the goal to be aimed at is to take the offensive in greatly superior numbers from the very first days. For this it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed by strong Landwehr formations, which will make the armies of the little nations decide to follow us or to remain inactive, and which will crush them should they attempt armed resistance.”

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These two passages, from a report addressed to the German Emperor by the German General Staff, show that there was a plan for crushing France through an invasion across Belgium, and, as a natural consequence, for violating Belgian neutrality, which dated back several years, though those originating it were not sure as to the date when the war would break out.

3. From 1913 onward Germany and Austria, though they had no grievances against Serbia, were preparing for war against her. They sounded Italy regarding this, but Italy turned them down and thus upset their plan. Evidence of this is to be found in a speech made by Signor Giolitti in Italy during 1914, in which he said:

“Since the principal thing is that Italy’s good faith be above any doubt, I wish to point out that as far back as 1913 Austria contemplated action against Serbia and wished to give this action the appearance of defensive action.

“Naturally Marquis San Giuliano let Austria know that Italy did not feel herself bound to participate in such action.”

SECOND SUMMARY

(Period Immediately Preceding the War)

1. Even before the Sarajevo murder, the Emperor of Austria addressed a memorandum to Ger-

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many asking her to help him strike Serbia. Thus, the murder was no better than a pretext (German Documents, No. 2).

2. June 28th. Murder of the Austrian Archduke at Sarajevo.
3. The German ambassador at Vienna telegraphed, under date of June 30th (German Documents, No. 7) : "I take advantage of all opportunities of this sort for advising, quietly but earnestly, against hasty measures."

The German Kaiser, in a fury, made the following marginal note on this dispatch: "Who told him to do this? It is very foolish. This does not concern him in the least."

4. Council of Potsdam. The Austrian ambassador at Berlin handed the German Emperor, on July 5th, by order of the Emperor of Austria, an autograph letter of his sovereign, asking the German Emperor's support in annihilating Serbia.

The German Emperor answered that such action must not be delayed, that Russia's attitude would be hostile in any event . . . that Russia, moreover, in view of existing conditions, was not ready for war and would hesitate greatly at taking up arms, but that she would incite the other Powers against us and feed the flames in the Balkans.

5. Following this, there was a council at which there were present Bethmann-Hollweg, Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann, His Ex-

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cellency von Capelle, representing Admiral von Tirpitz, Captain Zenker, representing the Naval Staff, and representatives of the Ministry of War and the German General Staff.

On July 17th, Quartermaster-General von Waldersee wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter in which he said, "I am ready," and, in October, 1919, he told his substitute, General von Bertrab, that he had been summoned on July 6, 1914, to Potsdam by the Emperor. He added, "There was no order to be given following this visit." The mobilization plan was finished March 31, 1914. The army was ready, as it always was (German Documents, page XVIII).

On July 15, 1917, General von Bertrab, who was present at this council, in a published report, shows he was sufficiently impressed to tell what had occurred to the Minister of War, who answered him, "I am always ready." On that day, then, despite the European complications to be foreseen, war was decided upon.

6. On July 12, 1914 (Bavarian Documents, No. 15), the Austrian ambassador at Berlin telegraphed: "Not only are His Majesty Emperor William and the high officials at the head of the government here firm in their fidelity to the alliance and in their support of Austria, but they most earnestly urge her not to allow the present opportunity to escape, but

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to act very energetically against Serbia, etc. . . .”

So there can be no doubt that, on that day, the decision to wage war was made in principle.

7. On July 13th, after the Sarajevo murder, Austria had ordered an investigation for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Serbian government was implicated in the crime. Here is the reply sent, on July 13, 1914 (Bavarian Documents, No. 17), by Austria's agent to his government:

“There is nothing to show the complicity of the Serbian government in directing the crime, preparing it, or furnishing arms, nor is such complicity to be presumed; on the contrary, there are signs which would seem to exclude such a hypothesis.”

Thus it is proved that on July 13th Austria, and, consequently, Germany, had been informed, by an Austrian agent who was an official investigator, of the absolute innocence of the Serbian government, and that, nevertheless, they persisted in the course which they had adopted.

8. Delivery of the ultimatum to Serbia, July 23, 1914.
9. July 25th. Satisfactory reply by Serbia. Reply by Austria. Rupture of diplomatic relations.
10. The Austrian ambassador at Berlin telegraphed to his government on July 25th:

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"I must remark that here it is generally considered that, should Serbia refuse, we shall answer by an immediate declaration of war, follow this up by military operations. Here any delay in carrying out military operations is looked upon as a serious danger in view of the possible intervention of other Powers. We are urgently advised to act at once and to confront the world with a *fait accompli*. I am entirely in agreement with this view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (Austrian Red Book, Vol. II, No. 32).

Hence, on July 25th, when the ultimatum had been sent to Serbia, an attempt was made to confront Europe with a *fait accompli*, in order to prevent interference by other Powers when the first steps should be taken to annihilate Serbia.

11. July 27, 1914 (Austrian telegram, Vol. II, No. 68) : "The State Secretary has told me plainly and strictly confidentially that soon proposals of mediation will be brought to the knowledge of Your Excellency by the German government. The German government declares in the most formal manner that it does not associate itself in the slightest with these proposals, that, on the other hand, it strenuously opposes that they be taken into consideration, and that it would not transmit them except in view of England's action" (Dispatch of the Austrian ambassador at Berlin to his government).

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So we see now how the comedy was prepared, on the 27th, before the staging of the drama. Germany is to content herself with forwarding some letters and, at the same time, she lets Austria know that no request that mediation be allowed has her support.

12. July 28th (German Documents, No. 293).

"After having gone over the Serbian answer, which I received this morning, I am convinced that, taken all in all, the desires of the Danube Monarchy have been complied with. The reservations made by Serbia on certain points can, in my estimation, be arranged through negotiations. But the humblest sort of capitulation is announced *orbi et urbi*, which causes all reason for war to vanish.

"Nevertheless, there is no reason for attributing to this scrap of paper and its contents more than a limited value so long as it remains untranslated into facts. The Serbs are Orientals and, consequently, liars, deceivers, and consummate masters in the employment of dilatory measures. . . .

"Of course, there is at present no longer any cause for war.

(Signed) "WILLIAM."

(Report to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg.)

This shows that as far back as July 13th it was known that the Serbian government was without guilt, on the evidence of an Austrian agent, for the crime of Sarajevo. On the

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26th the satisfactory answer of Serbia was known, and on the 28th the Kaiser declares that there is no longer any cause for war.

13. July 29th. The Tsar of Russia asked the German Emperor to have the question arbitrated by the Hague Tribunal. This elicited for reply nothing but an insulting and threatening dispatch, sent on July 30th to the Tsar.
14. The Austrian army had just concluded its grand maneuvers and opened war against Serbia, mobilizing eight army corps.
15. On July 29th, Russia, for self-protection, and giving proof, at the same time, of her desire for peace, mobilized four military zones and did so solely against the Austrian frontier, refraining from placing one solitary soldier on the German frontier.
16. July 29th. Germany, who was threatened by no danger from the above action, delivered an ultimatum to Russia—though not advising Austria in the slightest to be prudent—demanding that Russia demobilize, showing thereby that she wanted war and was creating a pretext for it.
17. In the night of July 29th–30th the Russian Tsar ordered restriction of mobilization.
18. July 29th, evening. Council at Potsdam; war was decided upon there.

Proof of this is furnished by the conversation which took place, after the council, between the British ambassador (who reported

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it to his government) and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, on that same night. Herr von Bethmann declared that Belgium would be restored, should it become necessary to invade her, that the territory of France would not be touched—but he remained silent as to the questions put by the ambassador regarding the French colonies. The British ambassador answered that Britain would not forego her freedom of action.

19. July 30th. While at St. Petersburg, the German ambassador and M. Sazonoff agreed; the latter dictated to the German ambassador a new formula for mediation, wherein he bound himself to stop Russia's preparations provided Austria stopped hers in Serbia. Herr von Jagow, having been apprised of this, objected to transmitting this request to Austria.
20. July 30th. At this very moment, one o'clock in the afternoon at Berlin, the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a semiofficial paper, published the order for German mobilization. The only way that this order could have been in the hands of the paper was because it had been handed to it the evening before, when mobilization had been decided upon at the council.

When the news was denied in the afternoon, it was already on its way to Vienna and St. Petersburg, and the dispatches which the Russian ambassador at Berlin wished to send in order to quiet his government were sent *via*

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Warsaw, in order that they might reach St. Petersburg as late as possible. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg admitted that these alarming rumors might greatly impress the Tsar.

21. M. Dumaine, French ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed from Vienna on July 30, 1914, the following: "The talk between the Russian ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs was conducted in an amicable tone and gave reason for believing that all chance for keeping the conflict localized had not been lost, when the news of German mobilization reached Vienna."

Which means that the said German mobilization made a most serious impression both at Vienna and at St. Petersburg, and it appears that the report of it was false.

There is evidence, moreover, that this mobilization had been prepared for July 30th, in the following dispatch (Austrian Documents, Vol. III, No. 34), sent by the Austrian ambassador at Berlin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna: "The military attaché, after a very important talk with the head of the German General Staff, has just sent Baron Conrad a telegram according to which Count Moltke urgently advises us to proceed to immediate general mobilization."

This exposes the triple game of Germany: to frighten St. Petersburg by a false piece of

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news, and, even more, by the German Emperor's imperious and threatening message of July 30th in the afternoon; to worry Vienna; to order general mobilization during the 30th at Vienna, making German mobilization seem to be imminent.

But all I have done so far is to get up a list of the political or diplomatic responsibilities of Germany. Let us turn now to her military responsibilities. Concerning them also I shall make a summary and take up events day by day.

THIRD SUMMARY

(Military Responsibilities of Germany)

July 21. Preliminary notice of mobilization to a certain number of classes of reservists (Yellow Book, 15).

July 24th. Secret announcement to Metz of covering instructions; installing of machine guns at various railway stations.

July 25th. Mobilization of the garrison of Metz; signing of victualing contracts by the authorities of Zabern; arming of frontier posts.

July 26th. Recall of the German fleet in Norway (Yellow Book, 58).

July 26th. Notice to four classes of reservists in Lorraine (Yellow Book, 59).

July 26th. Cutting down of trees, placing of guns, strengthening of barbed-wire entanglements, construction of battery emplacements.

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July 27th. Recall of German officers in Switzerland (Yellow Book, 60).

The above were only part of the preparations instituted from July 21st onward by Germany. Let us turn now to the mobilization measures:

1. July 28th. Austria, whose army had been taking part in grand maneuvers, mobilized partially.
2. Russia countered by a partial mobilization on the 29th, declaring that she was impelled by no warlike motives, and she did not mobilize on the German frontier.
3. July 29th, evening. Germany, without a word to Austria, who had mobilized first, sent a peremptory demand to Russia demanding that she demobilize, though Russia was not endangering her at all, and though, three days before, in view of the continued possibility of mobilization, Herr von Jagow said to M. Cambon that Russian mobilization, if directed solely against Austria, would not cause intervention by Germany.
4. July 29th, evening. Council at Potsdam, at which war was decided upon.
5. July 29th. The German government sent, through its representative in Brussels, an ultimatum to Belgium, drawn up July 26th, with orders not to open it except after special instructions.¹ This was the ultimatum delivered to Belgium, August 2d.

¹ German Documents, Nos. 375 and 376.

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6. July 30th. (See dispatch previously quoted.) Austrian general mobilization began in the evening, upon orders from Germany.
7. July 31st, at 1.30 P.M. Germany decreed the existence of the danger of war, which is equivalent to general mobilization, since each reservist is told what post he is to occupy.
8. On July 31st, despite Russian general mobilization, the Austrian government instructed its ambassador at St. Petersburg to continue negotiating with M. Sazonoff, and the Russian ambassador at Vienna discussed with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
9. August 1st. France mobilized. At 1.15 I countersigned the decree of mobilization, which was posted publicly at four o'clock. Thus, French mobilization came more than one day after the German declaration of the existence of the danger of war, which, in the eyes of all honest men, is the same as actual mobilization in Germany.
10. August 1st. Declaration of war against Russia.
11. August 3d. Declaration of war against France, based on the pretext that aviators had flown over Nuremberg. On the same day the municipality of Nuremberg protested against this false report on which the declaration of war against France was based.

There, then, is a summary which is self-sufficient and which, as may be noted, has been divided, so that it may be easy to read, into sec-

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tions arranged according to the date of the various happenings.

Really, Germany's system in discussion is too easy. She begins by alleging a policy of encirclement on the part of her rivals dating back twenty years. She levels her principal accusations for this against England. Then, she no longer has any eyes except for the game of mobilization, at the end of July and beginning of August, 1914.

Despite the fact that they have been proved but too often, we have made a point of drawing attention to these hasty and formidable mobilizations, and we have done so with the necessary proofs ready to hand, with German and Austrian documents as well.

Every whit of responsibility falls upon Germany and Austria.

But that is not all.

Who was it who forced Europe, throughout twenty years, to arm herself for defense, and who was it who took the initiative in armaments and increase of military forces? Why these actions, if not because war was desired?

Who was it who wished to strike the blow in 1913?—to say nothing of the aggressive acts of 1905, 1907, 1908?

Who was it who, in that month of July, 1914, when all might have been smoothed over in spite of Germany's actions, decided, in cold blood and criminally, not to transmit to Austria any proposal for conciliation; who, though aware that a Eu-

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ropean war would be unloosed, continued up to the last moment to increase the probabilities of war and incite passions, even by circulating false reports—in short, who was it that created the situation in which Europe found herself as far back as July 29, 1914?

From that day a fever born of natural causes, an increasing wave of excitement, a mortal anxiety, reigned over Europe.

By whose fault?

What could be thought, after Serbia had accepted the ultimatum, when diplomatic relations were broken off, war declared, all good will excluded?

For years the explosives had been prepared, each year the powder had been accumulated—close to these explosives a fire had been lighted, and fuel had constantly been added to it. Then, those who had lighted it drew away to one side and, when the explosion sowed terror to the remotest ends of the earth, he who had done the deed declared himself innocent! There, in a nutshell, is Germany's attitude.

To resume: There is no explanation for the attempt of 1913, frustrated by Italy, nor for the plan of invasion of the German General Staff.

What was to be expected, in 1914, from those who had hatched what had gone before?

There is no explanation why the Central Empires on July 13, 1914, when they had official proof, provided by one of their own agents, of the inno-

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cence of the Serbian government, continued on their way, unless it be assumed that they wished to bring on a war which they were aware would become general?

There is no way to explain why, on July 26th, the German Emperor, having declared that there was no longer any reason for war, in view of the Serbian reply, decided, on that same day, not to support any of the requests from the Entente tending toward mediation, whereby he fed the flames smoldering in Europe.

Finally, there is no way to explain why, on July 29th, the Tsar's suggestion that the Hague Tribunal be invoked, received no reply until July 31st, in the morning, when Russia, threatened by Austrian mobilization and Germany's formidable preparations, decreed mobilization, though appealing at the same time for peace. The Serbian question was riper and better adapted to equitable settlement than on the 26th—why, then, was it not studied and settled, and why was delay caused until July 31st—that is, until everything was upside down in Europe—before discussions were begun at Vienna?

Nor can one forget that, on that day, after the question had been referred to negotiations, despite all delays and misunderstandings, and war had thus been avoided, war was, nevertheless, desired and unloosed upon Europe by means of an outrageous combination of suppressions, machinations, falsifications, and outrages.

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At that moment the war began—not later. That is what the assembled nations realized when, after having studied the petition of the German delegation in 1919, and though they were still unacquainted with all the documents of the Austrian Red Book, the Bavarian Book, and particularly of the White Book, they handed down their verdict to the effect that “Germany should be held responsible for the war.”

CHAPTER XIV

“LAFAYETTE, WE'RE HERE!”

AT last, however, Destiny takes unto herself the lineaments of Justice. At last it seems as if the whole earth were rising up in revolt against such tyranny and injustice. All the nations not under the yoke fall in behind the soldiers of liberty, who, encouraged by the generous enthusiasm of America, are finally on the way to securing the welfare of the world.

Already the Emperor of Austria, the serf, and the King of Bulgaria, the valet, have thoughts of scuttling to cover at the very first premonitory signs of catastrophe. The iron hand of Germany, which drove the old Emperor of Austria to war, does not loosen its grip on the young Austrian monarch—he who has since died.

But ominous crumbling sounds announce to the German Emperor the weakness of his throne. Already he has sounded the good will of the Holy See in a ridiculous interview, which he narrates himself in his *Memoirs*. Already he has turned to America, and, after giving evasive answers to President Wilson, when the latter asked, in January, 1917, that the belligerents declare their war aims, he has been reduced to countering the honest replies of the Entente with a miserable and flat statement.

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He did not realize that, in so doing, he disconcerted the Chief Magistrate of America and the entire American people, lovers of frankness, who had remained unmoved by, and deaf to, the fantastic lures of Ambassador Bernstorff. Stupid German pride, as always; underestimation of human worth, ignorance of what an untrammled human will can do!

Can America cross the seas and defy the submarines, whose exploits the Kaiser, gloating over so many massacres, dares extol in his *Memoirs*? Can Wilson cause men to spring up? Can the pouring torrent of man power be fed from such distant affluents? After all—Wilson must be merely striking an attitude, making a gesture? That is what the Kaiser said to himself in 1917. Well, it was a gesture that Wilson's hand made, but—in that hand there was a sword!

The Kaiser and his government failed utterly to understand America, despite the fact that, among those inhabiting it, were millions of German subjects, emancipated by American laws, purified by the healthy air of freedom.

There are different ways of explaining this monstrous ignorance. At the beginning of the war, during the first days of August, 1914, Theodore Roosevelt, that noble and great soldier of the rights of humanity, the citizen of the universe, received, at his Oyster Bay home, a visit from an official of the German Embassy, who had traveled thither from Washington.

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"By order of His Majesty the German Emperor," said this official, "I have come here to recall to you that war has been declared. My master hopes that you will remember that you have been his guest."

The insolence of these words betrayed the soul of the parvenu who was sure of dominating the world.

Roosevelt replied, carelessly:

"Yes, my memory is faithful. I remember that I was the guest of His Majesty the Emperor. But I also remember that I was the guest of His Majesty the King of the Belgians."

Having received that slap, the German official departed.

Some years later the German Under-Secretary-of-State Zimmermann, joking with Ambassador Gerard, who had come (it was in 1917) to get his passports, said, "Five hundred thousand Germans, living in America, can cause you trouble."

"We have five hundred thousand lamp-posts to which we can hang them," answered the American, sure of his countrymen. And Ambassador Bernstorff added to the total of all these foolishnesses by his awkward acts.

This sort of anecdote does not suffice to explain the tremendous outburst of enthusiasm sweeping onward like a hurricane, from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and thence to Europe—nevertheless, such tales should be retained in the memory.

In 1917 I had the opportunity, side by side with

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Marshal Joffre, to witness the vast wave of enthusiasm which shook the American cities, whence arose a tumult of voices like the grim song of the legions of liberty. Was this due to some casual whim? When President Wilson was elected, America's entry into the war was far from being an item of the program. But the cruel duration of the war in Europe, the havoc which it caused even in the remotest lands, the sight of liberty being torn to pieces in its struggle against autocracy—all these things inspired in America that imperious question launched in December, 1916: "You have been fighting for three years. Why?"

The Allies answered, as is well known, by honest statements, repudiating all odious war aims. Germany, though, pretended not to understand, refused to answer, and shrank from entering into debate. From that moment judgment was passed upon her; it was she who had begun the war.

With incomprehensible blindness to realities Germany watched the evolution of the American soul.

Whence came, from the month of December, 1916, onward, spreading over the vast expanse of the American continent, that revolution of soul which caused the uprising of the civic cohorts of America, transformed so rapidly into battalions of combatants? Of course, the propaganda conducted by President Wilson was without an equal for daring and skill. And every time that he spoke, with his eyes fixed on the vast horizon of the world, he spoke in the pure and noble accents of democracy.

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Of course, from the very first days of the war, America had given us proof of her fraternal affection; she had sent some of her sons into the perils of war; she had succored our sons on the battle-fields. Never will anybody in France forget that magnificent outburst of generosity the memory of which breathes again in the history of every one of our campaigns. But the remoteness of the war, the effacing of the sounds of battle by distance, and particularly the tradition of political isolation incarnated by Washington and Monroe, kept many Americans—though not all of them—far from the fighting.

The main motive which brought America into the war was democracy—democracy, a living thing in England, a symbol of which France is the incarnation; democracy which means respect for civic rights which is the basis of the Italian constitution; democracy, that noble goal which all of us seek when we stand up in defense of our rights. All this was revealed clearly to Americans of all parties, Republicans as well as Democrats. Economic catastrophe, growing every day more menacing, was advancing upon the world. There was no power on earth which could answer for the solidarity of humanity. And, moreover, in that deadly duel in which blood was flowing in the holy cause in which Lafayette, DeGrasse, and Rochambeau had risen to greatness, who could be absent without turning a deaf ear to the voice of the world's conscience?

From the moment that America realized that the

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world's conscience was affected, that it might be struck down, that autocracy might stride forward to triumph, it was a foregone conclusion that she would rush into the battle. She understood, she rose, so that soon the vast ocean seemed no more than a river. "Tell the German ambassador to thank British honor and French honor when he has left our territorial waters." That was the farewell of Mr. Wilson to the German ambassador, conveyed to the latter by Robert Lansing, when he turned over to the ambassador his passports.

What infuriated America was the German government's refusal in 1916 to give a straightforward answer to the formal request addressed to the belligerents by Mr. Wilson. Distrust grew apace and it was even greater at the time of the armistice, when the Kaiser and his Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, tried to enter into discussions. It was borne in upon them that they were not wanted and they were compelled to betake themselves out of the way—not, however, until they had previously adhered to the famous Fourteen Points.

This adhesion, made insincerely by Germany, was merely a ruse. Germany thought that, during the days of the armistice, or at the opening of peace discussions, she might arouse differences among the Allies. In fact, the program of Mr. Wilson never bound anybody but the Allies and himself. And it may well be said that the peace treaty, in so far as it could, solving as it did insurmountable difficulties, applied the Wilsonian ideas.

The theory of mandates, that noble guardian-

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ship which rescued emancipated populations from the oppression of Germany in order to place them under the protection of the League of Nations, is an institution worthy of praise. I may add that the Germans, who in their accusations reproach Mr. Wilson and the Allies for not having applied the Fourteen Points to the Treaty of Versailles, are either deceiving themselves or mixing things up. There are principles contained in the speeches of Mr. Wilson—for instance, in his celebrated Mount Vernon speech—which are not to be found in the Fourteen Points, with which the Germans seek to mix them.

A war into which an entire nation rushed with all its courage aflame, fighting disinterestedly because its conscience so willed, was bound to change in its aspect. At last fate had been mastered! Well had they stood their ground, those first soldiers of 1914 and 1915, those soldiers who fought in mud and snow, who did not despair, who lent courage to all the world! To them should the thoughts of the survivors be consecrated!

This war illustrated the words of Tocqueville, who, because he had lived long in America, was better acquainted than the men of his day with the resources available to democracy.

“In a war,” he said, “between autocracy and democracy, democracy, if she does not succumb in the first shock of battle, will win the victory.”

What an admirable and just eulogy of that moral courage which breaks down the strength of the strong!

CHAPTER XV

THE ABDICATION

IN the month of July, 1918, the fourth anniversary of the implacable war was about to come, and the opposing armies, so disproportionate at the beginning, were vigorous, well armed, ready for battle. But—now the stakes were different. In 1914 France had held in her hands not only her own fate, but the fate of the world. No matter what might happen after the Marne, after the Yser, after Verdun, after the heroic recovery of 1918, after the formidable onrush of the Americans against the common enemy, the future, though still dark, was less terrible than it had been at the beginning of the war.

But Germany now stood on the brink of the pit which she herself had dug.

She could no longer count on winning victory by one final blow, nor on being lastingly favored by fortune. It was necessary for her to win advantage enough for obtaining a favorable armistice, followed by a “white” peace, leaving neither victor nor vanquished. If not this, there were left to her only two alternatives—to yield or to die.

The German army, on the terrible evening of July 14, 1918, plunged forward in an attack which

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was expected by the French high command and was received by the Allied armies in such fashion that it was smashed to pieces at the very outset. The German army was hurled back in confusion and terror, torn to pieces on the wire entanglements of the Allies, now fighting under a single command for a single purpose; the Germans were cowed by the havoc wrought by the infernal inventions which they had been the first to employ in a barbarous manner; and, little by little, the German army, scattered, fell back through France.

It was the end. The huge organism drew together, no longer able to fill the gaps in its ranks, and the German soldiers learned, while they retreated, that there was no army held in reserve, that they themselves were the only rampart protecting their crumbling country. Behind the army of combatants were desolation, devastated lands, the remote fatherland, innumerable villages traversed before by the light of conflagration voluntarily kindled, when those same soldiers were bent under the weight of the plunder that they were carrying.

At the Kaiser's headquarters everything suddenly became somber around the personage who had become, during the past few weeks, the prey of terror and of mortal anxiety, which had wrinkled his forehead and cheeks. Around that man, before whom all had bowed, that man who had expected to dominate the world, even the most faithful were beginning to waver, and misfortune, in the guise of tardy and incomplete retribution, was now be-

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ginning to close down upon this mediocre man, who had never realized what misfortune might do, who was incapable of enduring it.

The greatest of the German chiefs were shaken by what was befalling them; the storm wind of catastrophe blew from all quarters upon the helpless ship whose captain, unable to meet the tempest face to face, sought, with terror-stricken eyes, the light of the far-away beacon, the sheltered harbor, the lifeboats, safety in flight.

Then was when his qualities and virtues were to be put to the test—for it is by matching them against adversity that the characters of men are judged.

Germany was in revolt. Everything points to this; but, contrary to what is told by those who wish to preserve the German army's reputation, that army was exhausted, crushed, incapable of going farther, ready to surrender if the Allies had continued their efforts.

It was a case of complete collapse; army and nation were a prey to the same panic. Something must be done. The Emperor must adopt some course of action.

How well had Bismarck and the father of the Kaiser understood the character of "the young man full of tricks," the comedian, the man with the little brain, the mediocre actor!

Nothing is more pitiful than that part of his *Memoirs* where he explains the events bearing down upon him. What happened is well known.

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It is quite evident that the Kaiser must have been filled with surprise at having been of so little importance at the end of the drama, and at the fact that the scenery suddenly dropped down upon his head while he was still acting out the end of his part.

Around him anxious generals were no longer sure of their troops. These men, who had created and imposed upon others the terrible bonds of German discipline, gauged at a glance the state of mind, soon to develop into open revolt, among those soldiers, now sad and haggard, who to-morrow were to be wild with exasperation. And they told the Kaiser their thoughts.

"Ah, well, they are probably exaggerating," thinks the Kaiser, lost in a dream about a fortunate lull in the fighting, which will allow him to keep upon his brow, already almost livid, the tottering imperial crown.

But—what is this? A telephone call from Berlin! What is happening? Chancellor Prince Max of Baden is not sure of the man in the street; there are grumblings that seem to presage riots; the big cities are agitated; the storm is brewing. Confined to his bed by grippe, the provisional head of the country is leaving everything in the hands of subordinates. And then comes the message, "Abdication or revolution!"

These two sinister words fall upon the august ear of the Kaiser like a knell of death, in tragic alternation. The Kaiser is badly shaken.

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He talks of abdicating, of abdicating as Emperor while keeping the title of King of Prussia. Then he hesitates, walks up and down, agitated, nervous, even more unrecognizable now than before; pale, wan, hollow eyed, trembling beneath his ridiculous uniform.

Finally the German commanders declare that they cannot act, after having advised the Kaiser to return to Berlin.

“Return!” exclaims Berlin. “That means that all is over!” And as the Kaiser delays in answering, others take it upon themselves to tell him what his answer is to be. Just as he is leaving the table after a meal, he is informed that he has abdicated: the Chancellor has stolen a march on him. No longer even King of Prussia? No—neither Emperor nor King!

Never did human contempt so soundly and thoroughly slap the face of one who had been great the day before; who, incapable of giving up power of his own volition, sees it snatched from his trembling hands like a child’s toy.

He must go. It is midnight. He fixes his departure for next day, not for the morning, but for five o’clock that November day to forestall the pale light by which a mournful dawn might betray the fugitive.

Why tell the rest? He reaches the Dutch frontier in an automobile, is rudely challenged by a young Dutch sergeant, yields his sword to the officer in command of the frontier post.

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Thus ends his tragic adventure—not for the world, but for the man whose name will be heard, as long as there exists a conscience in the human race, amid the curses of the mothers of men. Though he played a certain rôle at the time of his accession to the throne, because of the imperious desire to reign that filled him, he played none at all when he fell; he was satisfied to fall heavily beneath the buffets of those surrounding him. Not for him was the rôle of the ship's captain who is the last to remain aboard his ship; William's rôle was that of the passenger who is carried away in a dead faint.

Never would one have believed that the Kaiser would have told what he does in his *Memoirs* about this succession of events. He complains of having been deceived by all, of having been deceived at Berlin by an ambitious Chancellor, deceived at the front; he complains that men whom he believed to be faithfully attached to his fortunes were in reality hypocritical emissaries of the Chancellor, who came to him to give him the kiss of Judas.

What a taste of life for a man who had known other men! To what were they to remain attached in those fateful hours, they who were the last survivors of this ephemeral splendor?

Men remain faithful to undeserved misfortune, but not to misfortune like that of William Hohenzollern! Men remain faithful to greatness, which, even crushed to the ground, retains its grim attraction—but what was the greatness of William?

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Men remain faithful to genius, whose radiance misfortune cannot at once eclipse, and which sets in glory like the sun—but where was the genius of William?

He had reigned, commanded, sent others to death, despised his fellow men, reduced man to the level where he found him? What had he to complain about? Why did he depart? The Kaiser explains that, being a Christian, he could not kill himself. Very well. Only religion forbids suicide. But the Kaiser might have died. Others, officers and soldiers, filled with much profounder piety and much higher ideals, fell in battle, their heads bared to Heaven, without the slightest thought of insulting Heaven by so dying. That haughty monarch was ignorant of history—or, if he had read it, what did he remember about it?

Bonaparte at Arcola, his face radiant with the promise of genius and the grace of youth, hurled himself into the midst of the enemy's fire. At Waterloo, with his scepter broken in pieces, he snatched up his sword and sought a soldier's death in the immortal ranks. Napoleon—William! May the shade of the great man forgive me for such a sacrilegious coupling of names!

In 1859, King Victor Emmanuel I, advancing to win his throne over the Austrian intrenchments, pushed aside the men of the First Zouaves who, filled with admiration by his reckless bravery, wished to protect him with their bodies. And, during the Great War, the aged King Peter of

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Serbia, driven from his throne, in the darkness of a night when all seemed over, went straight to his soldiers and said to them, "My children, I have come to die with you."

Did the Kaiser do anything like this? No, the Kaiser feared the enemy, whom he had always defied hundreds of kilometers in the rear, and he also feared his soldiers, who, he thought, might rise in revolt. In vain, certain carefully chosen men—as he tells in his *Memoirs*—came to acclaim him; he was well informed as to the state of mind of the army and knew full well how bitterly hostile toward him were its sentiments.

German officers of inferior rank, upon whom rested no responsibility, who happened to find themselves, in the course of the retreat, in the last villages close to the French frontier, having been insulted and degraded and spat upon by their soldiers, cowered in hiding in the rooms of French-women, whom they would not even salute one month before in their own houses. Pointing to the soldiers pouring through the streets, they begged for protection, with pale faces distorted by terror; to go out into the street meant, for them, to be assassinated. And he, the Kaiser, was thinking, doubtless, of what he said in 1891: "You belong to me body and soul, and if I should give you the order to fire upon your fathers and mothers you would obey me without a murmur!" And, doubtless, while he was thinking of that incitement to murder, he must have heard another voice borne on

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the wings of the tempest, crying, “Why not fire upon the Emperor?”

Shall we now discuss that part of the *Memoirs* in which, exalting his cowardice to the height of sacrifice, the Kaiser pretends to have deserted his post for the good of Germany and because he thought that, by doing so, less severe terms would be meted out to his country in the treaty of peace? Which means, if he speaks the truth, that he felt himself to be the one upon whom the main burden of guilt fell, and that he offered the ridiculous ransom of this precipitate departure into a gilded sojourn in foreign parts?

To declare war after having prepared it for years, to plunge the world into carnage, and then to hand in his resignation in order to avoid scandal, and—as we say in governmental circles—in order that the incident be closed—to do these things presupposes a degree of cynicism which might almost lead one to doubt the Kaiser’s sanity. However, at bottom, the Kaiser knows that there is nothing in what he says.

The Kaiser did not depart in order to obtain, by his accommodating flight, better treatment for his country. He had lost that country of his already, torn it to pieces and soaked it in blood, and he could no longer return to it. He departed because he had been driven from his country, because he had been driven away by his troops and by the entire world. He did not think that rigorous treatment such as was meted out in earlier times to illustrious

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men vanquished in war, even to the moment of their last agonies, could be imposed upon him, since he felt, doubtless, that their memory would be insulted by being thus brought into comparison with his.

Now he writes, groans, lies, places the blame upon others, denounces his coworkers and servants. And by so doing he has succeeded in making the rôle played by him even more contemptible.

Let him live, if living brings him joy! Let him taste, almost on the anniversary of the Kaiserin's death, the perverse joys of a senile betrothal!

The man belongs to History—let us leave History to complete her work.

CHAPTER XVI

AUTOCRACY—ANARCHY—DEMOCRACY

IN accumulating upon the head of the Kaiser the tremendous and merited burden of crimes committed, one must see to it that history is not deflected from its true course; that, amid the huge mass of personal guilt for the war, collective and general guilt be not forgotten.

We are not saying this for the purpose of keeping alive hatred at a time when the concentration of the entire virile strength of the world is necessary for its salvation—our task, indeed, is to carry out the mission of the future, clear the way. And if—as we believe—the world is to be regenerated, it is for us to determine the moral and material rôle which Germany, now lying prostrate, is to play some day in that regenerated universe.

The responsibilities for the war are not the same nor of the same degree; throughout Germany, there are strong elements which shared the moral and material leadership of the nation, but which, for a variety of reasons, are calling their share of the blame into question.

The capitalists, the men who had created a sort of commercial and industrial Pan-Germanism, stood around the Kaiser at the last moment. As

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they stand to-day, amid the misery of the German proletariat and the lower middle class, gazing upon their wealth placed in safety in foreign banks, they may say to themselves that they condemned their country to ruin and led it consciously to the downward path of war.

To aim at dominating the world by ruining it; to ruin it by distributing at low prices the products of German industrial activity; to recoup the losses occasioned by such sales by the high prices charged at home—all this is equivalent to condemning the mass of men not only to forced labor, but to a labor bound to bring them to impoverishment and bankruptcy. In fact, the more Germany produced (and how splendid were the pre-war statistics telling of the magnificent but illusory results achieved by her!) the more she lost in foreign countries whose competition she hoped to crush, in order that she might, after this competition had been killed or weakened, be the supreme ruler of a ruined world.

From this dream only two awakenings were possible: either Germany must hold firm until her competitors had been exterminated, whereupon she could take their place and raise prices; or else she must perish in her attempt, which she was bound to do if her rivals resisted, managed to survive, defended themselves—for instance, by raising against economic invasions the barrier of customs duties.

In 1913 the second alternative began to loom up as the more probable before the worried and far-seeing eyes of German manufacturers. From that

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day they set their gaze upon war—that is, upon easy and prompt victory, upon economic and colonial conquests, upon the seizure, doubtless, of our northern Africa, that jewel of the Mediterranean, and a formidable rival. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his talk with the British ambassador on July 29th, made himself the spokesman of German industrial interests. Of course, such seizures as those outlined above would have been the minimum.

Germany's position in the world was admirable. Commercially, she was colonizing countries by her banks and her business firms, even going so far as to lend a foreign appearance superficially to what was, in reality, something quite German, though hidden inside the offices of these German outposts. At the last moment capitalism at bay sought to save itself through war. That was the fateful moment. Capitalism, rallying to the support of the idea of waging war, advanced the hour of the militarists.

The latter had been ready fifty years and more. The dream of old Moltke had been to sow the seeds of permanent conflict between France and Germany, by seizing Alsace-Lorraine and making an open wound ; and since peaceful France, though forgetting nothing, demanded nothing and gave proof of her sound good sense, there was much to be done before war could be brought about.

So war plans were hatched ; murderous designs plotted ; discipline carried to extremes ; the army systematically increased from 1905 onward ; an

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entire network of railways built converging upon the French frontier; Luxemburg subjugated; Belgium condemned to death simply and solely because she existed; and an ultimatum launched on July 26, 1914, in cold blood, in the very midst of peace. But why recall what the world will not forget—that frightful irruption of the German soldiery?

This irruption was backed all through the last century, all through this century, ever since 1870, even after 1918, by the authority emanating from the German universities. If there is ferment in the barracks, if soldiers are conscious of having been born for battle, then it is the business of the nation to curb them. But in Germany it became the business of the universities to spur them on. Never before was any nation brought to ruin by such an outburst of savage hatred, of bestial frenzy, of cynical provocation. For the honor of the human mind, indeed, one must refrain from telling or reading the whole story over again.

German philosophy set about to justify violence and murder, provided they were committed collectively; it sought to condone violation of treaties, setting up a special code of morality, which poisoned an entire nation. Such was the terrible crime of that epoch of German history.

Social democracy did not play its rôle, that splendid rôle vouchsafed, by their very mission, to those aiming at leading the proletariat toward a peaceful and invigorating future. German Social

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Democracy should not be judged either on the day of war nor on the eve of war. It tolerated everything, acquiesced in everything, and, though buttressed with a press of its own, controlling hosts of ballots, swaying the vote of nearly four millions of Germans, it failed to see that the internal force of autocracy would destroy it—or, even though it saw, it was powerless to prevent it.

To be sure, now and then—the day after the Zabern affair, for instance—it protested, but it did not take up an impregnable position. Which explains why Kautsky, questioned in 1913 at Dresden by Jaurès, told the French Socialist, in order to leave him absolutely without illusions, “Do not count upon my comrades in case of an attack upon France.” And I have also heard an older and more ominous saying of old Bebel, uttered in 1904 at Amsterdam. Jaurès asked him what the good was of millions of votes piled up in ballot boxes, what use the German Socialists could make of these against an autocratic government thinking of leading them to war. Bebel replied, “The Kaiser is above classes.”

One’s country is above classes—but the Emperor . . . ! Bebel’s words show how the Germans deliberately acquiesced in their absorption by one man as something legitimate—nor was it absorption by a man risen from among themselves, but by a monarch imposed upon them! How could German Social Democracy reconcile this doctrine of political enslavement with the doctrine which it

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held, at the same time, of liberation of the economic world?

And now? No longer is the Kaiser above classes. And it is said that Scheidemann, Under-Secretary of State in 1918, announcing the Kaiser's abdication to the people, said—in words which I have not as yet been able to verify: "The German people has won all along the line; the old rottenness has fallen away of itself, the era of militarism is past, the Hohenzollerns have abdicated!" Which is all very well—but what is the result to be?

The treaty of peace was accepted by Germany, after nearly a year of debate, and she renewed this acceptance through the Reichstag vote of March 10, 1921. The treaty is severe, she says; and yet it does not impose upon the vanquished the costs of the war, though France had them imposed upon her in 1871; and, owing to this, profound financial and economic disorders still unsettle the Allied nations, crushed under the arrears of their debts.

What of the French occupation of the Rhineland? Well, for three years, forty-five of the French departments were occupied, nor did the German troops evacuate them until the war indemnity had been paid.

What of the indemnity exacted from Germany—is it not too heavy? I am not going to immerse myself in calculations, now that time has elapsed and the value of money has diminished, but it seems that, comparing the war of 1870 with the Great

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War in duration, scope, cruelty, and cost in men and material things, the five billion francs of 1870 are, proportionately, an enormous sum compared with the sums of to-day.

Moreover, have the Germans thought about the damage caused? Let us set aside the dead and speak only of things and of the living:

Ten French departments, representing, because of their industrial, mining, agricultural, and commercial wealth, one-half, or at least one-third, of the wealth of France, have been destroyed and pillaged. Even the very tools have been smashed; the very horses and cattle, the very garments of the inhabitants, have been carried away into Germany. When French soldiers, natives of this part of France—peasants, laborers, industrial workers, owners—returned to this region, what did they find?—nothing but a desert, nothing but death!—anarchy even among the ruins!

Germany ought to pay. She has systematically brought herself to ruin as a nation, organizing her own bankruptcy. During this time France, who had borrowed money for her defense, has borrowed money to rebuild herself. During four years she has spent, for Germany's account, 95 billion francs, on rebuilding her ruins and paying the pensions of her widows and crippled soldiers.

And what of the German soldier? He returned home to find his home untouched, the factory still standing, the fields unimpaired. It is France who pays!—though Germany is guilty and vanquished!

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It is impossible to look on at this spectacle with indifferent eyes.

The Allies presented humanity with the immense gift of millions of soldiers who overthrew autocracy. The ancient dream of disarmament comes every day nearer to reality, and we should be closer to its realization if Germany, tortured like a volcano, did not still wrap her plans in mystery; if she were not still subject, in her condition of uncertainty, to sudden convulsions.

The reparations demanded by history have been paid. Upon the ruins of autocracy, liberty has dawned for little nations. But security is lacking. France is calling for it; France who, as always, is hostile to conquests, to wars, to adventures. But all this cannot be brought about unless there be in Germany men who think and have the power to make others think.

Economically, the situation is still serious. The fall of the mark is a brutal fact. But one must not allow it to be said that this fall is a result of the treaty of peace, and I believe that even in Germany there are writers who admit this no more than we French do.

The day after the armistice and the day after the signing of the peace treaty the condition of the mark was quite different. What has happened?

First, there has been speculation in the mark; it has been purchased below its normal value with the idea of forcing it upward and closing such hazardous ventures by pocketing a profit. German finan-

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ciers, together with others in other countries, acted thus, and the result was terrible: the mark fell, and when its fall had definitely set in it was accelerated by the dumping on the world's money markets of depreciated marks which had been held back for profitable speculation.

And there is yet another reason: during the war Germany developed her industrial equipment, fortified her industries, which have lost nothing. Hence she had in hand big reserves, which we lacked, as did also the other nations attacked. Counting upon improvement of conditions and hoping to accelerate them by exports, Germany multiplied her exports. Resorting, as she had done in earlier years, to excessive dumping, Germany, already weak, has weakened herself more, just as a strong Germany would also have weakened herself. She dumped her products upon the world, leaving in foreign lands the money accruing from these operations. And, during this time, Germany, with no resources, unable to buy raw materials except under difficulties, suffering, like all of us, from the rise in the exchange, in the cost of materials, and in salaries, has become adversely affected by these very business operations of hers.

These then are the general causes of Germany's situation, which is evidently critical.

Germany should take counsel with herself. She should not seek the road to salvation through monarchical intrigues, which arouse popular anger, or

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by demagogic excesses, which inexorably lead to reaction.

What is the way out open to those Germans capable of action? What can they do, hemmed in between two perils? How are they to escape trouble from above and trouble from below?

Between the two extremes I, for my part, believe that German democracy may still be saved, provided German democrats realize that it is not enough to have the attributes of a republic, freedom of the press, universal suffrage, immense responsibilities, but that the proper democratic mentality is likewise necessary.

Germany wishes to live. We, too, wish her to live; we are helping her, we are seeking to draw closer to her in economic discussions, we are in favor of everything that will revive the useful and conciliating efforts of workers throughout that continent of Europe so often scourged by human pain.

But—the world also wishes to live, and in order that it may live it needs material reparations to which it is justly entitled. And, since the life of the world is based also on justice, no greater incentive to collective murder among nations could be provided for future generations than the scandalous spectacle of a war which remained an unpunished crime.

THE END

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